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A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is typically a set of wireless mobile nodes 
enabled to communicate dynamically in a multi-hop manner without any pre-
existing network infrastructure. MANETs have several unique characteristics in 
contrast to other typical networks, such as dynamic topology, intermittent 
connectivity, limited resources, and lack of physical security. Securing MANETs 
is a critical issue as these are vulnerable to many different attacks and failures and 
have no clear line of defence. To develop effective security services in MANETs, 
it is important to consider an appropriate trust infrastructure which is tailored to a 
given MANET and associated application. However, most of the proposed trust 
infrastructures do not to take the MANET application context into account. This 
may result in overly secure MANETs that incur an increase in performance and 
communication overheads due to possible unnecessary security measures.  
Designing and evaluating trust infrastructures for MANETs is very challenging. 
This stems from several pivotal overlapping aspects such as MANET constraints, 
application settings and performance. Also, there is a lack of practical approaches 
for assessing security in MANETs that take into account most of these aspects. 
Based on this, this thesis provides a methodological approach which consists of 
well-structured stages that allows the exploration of possible security alternatives 
and evaluates these alternatives against dimensions to selecting the best option. 
These dimensions include the operational level, security strength, performance, 
MANET contexts along with main security components in a form of a multi-
dimensional security conceptual framework. The methodology describes 
interdependencies among these dimensions, focusing specifically on the service 
operational level in the network. To explore these different possibilities, the 
Server-based Security Architectures for MANETs (SSAM) simulation model has 
been created in the OMNeT++ simulation language. The thesis describes the 
conceptualisation, implementation, verification and validation of SSAM, as well 
as experimentation approaches that use SSAM to support the methodology of this 
thesis. In addition, three different real cases scenarios (academic, emergency and 
military domains) are incorporated in this study to substantiate the feasibility of 
 
 ii
the proposed methodology. The outcome of this approach provides MANET 
developers with a strategy along with guidelines of how to consider the 
appropriate security infrastructure that satisfies the settings and requirements of 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Nowadays, as a result of remarkable advances in mobile computing and wireless 
communication technologies, mobile devices (e.g. smartphones, PDAs, tablets, 
laptops, etc.) are having a greater impact on many diverse applications in military, 
civil, heath and space domains. Consequently, a mobile ad hoc network 
(MANET), which offers a means of interconnection between wireless devices 
without a predefined infrastructure, has received a substantial attention by 
different communities. A new evolutional market is emerging which aims to 
deploy and run new network services through exploiting current mobile devices in 
order to access resources anywhere and anytime (Guarnera et al., 2002; Chlamtac 
et al., 2003), for example, in mobile gaming, live or on-demand multimedia 
streaming and video conferencing, etc. 
Although a MANET exhibits great potential, it has a number of challenging 
properties network- and application-wise. Network-wise, each node is able to join 
and leave the network freely, consequently this changes its topology frequently 
(Toh, 2001; Murthy and Manoj, 2004). In addition, the nature of its resources is 
constrained, as the majority of its nodes are low-end devices normally powered by 
a battery. Also most types of MANETs exploit the current wireless technologies 
(e.g. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and IrDA) that already operate with limited bandwidth and 
intermittent communications (Chlamtac et al., 2003). Application-wise, a 
MANET may be utilised for running particular applications which have different 
settings and requirements. For example, an application may use MANETs for 
spontaneous communication, i.e. no prior relationship between nodes, or for 
planned communication. Furthermore, a MANET may operate for short time or 
long time period according to application time requirements (Hoeper and Gong, 
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2004; Dawoud et al., 2011). Hence, the demand of an application will shape the 
complexity and cost of a MANET initialisation, operation, and management. 
Furthermore, securing a MANET is very important but at the same time very 
problematic, due to the fact that this network, unlike other typical networks, is 
vulnerable to different attacks and also it is characterised with no clear line of 
defence (Yang et al., 2004; Djenouri et al., 2005; Carvalho, 2008). This is as a 
result of the open wireless medium used and a number of specific constraints in its 
properties, for example the limitation in resources capability, the lack of physical 
protection, and the variances in security requirements of MANET applications. 
Trust is a very important term which most security solutions (e.g. authentication, 
authorisation, confidentiality, etc.) rely on in their deployment. In fact, in the 
literature (Zhou and Has (1999), Yi et al. (2003), Bechler et al. (2004), Luo et al.  
(2004), Ngai and Lyu (2004), Hadjichristofi et al. (2005), Luo et al. (2005) 
Rachedi et al. (2006, 2007), Raghani et al. (2006), Dong et al. (2007), Omar et al. 
(2007), Wu et al. (2007), Saremi et al. (2009), Al-Bayatti et al. (2009) and Larafa 
and Lauren (2011)) particularly there are various credential-based authoritarian 
trust models whose mission is to describe how to manage trust relationship 
between entities by an authority using a particular credential (e.g. certificates). 
This stems from the fact that relying on an authority can guarantee securing high-
value communications with high confidence, particularly in large-scale networks 
as every node in the network should have a strong trust on the authority for 
handling their security matters. For this reason, to develop effective security 
services in MANETs, initially it is imperative to select the proper trust 
infrastructure which is tailored to the context of MANETs in question. This 
context consists of MANET characteristics and application requirements. 
Conversely, it may be argued that any security solution for MANETs is not the 
overall story. Improving security strength in MANETs would definitely incur an 
increase in computation, communication, and management overhead due to 
additional functionalities that must be implemented for supporting security. 
Therefore, network performance, in the sense of scalability, service availability, 
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robustness of the security solutions, becomes an important factor in resource-
constrained MANETs. While many existing proposals focus on the cryptographic 
perspective of their security solutions, they ignore unintentionally the 
consideration of the network performance factor (Yang et al., 2004). Hence, it is 
important that both dimensions of security strength and network performance 
should be equally taken into account for better security design of MANETs and 
this can be achieved by making an appropriate trade-off between them. 
In addition, the design paradigm of MANETs should arguably follow the 
standard layer-based stack – the OSI (ISO/IEC 7498-1) model which leverages the 
strict protocol-layer separation and horizontal interaction so as to facilitate the 
MANET development and deployment by supporting modularity, flexibility, 
simplicity and interoperation in networking system design. Some design proposals 
show a compliance with the OSI model for tackling MANET security, such as Yu 
et al. (2003),  Yang et al. (2004) and Sehgal et al. (2011). However, other design 
approaches have been proposed, sacrificing flexibility and interoperation aspects, 
for example,  a vertical layer integration approach in Corson et al. (1999)  and a 
cross-layer design approach in Conti et al. (2004) and Messerges et al. (2003). 
Hence, the aspect of having a layered design (i.e. operational levels called in this 
study) is vital for a MANET design as each layer has its own different activities 
and issues (e.g. security, performance, routing, etc.) which can be tackled 
independently and effectively during the MANET development. 
Therefore, developing an effective and efficient security solution (especially in 
the domain of security/trust infrastructure) for MANETs is not a trivial issue. This 
is because there are several dimensions (i.e. levels, strength, performance and 
constraints) which have a significant impact on the security design of MANETs. 
Few works have addressed some of these issues. For example, in Balakrishnan 
and Varadharajan (2005), three dimensions were identified and must be taken into 
consideration when securing MANETs: cryptography, resources and behavioural 
trust. On the other hand, most published studies in MANET security have only 
focused on routing and networking security (Cho et al., 2011) while overlooking 
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security design in transport and application layers (i.e. representing the service 
level where a client-server model is predominant). Only Martucci et al. (2004) 
and Aljnidi and Leneutre (2007) have focused on the application layer for their 
security solution. Overall, it appears that few publications, if any, attempt to adopt 
a balanced view of MANET that reflects an operational level, security, 
performance and aspects of a given application along with MANET capabilities. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the security alternatives need more scrutiny 
along with those pivotal overlapping factors discussed before (e.g. security 
strength, performance and the contexts of MANET constraints and application 
settings), especially in the service level of MANETs. Accordingly, this study is 
dedicated to presenting an exhaustive evaluation for different authority-server-
based security architectures for large-scale MANETs which are primarily 
composed of a specific server architecture and authentication protocol, 
cryptosystem, and security credential. The outcome of this multi-dimensional 
evaluation, which mainly consists of a set of indicators and recommendations, has 
the potential to enable a systematic approach to sensibly choose a security 
architecture under a certain context of constraints and settings. This approach can 
assist MANET developers to come up with pragmatic solutions for security 
problems in MANETs. 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
The previous section has underlined that there is a number of different aspects 
which have influence on implementing a security/trust infrastructure in the service 
level of large-scale MANETs. Selecting a security solution for a given MANET 
often requires an insight into the trade-offs between different aspects which are 
security strength, performance and context. Therefore, the main aim of this 
research is: 
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“To develop a methodological approach that enables MANET developers to select 
the best appropriate server-based security architectures that satisfy the security, 
performance and context requirements of a given application” 
To fulfil the aim of this study, the following five objectives will be met.  
Objective 1: Conduct a literature review to evaluate the current and most 
common security fundamentals and authoritarian trust models in 
the MANET domain to highlight their capabilities, requirements 
and limitations which will be a cornerstone for developing the 
proposed approach in the aim of this study. 
 
Objective 2: Design a conceptual security framework for identifying the 
building blocks of the proposed approach of this study: the 
security operational level design; the security/trust infrastructure; 
security strength; performance; context and addressing the 
relationship between them as well as establishing this approach. 
Objective 3: Design a new security model of server-based security 
architectures for MANETs (SSAM), based on the components of 
the security/trust infrastructure for the service level of MANETs 
and also for checking the applicability of the proposed approach 
designed in pervious objectives. 
Objective 4: Develop a simulation model for the proposed server-based 
security architectures for MANETs (SSAM) and experimentally 
test them under different scenarios using a network simulator in 
order to understand the cost of applying them on the performance 
and communication of MANETs, i.e. to create a performance 
evaluation model. 
Objective 5: Develop the proposed approach based on the results collected 
from the simulation experiments from the previous objective and 
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the consideration of the other security strength and context 
requirements.  
Objective 6: Evaluate the proposed approach through the use of real case 
scenarios so as to demonstrate and validate the benefits and value 
of the approach. 
 
1.3 Research Approach 
The general theme of this research clearly abides by the experimental simulation 
approach (Balci, 1990; Law and McComas, 1991; Balci, 1994; Nance, 1994) 
which required the SSAM model to be evaluated in terms of the performance and 
communication using the OMNeT++ simulation tool. The results generated from 
this experimentation would be used in validating the proposed approach of 
selecting appropriate security alternatives in this study, based on different criteria 
(security strength, performance, etc.). Therefore, the simulation appeared to be a 
suitable scientific methodology for conducting this research. 
For successful and credible research outcomes, the simulation methodology is 
divided into three main stages, (1) the problem definition, (2) the model 
development and (2) decision support stages. In each stage, a simulation study 
typically has distinct processes that are required to be performed in order to reach 
the various phases within the stage, as shown in Figure 3-2. The identified 
problem, system boundaries and objectives phases are formulated in the problem 
definition stage. The model development stage presents how the simulation model 
will be evolved through different phases, conceptual, communicative, 
programmed and experimental models and model results (generated from 
simulation experimentation). In decision support stages, the results from the 
previous stage will be incorporated to support decision. Chapter 3 explains this 
approach in more detail.  
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1.4 Terminology  
For avoiding ambiguity, three terms which are used in this thesis extensively are 
important to be defined and described as follows:   
1- The multi-dimensional security framework: This framework is defined as a 
conceptual structure of a security/trust infrastructure (i.e. security building 
blocks) for MANETs and its vital dimensions (i.e. operational levels, security 
strength, performance, MANET contexts). The framework is introduced to 
serve as a guide for the designing of better security/trust infrastructures for a 
security service over MANETs taking into consideration these proposed 
dimensions. 
2- The methodological, systematic or pragmatic approach (“Methodology”): 
this methodology is defined in this thesis as a set of well-structured steps 
which are necessary to follow in order to effectively evaluate security 
alternatives in MANETs and then find the most appropriate ones which fulfils 
particular requirements. Simulation experimentation along with a decision 
making technique is used in the evaluation and selection of those alternatives. 
However, the security alternatives in this context indicate the security/trust 
infrastructures for MANETs (i.e. the SSAM model) which are already 
represented in the framework defined before. Also, the dimensions in this 
framework are incorporated in this methodology to establish the requirements 
for sake of evaluation. 
3- The security architecture: this architecture presented in the SSAM model is 
defined as an initial and incomplete design of the security infrastructure for 
deploying a security service in MANETs. The architecture is intended to 
describe the types of security servers and authentication protocols and the 
strategies of calling and re-authentication which are in use. 
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) showed the 
research motivation, clarified the aim and objectives of this research, the research 
approach being adopted and finally the thesis structure. 
Chapter 2: This chapter provides a literature review of the related topics that are 
the knowledge body of this research. It begins to present the MANET evolvement, 
their unique characteristics and potential applications. Also it outlines most 
common MANET challenges that need to be investigated. Thereafter, most 
MANET-related security fundamentals, which may be incorporated in the 
proposed security approach of this study, are identified, such as security 
requirements, MANET threats and attacks, and relevant security mechanisms. 
Finally, the notion of trust management and the current related trust models in 
MANETs are discussed. This chapter is to establish grounding to the proposed 
approach through characterising a number of elements, such as distinct MANET 
attributes, MANET security and trust infrastructures. 
Chapter 3: This chapter discusses the research methodology followed in this 
thesis. It starts with an outline of the overall research approach for this research. 
Thereafter, the chapter sheds light on the simulation technique and its 
experimental approach which are used to conduct performance and 
communication testing for the SSAM model. Three different stages of the 
simulation approach are illustrated along with how these stages are applicable to 
this study: the problem definition, the model development and the decision 
support. In addition, the verification validation and testing techniques (VV&T) are 
identified and used in the simulation approach of this research to establish its 
credibility.  
Chapter 4: This chapter consists of two parts (Part A and B). Part A mainly 
presents the conceptual security framework for MANETs which leverages various 
and crucial security-design-related facets as to support designing and developing a 
trust/security infrastructure in MANET (i.e. an operational level, security 
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components, security strength, performance, the context of MANET constraints 
and application settings). The aim is to introduce a methodological approach 
which would assist a MANET security developer to come up with an effective 
security solution for a certain MANET context. Part B describes the proposed 
security model (SSAM) with its components (i.e. a server architecture, an 
authentication protocol, a cryptosystem, a security credential, a strategy of calling, 
and MANET settings). Also, it presents in detail the model design of SSAM 
activities, communications and processes. The SSAM model is intended to 
provide a new security design for MANETs in the service operational level and to 
prove the feasibility of the suggested multi-dimensional approach generated from 
the framework proposed in Part A. 
Chapter 5: Along with the proposed model assumptions, this chapter presents the 
implementation and experimentation of the SSAM model being designed in 
Chapter 4. The OMNeT++ simulation tool is chosen for creating the SSAM 
prototype. This prototype relies on defining the necessary network and node 
structures and creating the related C++ classes. Furthermore, all important 
configurations and initialisations for this prototype are systematically addressed in 
order to appropriately conduct performance testing. There are two particular types 
of configurations that are elaborated in this chapter, the security and network 
configurations for SSAM. The security configurations are related to the SSAM 
server architecture, massage sizes in different authentication protocols, processing 
time in authentication process and the re-authentication scheme being used. The 
network configurations refer to various related MANET components, such as 
mobility, traffic, churn models, and transport, routing and MAC protocols.  
Eventually, the experimental design for running SSAM simulation is described 
through determining the necessary metrics, the test cases and the number of 
replications for simulation. 
Chapter 6: This chapter initially presents the analysis of quantitative results 
produced from testing the performance and communication of the proposed 
security architectures in SSAM under different network scenarios (i.e. the Churn 
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and No-Churn scenarios). The strength of each security architecture in SSAM is 
analysed against particular server-related security problems (i.e. Single-Point-of-
Failure (SPF) and Single-Point-of-Compromise (SPC)) and protocol robustness. 
The outcome of the analysis represents three different dimensions, such as 
performance, communication (i.e. MANET constraints) and security strength. 
This is incorporated in the proposed approach (i.e. methodology) of this study. As 
a result, this approach is applied in the context of the SSAM mode for validation 
purposes. As part of the evaluation stage in this approach, a simple ranking 
system, which is based on achievement scoring, reciprocal ranking weighting 
(RRW) and weighted averaging, is proposed to facilitate ranking the security 
alternatives. The value of this proposed evaluation approach is justified by 
employing this approach to three different real case scenarios (academic, 
emergency and military contexts). 
Chapter 7: This chapter concludes by recapping the whole work done in this 
research and describing the thesis contributions and the main limitations of this 
work. It also suggests the future directions of research to complement this work. 
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Chapter 2:  MANETs and Security 
Background 
2.1 Overview 
As explained in the previous chapter about the road map of this thesis, the main 
purpose of this chapter is essentially to introduce the common reviewed topics 
associated with MANETs and security in MANETs. On one hand, it covers the 
MANET definition and history, unique MANET characteristics, MANET 
application domains and MANET current challenges. On the other hand, it also 
addresses the security background relevant to this MANET research and mainly 
includes security requirements, cryptographic mechanisms, trust management and 
the related credential-based trust models. Eventually, this chapter attempts to clear 
up the vital fundamentals of MANETs and security issues. These can be exploited 
to create a better understanding of some keystones that are required to be 
considered for developing this study proposed approach of planning and designing 
security service in MANETs. 
2.2 Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) 
This section introduces MANETs: definition; history; characteristics; applications, 
challenges. A definition and history of MANETs are briefly presented. The 
MANET characteristics with their relevant sub-attributes are described in detail. 
In addition, in this section, the various application domains that can utilise 
MANET capabilities are discussed and then MANET challenges are highlighted.  
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2.2.1  Definition and History 
In fact, the ad hoc networking paradigm is considered one of the most attractive as 
well as challenging paradigms in the networks development. As shown in Figure 
2-1, a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is defined as a self-organised network 
which consists of a set of wireless mobile nodes enabled to communicate 
dynamically on the fly in multi-hop manner without any pre-existing network 
infrastructure (infrastructure-less) (Chlamtac et al., 2003). Unlike cellular 
networks and WLANs, each node has two roles simultaneously; it becomes a 
router to handle packet to other nodes and an application node (i.e. a user or 
service provider) to handle its own communication (Toh, 2001; Chlamtac et al., 
2003; Murthy and Manoj, 2004). Therefore the nodes communicate directly with 
each other without any intermediate body. Each node can also join and leave the 
network at any time.   
 
Figure  2-1: The Mobile Ad hoc Network - MANET 
Historically the first ad hoc network was coined in tactical network 
applications in order to improve battlefield communications survivability. In 1972 
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PRNET (Packet Radio Networks) under the DARPA project was developed by 
US Department of Defence aiming to provide effective packet-switched multi-hop 
networking (i.e. bandwidth sharing and store-and-forward routing) to mobile 
battlefield elements like soldiers, tanks, aircrafts in a hostile environment without 
relying on any fixed infrastructure and central control. PRNET basically relied on 
the combination of ALOHA and CSMA channel access protocols so as to support 
the dynamic sharing of the broadcast radio channel. In addition, to avoid limited 
radio coverage, it used distance-vector routing protocols to facilitate multi-user 
interconnection.  
A few years later in 1983, Survivable Radio Networks (SURAN) came out as a 
new version of PRNET, which had significant improvements to the issues of 
network scalability, security, capacities and power management. Its goals were to 
devise network algorithms to boost a network that could use small, low-cost and 
light-energy radios for interconnection, scale well to thousands of nodes (using 
hierarchical link-state routing protocols) and have resilience to electronic attacks 
(Freebersyser and Leiner, 2001).  
Almost a decade later, the notion of commercial ad-hoc networks began to gain 
more attention with the advent and widespread popularity of notebook computers 
and other new viable wireless communication technologies (e.g. IrDA, RF etc.). 
The IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) working group adopted 
the term ‘Ad Hoc’ for such networks and have them in its standardisation 
initiatives. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) started 
standardisation of the High Performance Radio Local Area Network/1 
(HIPERLAN/1) which utilises ad hoc networking in its architecture. Meanwhile 
the US Department of Defence funded other projects related to Ad Hoc networks, 
including the Global Mobile Information Systems (GloMo) and Near-Term 
Digital Radio (NTDR). GloMo was developed to use an Ethernet-based 
technology to offer a multimedia connectivity any anywhere and anytime in 
handheld devices while NTDR was based on a self-organised two-tier ad-hoc 
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network which made use of clustering and link-state routing (Ramanathan and 
Redi, 2002).  
From the mid 1990’s, ETSI released the first edition of the HIPERLAN//1 
standard (Halls, 1994) and then the HIPERLAN//2 standard in following couple 
of years  (Khun-Jush et al., 2000). The IEEE 802.11 subcommittee brought to 
light its first standard, IEEE 802.11 (IEEE), a medium access protocol that was 
based on collision avoidance and tolerated hidden terminals, enabling to create a 
mobile ad hoc network prototypes from notebooks fitted with 802.11 PCMCIA 
cards. The following standards, IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11b IEEE 802.11g 
were the successors of this standard. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
founded the MANET charter (MANET, 2012) aiming to investigate and 
standardise routing protocols for ad hoc networks. As results of these efforts, a 
number of reactive and proactive routing protocols (e.g. AODV, DSR, and OLSR 
etc.) have been developed. The Bluetooth technology became also recognisable as 
an example of exploiting ad hoc networking in building Personal Local Networks 
(PAN). The Bluetooth special interest group released standard v. 1.0 in 1999. 
Furthermore, Bluetooth standardisation started to be carried out in close 
collaboration with the IEEE 802.15 PAN working group, leading to the release of 
the IEEE 802.15.1 standard based on the Bluetooth specification v. 1.1 in 2002. 
It appears that on-going research in MANET technology is moving towards the 
standardisation of different existing systems with different network controls in a 
unified application framework. It is also noticeable that wireless devices are 
becoming smaller, smarter and more affordable. General-purpose MANETs 
therefore offer organisations a low-cost way to keep these devices connected 
thereby increasing MANET demand. 
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2.2.2  MANET Characteristics 
 MANETs as perceived from the MANET definition and their history stated in 
pervious section, have several exceptional characteristics MANETs in contrast to 
other typical networks. In this thesis for the sake of simplicity, the MANET 
characteristics are sorted into two main classes, the network- and node-related 
attributes. Each main class has its key attributes and their following sub-attributes 
which contribute to their key ones as shown in Figure 2.1. The network-related 
ones features that are pertinent to the system structure of MANETs whereas the 
node-related ones indicate to physical capabilities of their nodes. Each is now 
described below.  
 










































Chapter 2: MANETs and Security Background  
 
Salaheddin Darwish 16
2.2.2.1 Network-related Attributes  
In the context of MANETs, this section discusses the main attributes of a 
networking system along with the relevant sub-attributes which contribute to the 
key ones. These attributes primarily involve most aspects of the medium 
technology, interconnection infrastructure, and network topology. 
1. Self-organisation (Infrastructure-less-ness)  
MANETs have been developed originally to suit given applications in particular 
circumstances where installing a long-term infrastructure is not feasible, for 
example, in battlefields or search-and-rescue missions. Therefore, the self-
organisation attribute fundamentally stems from the fact that MANETs 
presumably do not depend on any pre-defined infrastructure or centralised 
administration (e.g. central servers, base stations, fixed routers etc.) for operation 
and also in most cases they could spontaneously be deployed with no a priori 
knowledge of the physical location and networking environment. On the other 
hand, for self-maintenance and alleviating network disconnection, MANETs 
exploit a unique pattern of cooperative interconnection using multi-hop routing 
between network nodes. In other words, each node normally acts as an 
independent router to relay other nodes messages and at the same time act as a 
host to make use of available network services (Chlamtac et al., 2003; Djenouri et 
al., 2005; Savola and Uusitalo, 2006).  
2. Wireless  
MANETs primarily rely on the open shared wireless medium to link their nodes. 
Wireless links usually have a lower bandwidth compared to wire-line counterparts 
thanks to a number of wireless phenomena for example noise, fading, interference 
and congestion. As  MANETs make use of current wireless technologies (e.g. Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth etc.) which already have problems (e.g. unreliability, low capacity 
and a short range), they will apparently inherit those problems in addition to their 
own ones. On the other side, MANETs are typically characterised by very much 
more restricted bandwidth than other similar wireless technologies like cellular 
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networks or WLANs. That stems from the dual role for each node to perform (i.e. 
an access point and host) which may reduce the link capacities for interconnection 
in MANETs (Corson and Macker, 1999; Yang et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2006).   
Furthermore, another reason of constraining the bandwidth of MANETs is that 
MANETs may occasionally operate in heterogeneous wireless environments 
where each node may have one or more radio interfaces that consist of different 
transmission/receiving capabilities and work across different frequency bands. 
This heterogeneity in node radio capacities can bring on asymmetric links which 
in turn lead to varying bandwidth-delay characteristics (Corson et al., 1999; 
Chlamtac et al., 2003). 
3. Dynamic Topology  
As the MANET nodes have wireless connectivity and mostly mobilise according 
to a certain mobility patterns (e.g. random human walk, vehicles mobility and 
etc.), these features allow nodes to freely roam and easily join, and leave the 
network, i.e. have specific joining and churn rates. As a result, the unreliable 
wireless links between nodes render unintentionally intermittent. Eventually, the 
network topology, changes arbitrarily and frequently. This makes the network 
unpredictable and amorphous i.e. changeable structure about both its size and 
shape (Corson et al., 1999; Corson and Macker, 1999; Djenouri et al., 2005).   
2.2.2.2 Node-related Attributes 
This section presents details of the attributes and their sub-attributes that are 
associated with capabilities of nodes participating in MANETs. It is noted that 
there are two important and critical attributes which need to be addressed in 
MANETs regard: stringent heterogeneous resources; poor physical security. 
1. Stringent heterogeneous resources 
Almost all MANET nodes are small, mobile and handheld devices for example 
smartphones, PDAs, etc. They often are powered by batteries and this makes them 
have a constraint in their power resources (i.e. limited energy). Besides, MANET 
Chapter 2: MANETs and Security Background  
 
Salaheddin Darwish 18
nodes in particular experience an exceptional energy challenge when compared to 
conventional wireless networks such as WLAN, etc. This is due to that fact that, 
as aforementioned, each node is assumed to act as both an end system and a router 
concurrently so additional energy is required to handle packets routing to other 
nodes (Chlamtac et al., 2003; Djenouri et al., 2005; Chadha and Kant, 2008).   
On the other hand, MANETs predominantly make use of various embedded 
and off-the-shelf wireless devices and such flexible usage entail heterogeneity in 
processing and storage capabilities as each of those devices have their own 
different software/hardware specifications. Also, their processing and storage 
capacities are normally considered restricted for sake of saving power (e.g. using 
small CPU and memory resources) since most of those devices rely on limited 
batteries (Chlamtac et al., 2003; Djenouri et al., 2005; Savola and Uusitalo, 2006; 
Merwe et al., 2007; Chadha and Kant, 2008).   
2.  Limited physical security 
Contrary to conventional wired networks, the use of wireless communication and 
lightweight and portable devices in MANETs implies poor physical security and 
serious security vulnerabilities. Those devices and the information stored in them 
can be easily physically compromised by either loss or theft. On the other side, 
wireless medium and cooperative nature in this type of networks also enable 
adversaries to take advantages to intercept the flow of information over the air and 
perform any number of tests and analysis in order to lunch attacks for example 
spoofing, eavesdropping and denial-of-service (Corson et al., 1999; Scott et al., 
2006; Merwe et al., 2007). 
To conclude, MANETs reveal how unique, diverse and challenging 
characteristics they possess. It is worth pointing out that in order to take 
advantages of most MANET potentials, those characteristics are therefore 
required to be taken into consideration when tackling any issues related to 
MANETs for example, security, performance, Quality of Services (QoS) and 
application deployment and implementation. 
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2.2.3  MANET Applications 
While the first MANET applications and deployments have been in the tactical 
domain, non-military applications have also started to spread considerably since 
then. Particularly in the past few years, as a result of the flourish of new mobile 
devices as well as rapid advances in wireless communication, MANETs have 
gained a substantial attention and interests from commercial industry, as well as 
the standards community (Sarkar et al., 2007). Correspondingly having new 
technologies such as Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11 and HYPERLAN greatly drives the 
deployment of MANET technology away from the military domain, and new ad 
hoc networking applications are beginning to emerge in specialised fields for 
example space, health-care, emergency services, disaster recovery and 
environment monitoring. This is owing to the fact that mobile ad hoc networking 
can be deployed anywhere where there is no support of a fixed infrastructure for 
communication or the existing infrastructure is not cost-effective to utilise. 
Furthermore, the MANET flexibility and its capabilities enable this technology 
to suit diverse applications ranging from large-scale, mobile, highly dynamic 
networks, to small, static networks that are restricted by power sources for 
example, in personal area networking, home networking, law enforcement 
operation, search-and-rescue operations, commercial and educational applications 
(Jun-Zhao, 2001; Guarnera et al., 2002; Chlamtac et al., 2003; Hoeper and Gong, 
2004). Table 2-1 presents some categories of current and possible future real 
scenarios for MANETs, as well as the services they may provide in each domain. 
DOMAIN APPLICATION DESCRIPTIONS/SERVICES 
Military Tactical Networks 
 Communication in army operations. 
 Automated battlefields. 
 Emergency & Health 
Care Services  
 Search and rescue operations, as well as 
disaster recovery; e.g. - early retrieval and 
transmission of patients.  








 An alternative to replace a fixed 
infrastructure in case of earthquakes, 
hurricanes, fire etc. 
 Monitoring patients.  
Transportations & 
Vehicles  
 Broadcast of news, road condition, weather, 
and music.  
 A local ad hoc network with adjacent 
vehicles for road/accident guidance.  
 Advertising location specific service, like 
petrol stations. 
  Particular services for providing a travel 
guide for vehicles on the street.   
Commercial & 
Business Services  
    
 E-Commerce: e.g. - Electronic payments 
from anywhere (i.e. taxi). 
  To provide dynamic access to customer files 
stored in a central server on the fly.     
 To offer consistent databases for all agents. 
 Shared Email and internet Gateways.  
Education  & Academia 
 To facilitate setting up e-class or e-
conference (e.g. video conferencing).  
 To establish ad hoc communication during 
conferences, meetings, or lectures taking 
place in the same area (e.g. spreading hand-
outs). 
 To offer an extra way for student to get 
access to certain services offered by 
university (e.g. internet and email gateway) 
or interact with other available e-learning 
applications like student study profiles, 
enrolment, etc.    




 Multi-user games 
 Robotic pets 
 Outdoor Internet access 
Home and Workplace 
 
 Smart homes for controlling different 
appliances.  
 Home/Office Wireless Networking (WLAN), 
e.g. - shared whiteboard application; use 
printing facilities anywhere.  
 Personal Area Networks (PANs). 
Space Space missions  
 Control of unmanned robots.    
 Spaceship, shuttle and satellite 
communications.  
Nature Sensor Networks 
(Akyildiz et al., 2002) 
 Environmental applications include tracing 
the activities of animals (e.g. birds and 
insects), chemical/ biological detection, 
vegetation etc. 
 Tracking data highly correlated in time and 
space, e.g. - remote sensors for weather, 
earth activities and disasters.  
Table  2-1 : MANETs Application Domains  
2.2.4  MANET Challenges (Research Areas): 
The unique properties and constraints of MANETs as well as the variety of its 
applications as discussed above, presents several crucial challenges to MANET 
design and deployment that must be addressed to fully harvest MANET benefits. 
These challenges however instigate a substantial body of research in the MANET 
domain in order to resolve its critical issues and facilitate the design and operation 
of the networks. In this regards; prevalent challenges and related research areas 
are briefly reviewed within the MANET domain as stated in Jun-Zhao (2001), 
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Chlamtac et al. (2003), Conti and Giordano (2007), Cordeiro and Agrawal (2011) 
and Goyal et al. (2011). 
• Wireless Channels & Medium Access Control Protocols: MANETs normally 
rely on current standard wireless technologies for interconnection (MAC single-
hop communication), for example, the IEEE 802.15.4 (also known as Zig-bee) for 
short-range low data rate (< 250 kb/s) networks, Bluetooth (IEEE  802.15.1) for 
personal area networks (PANs), the 802.11 standards for high-speed medium-
range MANET, and the 802.16 standards suite for high-speed wide-range. On the 
other hand, these standards are in fact not originally developed for multi-hop ad 
hoc networking. There are several constraints when operating in an ad hoc mode 
(e.g. hidden terminals). Accordingly the performance can be degraded especially 
in large-scale scenarios, and users in this situation may be deterred using 
MANETs. Improvements in antennas, signal processing schemes and software 
defined radio are expected to help to enhance the performance and reliability of 
current wireless technologies (Chlamtac et al., 2003; Conti and Giordano, 2007).  
• Routing: As the topology of a MANET may change frequently due to  nodes 
mobility and churn, establishing a routing infrastructure to enable any pair of 
nodes to communicate becomes a troublesome issue. There are different types of 
routing protocols that have been developed for providing effective and efficient 
routing in MANETs not only for single hop communication but also for multi-hop 
communication (Eriksson et al., 2005; Sarkar et al., 2007). They are grouped into 
six main categories: reactive, proactive, hybrid, location-aware, energy-aware and 
multicast routing protocols. For more example, see Conti and Giordano (2007). 
• Power Management: Power management is a very critical issue in MANETs 
since most of the network nodes are light-weight mobile terminals powered by 
limited sources like batteries. Additionally, they have the dual role that each node 
takes (i.e. router and host roles). Therefore, it is imperative that communication-
related utilities should be enhanced for reducing power consumption. Energy 
saving and power-aware routing should be taken seriously into account (Sarkar et 
al., 2007). 
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• Quality of Service (QoS): Offering different quality of service levels in a 
dynamic environment like MANETs is not an easy task. Also, the inherent 
stochastic and unreliable nature of communications quality in MANET has a 
negative impact on providing fixed guarantees on the services offered to a device. 
Hence, aware or adaptive QoS must be developed over the traditional resource 
reservation to support the multimedia services (e.g. voice and video). On the other 
side, QoS in MANET is still an immature research area. Issues of QoS robustness, 
QoS routing policies, algorithms and protocols with multiple priorities are 
necessary to be investigated (Cordeiro and Agrawal, 2011). 
• Security: Security concerns are considered to be the main obstacle that makes 
companies hesitant to fully adopt any particular technologies. MANET security 
issues need to be addressed and handled thoroughly. In addition to the common 
vulnerabilities of wireless networks, MANETs are vulnerable to other different 
attacks like relay, black hole , Sybil attacks and  also have no clear line of defence 
(Yang et al., 2004; Djenouri et al., 2005; Carvalho, 2008). This is due to the open 
wireless medium used and a number of specific constraints in MANET properties 
for example limitation in resources capability, lack of physical protection, and the 
variances in security requirements of tackled MANET’s applications. However, 
because of MANET mobility and infrastructure-less-ness, MANETs require 
presumably distributed operation for different schemes of authentication and key 
management. As the core of this research primarily addresses security and 
relevant topics in MANETs, this issue will be elaborated later in this chapter. 
• Inter-networking and Interoperation: In some given cases, a number of 
MANETs is anticipated to communicate with other conventional networks (e.g. 
IP- based networks). However, defining the interface that facilitates interoperating 
between the two different networks is problematic. Also, adapting routing 
protocols in such a mobile device to work with other types of networks introduces 
another challenge as MANETs, unlike traditional networks, have a dynamic 
topology caused by mobility (Goyal et al., 2011). On the other hand, much 
research on current wireless networks is mainly devoted to offer seamless 
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integration of all types of networks. Therefore, MANET design should cater for 
compatibility with other types of network, for example, wireless LANs, 3rd 
Generation (3G) and (4G) cellular networks (Cordeiro and Agrawal, 2011). 
Eventually, although MANETs have great promise in terms of variety of 
applications and attractiveness of their characteristics, they nevertheless are 
confronted by several critical challenges, as shown clearly above. Each of these 
challenges can be deemed as a separate research topic that requires in-depth 
investigation. On the other hand, these six subjects discussed above are still 
considered as very prominent and broad topics in the field of MANET research.  
2.3 MANET-related Security Fundamentals 
Compared to the conventional networks, the distinctive facets of MANETs like 
open collaborated network architecture, shared wireless medium, stringent 
resource constraints, and highly dynamic network topology instigate many more 
nontrivial security concerns and threats. These concerns obviously make a 
demand for developing multi-fence security solutions that satisfy both wide 
protection and desired network performance. Accordingly, in order to perceive 
security challenges and dimensions in MANETs, it is important to shed light on 
the most common security fundamentals relevant to the security MANET domain. 
This section mainly not only covers most general principle of security in any 
networking systems but also indicates to the other important security issues 
related to MANET. It starts with addressing the key security requirements known 
as security services and the potential attacks in MANETs. In addition, in this 
section a number of important related security techniques required to fulfil 
particular security requirements and prevent specific attacks are discussed. 
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2.3.1  Security Requirements (Security Services) 
When tackling security of a given networking system like MANETs, security 
requirements must be addressed as a vital element in order to achieve a standard 
level of protection from any particular attacks or threats that a networking system 
encounters. However, satisfying all those requirements in a networking system is 
not an easy task. Security experts therefore have identified a set of key 
requirements that cover the major security needs of any systems. These are also 
identified  by well-known organisations such as, the International 
Telecommunications Union (represented by their ITU-T Recommendation X.805 
and X.800 (ITU, 1991, 2003)) and the International Organization for 
Standardization (by their standard ISO 7498-2  (ISO, 1989)). The key 
requirements includes confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, authentication, 
authorisation, availability (Djenouri et al., 2005; Stallings, 2010).  
• Confidentiality means that messages or data should be protected from any 
unauthorised disclosure during transmission. In other words, confidentiality 
ensures that the content cannot be interpreted by unauthorised entities. 
Confidentiality can be implemented by using any of the well-known encryption 
methods (e.g. symmetric and asymmetric ciphers). 
• Integrity ensures the correctness or accuracy of data or message content during 
transmission. These must be protected against unauthorised alteration such as, 
deletion, injection and replication and it must be indicated. Technologies of digital 
signature and hash functions normally are being used to achieve integrity. 
• Non-repudiation guarantees the identity of the sender of a service request (e.g. 
proof of obligation, intent, or commitment; proof of data origin; delivery and 
submission of a request). This can be delivered by using digital signature on 
service invocation to refer to the authentic signer. 
• Authentication validates the claimed identities of entities that are 
communicating (e.g., device, service or application) and to make sure that no 
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entity is attempting a masquerade or an unauthorised replay of a preceding 
communication.  This particular requirement can be considered as the first line of 
defence against intruders as most other security requirements (e.g. confidentiality, 
integrity etc.) rely on authenticated entities for their deployment. There are two 
types, peer entity authentication and data origin authentication. Peer entity 
authentication caters for validating the identity of a peer entity in an association 
while data origin authentication is to assure the source of a data unit being 
received. 
• Authorisation (Access control) is a means to prevent unauthorised use of 
network resources. In other words, access control only allows legitimate personnel 
or devices to use stored information, services and applications by managing the 
level of access to those resources. Clearly, access control is tied to the 
authentication requirement. There are a number of approaches to access control 
most common for example, Role Based Access Control (RBAC), Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Attribute Based 
Access Control (ABAC). 
• Availability ensures that the provision of access to network services is available 
whenever they are required, even the services are under attacks (e.g. denial of 
service DoS). Therefore this requirement can be implemented by a proper 
management and control of system resources (i.e. access control services and 
other security services).  
2.3.2  Security Threats and Attacks in MANETs 
Due to the open and shared operation medium of MANETs, and also the lack of 
any central administration or clear line of defence in this particular type of 
networks, MANETs tend to be more vulnerable to security threats and attacks 
than any other conventional networks like wired ones. While security threats and 
attacks in MANETs are not the core of this work, the following is intended to 
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show the different forms of attacks and suggests that there is no uniform blanket 
approach to MANET security.  
The potential attacks of MANETs can be split into two main streams according 
to their nature: passive attacks and active attacks. A passive attack can be 
identified when an adversary gains access to a protected asset of the network but 
without modifying any content of that asset or can track and learn about activities 
within the network but without disrupting the operation (e.g. eavesdropping and 
traffic analysis). Avoiding such passive attacks is very challenging because the 
network operations and resources are not touched to indicate that there is an attack 
(i.e. attacks may be undetectable).  The appropriate way to overcome these attacks 
is to make use of encryption methods which normally protect the message content 
being transmitted, so that it becomes hard for eavesdroppers to gain any 
information about what is being transmitted. However an active attack can be 
recognised when an adversary attempts to temper message or data contents (e.g. 
modification, injection and deletion) being exchanged in the networks. Active 
attacks usually have several forms:  masquerading (i.e., impersonation and man-
in-the-middle attacks), replay (i.e., retransmitting messages), jamming, message 
spoofing, message modification, and denial-of-service (DoS) (i.e. causing 
excessive resource consumption in the network). These attacks can be alleviated 
by using security mechanisms, for example encryption techniques, firewalls and 
intrusion detection systems, etc. (Djenouri et al., 2005; Abusalah et al., 2008; Cho 
et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, since most MANET nodes usually have a dual role of 
network operation, both types of attacks discussed before can be performed by 
either insider or outsider nodes. However, attacks originating from insiders are 
considered much more damaging and difficult to prevent when compared with 
outside attacks. This is due to the fact that the insider typically owns valuable and 
secret information (e.g. access privileges) about the network system which can be 
exploited to disrupt the network easily (Wu et al., 2007a; Cho et al., 2011). 




Figure  2-3: The MANET Attacks Categories (Wu et al., 2007a; Cho et al., 2011). 
To realise the variety of threats that a MANET may encounter, Figure 2-3 
outlines a representative, but not exhaustive list of attacks occurring in MANETs. 
Those attacks are arranged based on their types (active or passive) and also 
according to where they can be launched in the OSI model (either in one specific 
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and Wu et al. (2007a). Last but not least, MANET threats become an important 
factor that has an impact on how to design and deploy any security solution for 
MANET. Therefore it is required to take those threats into account seriously in the 
proposed security solution for more protected MANETs otherwise this will make 
this security solution ineffective in term of attack resistance.  
2.3.3  Security Techniques (Cryptographic 
Fundamentals)  
Cryptography is known as the art and science of secrecy (Scheneier, 1996). This 
science basically exists to facilitate how to manage, store, transmit sensitive data 
securely across insecure networks (e.g. internet) so that no one can intercept or 
interpret it except the intended recipient. On the other hand, the  main mission of 
cryptographic techniques are presumably to meet the requirement of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, authorisation and non-repudiation and 
also to protect from any potential attacks (Scheneier, 1996; Stallings, 2010). 
Several security techniques can be recognised in the knowledge body of security. 
However, this study covers only those pertinent techniques which contribute to 
the main goals of this study. Briefly the next subsections exclusively describe 
those techniques in details:  encipherment, hash functions, message authentication 
codes (MACs), digital signatures, authentication exchanges, digital certificates 
and threshold cryptography. Also, to understand the relationship between these 
prescribed security techniques and the key security requirements, Table 2-2 
primarily presents how using a specific security technique leads to satisfy certain 
security requirements annotated by “Y”.  
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Encipherment Y      
Hash Functions  Y     
Message Authentication Code  Y  Y   
Digital Signature  Y Y Y   
Authentication Exchange    Y  Y 
Digital Certification    Y Y  
Threshold Cryptography Y Y Y Y  Y 
Table  2-2: Security Techniques Vs Security Requirements, “Y”= Yes  
2.3.3.1 Encipherment  
In cryptography, to provide confidentiality features, plaintext is transformed into 
cipher-text by using an encryption cipher while an intended recipient is able to 
decrypt the cipher-text back into plaintext by a decryption cipher. The encryption 
and decryption are normally characterised and controlled by security keys which 
are considered as an active element of running any cryptographic algorithms, and 
must often be kept secret in particular cases. There are two primary types of 
cryptographic algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric key algorithms. Symmetric 
key algorithms (e.g. AES) make use of the same secret key for encryption and 
decryption, whereas asymmetric key algorithms (e.g. RSA, ECC) make use of two 
different keys, public and private keys for encryption and decryption. On the other 
side, in term of processing cost, symmetric key ciphering is less expensive than 
asymmetric. A symmetric key cipher is therefore suitable for use when there is a 
limitation in resources being used (i.e. limited power and processing capacity). 
Typically the asymmetric method is used only to exchange the shared secret 
(Smart, 2003; Stallings, 2010). 
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2.3.3.2 Hash Functions and Message Authentication Code 
A cryptographic hash function is used to apply a one-way compression function 
on a block of data of any size to convert to an output of fixed length n (i.e. called a 
data digest). The common purpose of using hash functions is to provide a measure 
of data integrity but hash functions can be incorporated with other cryptographic 
techniques to achieve other security requirements (for example, a digital 
signature, a message authentication code (MAC) and hash chains for 
authentication). There are several families of standard hashing algorithms such as 
the message digest (MD) family (e.g. MD2, MD4 and MD5); the secure hash 
algorithm (SHA) family; (e.g. by SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-
512) (Menezes et al., 1996; Cayirci and Rong, 2008). 
On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that a message authentication code 
(MAC) algorithm also belongs to hashing techniques. However, it uses a secret 
key as an input in the compression process of any standard hash functions without 
using any particular type of encryption (e.g. HMAC). Furthermore, it is a light-
weight algorithm in terms of processing overhead and also it meets security 
requirements of integrity and authentication (Cayirci and Rong, 2008; Stallings, 
2010). 
2.3.3.3  Digital Signature  
A digital signature is based on an asymmetric key algorithm (e.g. RSA or 
Elgamal) to be produced. In this technique, the sender initially utilises a hash 
function (e.g. SHA) to create the digest value of a message and then applies 
encryption using its private key on that digest in order to generate a valid digital 
signature attached with an original message. The recipient on the other end is able 
to verify the origin and integrity of a message by repeating hashing and decryption 
using the sender public key. This security technique assures that the message or 
data has not been tampered after running the digest calculation (integrity) and they 
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are authentic and come from the owner of the public key (authentication). 
Furthermore, digital signature techniques can be used to provide a measure of 
origin non-repudiation for data (i.e. the recipient of data with entity sender’s 
signature on it can identify that the sender sent the data (which even sender cannot 
deny)). There are a number of standard algorithms for the digital signatures, for 
example,  RSA signature, the digital signature algorithm (DSA) or Digital 
Signature Standard (DSS), etc. (Scheneier, 1996; Smart, 2003). 
2.3.3.4 Authentication Exchange 
Authentication exchange techniques, often referring to authentication 
communication protocols, are defined as a series of handshakes for 
cryptographically protected messages in order to enable two communicating 
entities to validate one another’s identity (i.e. to accomplish entity authentication) 
mutually or unilaterally (known as mutual or one-way authentication). 
Furthermore, these exchanges may be exploited to establish a secure connection 
either by transporting secret keys from each entity or by deriving session keys 
between each other as an additional feature to the authentication process (Boyd 
and Mathuria, 2003). On the other hand, depending upon the type of 
authentication exchange, these techniques usually need different cryptographic 
methods like encipherment, digital signature or integrity mechanisms for 
protecting the messages being exchanged. Therefore, authentication exchange 
techniques are split into three main categories according to underlying 
cryptographic primitives used: symmetric and asymmetric and hybrid (symmetric 
and asymmetric) authentication protocols. Besides, in a given authentication 
technique, non-cryptographic mechanisms (typically time-stamps or random 
nonces) can be involved during messages exchange so as to confirm the freshness 
of messages in authentication for thwarting  such particular attacks like a replay 
attack (Menezes et al., 1996). 
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As implied, authentication protocols mainly aim to fulfil authentication 
requirements yet on the other side, especially when dealing with a limited network 
bandwidth, these protocols can contribute to availability requirements (i.e. service 
availability) through the number of protocol messages being exchanged in a given 
network and the size of these messages’ contents being piggybacked. In other 
words, the lower the number of messages and the smaller the size of the 
authentication protocol messages, the less load on the network (i.e. more 
available) avoiding such a denial of service (DoS) attack.  
There are several prominent examples of authentication exchange techniques 
that have been standardised for adoption and interoperability purposes like 
SSL/TLS (Dierks, 2008)  or an one-way pass, two-way and three-way passes  
authentication protocols in (ISO/IEC 9798-2, 2008) — using symmetric 
encryption  and (SO/IEC 9798-3, 1998/Cor.1:2009) and X.509 (ITU-T, 1989; 
Chokhani et al., 2003; ITU-T, 2008) — using public-key encryption, etc..    
Finally, the use of authentication exchanges is very demanding as it is a key 
part of the provision of security in any circumstances where the medium of 
communications in a particular network (e.g. MANETs) is unreliable and 
vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, it can be considered as a first line of defence 
against adversaries trying to fraudulently access services in any network; use of 
this technique in the network becomes inevitable (Menezes et al., 1996; Stallings, 
2010).  
2.3.3.5 Digital Certificates 
Relying upon public-key cryptography, a digital certificate is typically developed 
as a form of identification to support the authenticity of public keys as well as the 
identities being used during communication in order to prevent from some 
particular attacks like man-in-middle. The certificate is generally defined as an 
electronic document which makes use of a digital signature to bind together a 
public key with identity-information of the certificate owner, for example, a name 
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of a person or an organisation, their address, emails or attributes, etc. In addition, 
there are two types of digital certificate: a public-key certificate and an attributes 
certificate. The certificate according to its type is assumed to be issued by some 
trusted certification authority (CA) or attribute authority (AA) which enables any 
interested party to check the integrity of the certificate by verifying the signature 
of that authority. This is shown in Figure 2-4 and represents an example of a 
public-key certificate.  
 
Figure  2-4: The Digital Certificate Generation and Verification (H: a hash 
function; E: encryption; D: decryption) (Stallings, 2010, p.430) 
It is important to note that digital certificates can be incorporated with other 
security techniques like authentication exchanges, digital signature, hashing 
functions or asymmetric encryption to leverage the most requirements of integrity, 
confidentiality, authentication, and authorisation. On the other hand, digital 
certificates take several forms depending specifically upon a trust model being 
adopted, for example, X509 (Chokhani et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2008; ITU-T, 
2008) or Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) (Abdulrahman, 1997). The X509 framework 
is a commonly used standard based on a the Public Key Infrastructure -PKI 
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scheme for certifying and revoking digital certificates via a third trusted party 
(TTP) so-called CA whereas PGP is similar but relied on Web of Trust to generate 
certificates via trusted users themselves. Both models will be discussed in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter.  
2.3.3.6 Threshold Cryptography (TC)  
Initially, the notion of threshold cryptography (TC) (Desmedt and Frankel, 1990) 
is constructed as a result of emerging and applying secret sharing techniques first 
developed by Shamir (1979) for a confidentiality purpose among a group of 
participants. In Shamir’s (1979) secret sharing proposal, the k out of n scheme (k 
≤ n) is essentially defined as a cryptographic technique which enables to break a 
secret S into n different shares  (1≤  ≤ n) according to a random polynomial 
used  so that the knowledge of at least k shares is necessary to recover the initial 
secret S by means of Lagrange interpolation. 
With the properties of better fault tolerance without increased risk, threshold 
cryptography can offer an approach to facilitate trust distribution and control 
sharing for critical activities (e.g. signing docs) by enabling k of n parties to 
perform the critical action cooperatively. In other words, this cryptography can 
usually be exploited to distribute the duty among a number of trusted entities so as 
to provide a given cryptographic service in collaborative manner. As the public 
key cryptosystem becomes very prominent with many standard algorithms (e.g. 
RSA, DSA, ElGamal, ECC, etc.), many schemes are proposed to cater for 
incorporating this technique with public-key cryptography particularly in order to 
generate a digital signature by multiple signers, so-called the threshold signature 
such as Desmedt and Frankel (1992), Wang et al.  (1998), Gennaro et al. (2000), 
Shoup (2000), Kong et al. (2001), Saxena et al. (2003, 2007), Kim et al. (2011)  
and Dossogne et al. (2013).  
On the other side, most schemes based on threshold cryptography mainly 
consists of two main dimensions of implementation: a sharing management 
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dimension where shares of the secret S are distributed, updated and verified 
among participants, and a usage dimension (i.e. a computation protocol) where a 
distributed protocol makes use of these shares jointly so that the function of the 
secret S can be applied, for example signing partial certificates using private 
shares of a private key in public key cryptosystem (Dossogne et al., 2013). 
In addition to a confidentiality requirement being fulfilled by secret sharing, 
threshold cryptography can also adhere to the other security requirements such as 
integrity, authentication and availability. Furthermore, a system running any 
threshold cryptographic schemes TC(k, n) is characterised with good security 
robustness and high availability since it depends on multiple players (n) to 
function and adversaries are required to compromise k out of n active players of a 
system in order to break the whole system. To conclude, the area of threshold 
cryptography is considered be different from the area of secret sharing as its aim 
is to perform a cryptographic function of the secret S without disclosing the actual 
secret (i.e. never reconstructing the secret S from its shares  <, . . ,  >	 but 
rather employing those shares as a shared input into that cryptographic function). 
However, the sharing techniques are usually the same in both areas. 
2.4 The Trust Management 
There are several interpretations of “Trust” differing from one domain to another. 
One view taken from the social sciences is the degree of subjective belief about 
particular entity’s behaviour (Cook, 2001). It is arguably fundamental to the 
security design in networks like MANETs. Furthermore, trust becomes a vital 
element which the most common security services (e.g. authentication and 
authorisation protocols, confidentiality, etc.) require in their deployment. 
Throughout this study, only in-network trust elements which are managed and 
maintained within MANET nodes are presented. 
Alternatively, trust which aims to help in establishing a relationship between 
entities usually can be recognised in different forms. As stated in Aivaloglou et al 
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(2006), Li and Singhal (2007), Yunfang  (2007), these forms can be classified into 
two key categories as shown in Figure 2-5 with a number of examples: (1) the so-
called credentials-based trust (e.g. certificates, and keys, etc.) and (2) the 
monitored behavioural trust,( e.g. reputation and recommendation (Louta et al., 
2010)). In the first case, the security frameworks that have adopted credentials-
based trust, typically exploit credentials like certificates for pre-deployment 
knowledge of trust relationships within the network nodes. Also, these credentials 
must be disseminated, maintained and managed, either independently or 
collaboratively by the nodes. On the other hand, having a valid credential is an 
indispensable criterion that trust decisions rely on and also this is to confirm 
trustworthiness of the target node by a credential authority (e.g. CA) or by other 
nodes that the issuer trusts. 
 
Figure  2-5: Trust Forms: Credentials-based Trust & Monitored Behavioural 
Trust with their examples 
In contrast, in the second case of monitored behavioural trust frameworks, each 
node plays the role of constantly observing the behaviour of its neighbouring 
nodes so as to evaluate trust which is usually perceived as a reputation (i.e. 
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monitored evolves increasingly or decreasingly according to the experience and 
perception of other nodes about that node, which is appraised from voting, rating 
and recommendation (Cho et al., 2011). On the other side, it is worth pointing out 
that the monitored behavioural framework is considered as a reactive approach, 
working under the assumption that nodes’ identities in the network must be 
verified via pre-installed authentication techniques. Since MANETs primarily 
depend on the cooperation of the most nodes, their monitored behavioural trust 
framework proposed in so-called cooperation enforcement schemes (Marias et al., 
2006; Louta et al., 2010) differs from the other same frameworks with the extra 
effort of alleviating problem of node selfishness. Therefore, the reputation of a 
MANET node can build up as long as it performs correctly the tasks of route 
discovery and data forwarding. Otherwise, in case the node misbehaves either 
through accessing network resources in an unauthorized way or not cooperating in 
routing, it will be regarded as a malicious or selfish node and be isolated as a 
result of misbehaviour detection. For more example about MANET cooperation 
enforcement schemes, they are well presented in Marias et al. (2006) and Louta et 
al. (2010). 
Last but not least, in the communication and networking field, it is important to 
realise that trust management is considered as a generalised approach which is 
supposed to incorporate both credentials-based and monitored behavioural trust 
frameworks fully or partial in order to manage trust effectively. According to Cho 
et al. (2011), trust management typically must tackle the issue of the formulation 
of evaluation rules and policies, representation of trust evidence, and evaluation 
and management (i.e. issuance and revocation) of trust relationships among nodes. 
Additionally, trust management must be concerned with collecting the 
information which is essential to form a trust relationship and also dynamically 
monitoring and regulating the existing trust relationship (Li and Singhal, 2007). 
Trust management can be involved in diverse security issues such as intrusion 
detection, authentication, access control, key management, and isolating 
misbehaving nodes for effective routing. 
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The dynamic topologies and constrained resources of MANETs, mean that 
trust management comprising of trust establishment, trust update and trust 
revocation encounters more exceptional challenges than in traditional centralised 
settings. For example, acquiring trust evidence so as to evaluate trustworthiness is 
problematic owing to frequent changes in topology instigated from node mobility 
or node failure. Furthermore, resource and power limitations in MANETs also 
become an obstacle to process trust evaluation efficiently. In MANETs, there are 
a few attempts to propose a trust management scheme that normally integrates the 
two types of trust approaches (credentials-based and reputation-based) partially or 
fully such as Buchegger and Le Boudec (2002), Hadjichristofi et al. (2005a; 
2005b), Yunfang (2007) and Toubiana and Labiod (2008). However, this study in 
MANETs is dedicated primarily to investigate and evaluate the current credential-
based trust frameworks as shown in this thesis and the domain of reputation 
models are out of scope of this study. In next section, the state of art credential-
based trust models in MANETs and their important relevant issues will be 
characterised and described with more details. 
2.5 The Credential-based Trust Models In 
MANETs 
As discussed in the previous section, the credential-based trust models are a main 
part of a trust management system in MANETs. These are deemed as one 
direction towards specifically facilitating the authentication and credential 
management processes. This is because these models essentially aim for 
establishing, maintaining and managing the trust relationship among nodes using 
security credentials and therefore they are able to interact with each other securely 
(i.e. authentication and authorisation). There is a variety of trust models proposed 
in the literature which MANETs may take advantages of.  
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To recognise the differences of these models regarding credentials management 
they are split into two main classes, authoritarian and self-organised models and 
their related subclasses along with the state-of-art proposals as shown in Figure 2-
6. These categories are defined according to certain criteria and characteristics 
such as Trust Third Party (TTP) reliance, a security architecture type, connectivity 
infrastructure and a cryptographic technique. All categories will be described in 
more detail in the following sections. 
2.5.1  The Authoritarian Models 
In an authoritarian trust model, every node generally relies on a special trusted 
entity a so-called Trust Third Party (TTP) (Menezes et al., 1996) for establishing  
trust with other nodes within the network  in order to enable nodes to interact with 
each other (i.e. accessible). In other words, a TTP is normally based on a certain 
authority-based infrastructure (e.g. CA, AA, KDC, AAA, etc.) which plays a role 
of organising trust among nodes through offering particular services of issuing, 
maintaining, updating and revoking credentials. As shown in Figure 2-7, there are 
three different approaches for the TTP involvement: (a) inline, (b) online and (c) 
offline. Both inline and online approaches require TTPs to be accessible to other 
nodes during a normal network operation phase whereas an offline one is opposite 
or may make use of another type of out-of-band channels for communication (e.g. 
physical contact, location-limited side channel (Balfanz et al., 2002), etc.). 
However, an inline TTP involvement is distinguished from online one by the fact 
that TTP becomes an intermediary, facilitating communication between nodes. 
Correspondingly, Hoeper and Gong (2004) suggest four different cases for 
availability of TTP in MANETs according to the network life phases (i.e. network 
initialisation  and running): TTP always available, TTP available at network 
initialisation stage and when a node joins, TTP only available at network 
initialisation stage, No TTP available at any network stage. Besides each approach 
of TTP involvement may allegedly entails new requirements and also may need 
additional configurations and installations before making the network fully 
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operational. To select the appropriate approach of TTP involvement in any 
network, it is important to carefully take into consideration some aspects of 
scalability, availability, reliability, conformity and localisation. In the current 
research of MANET trust, although MANETs have dynamic topologies and 
limited power resources, most authority-based trust models are still in favour of 
an online approach and few are adopted offline or both such as Martucci et al.  
(2004) Verma et al (2004), Luo et al. (2005) and Hadjichristofi et al. (2005a).   
 
Figure  2-7: The approaches of TTP involvement 
Eventually, depending upon the TTP architecture type, several authoritarian 
models for MANETs can be organised into two mainstreams: centralised and 
distributed models. In the former, TTP depends on only on a central node to 
manage trust of the whole network whereas the role of TTP must be distributed 
among a number of specific in the latter. Additionally, since the category of 
distributed models relies certainly on different techniques for applying 
distribution (collaboration, replication, hierarchy, dependency and routing 
infrastructure), there are four proposed types for the distributed models that can be 
recognised in this regard: non-collaborated, collaborated, hierarchical and 
clustered-based models. In the next subsections, as presented in Figure 2-6, all 
cases relevant to centralised and distributed models will be explained. 
(a) Inline (b) Online (C) Offline 
TTP TTP TTP 
Out of Band Connection 
Real Connection 
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2.5.1.1 Centralised Models 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based on an asymmetric cryptosystem is still 
acknowledged as one of the most effective and well-known models for managing 
digital certificates (e.g. issuance, revocation and distribution) to trusted peers. 
Those certificates like  X509v3 (Chokhani et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2008) are 
essentially used for deploying security services, such as authentication, 
authorisation and digital signatures and encryption (Perlman, 1999). PKI relies on 
TTP, the trusted entity in the system like what is a so-called CA (Certification 
Authority) and it is considered a central element of a PKI. On one hand, the 
typical mission of CAs is to create certificates and digitally signs them using the 
CA's private key. On the other hand, by using the CA's public key, any entity 
demanding to validate a certificate's authenticity verifies the CA's digital 
signature, as well as confirms the integrity of the contents of the certificate.  
In addition, PKI has originally been developed for wired networks and some 
infrastructure-based wireless networks where there is no serious problem in 
connectivity and availability, It is noticeable in the PKI domain that security and 
scalability issues of CA are considered very crucial as CA is required to handle a 
large number of requests effectively. On the other side, it is important to indicate 
that most of other trust models for MANETs discussed in the study obviously lean 
on PKI fundamentals.  
Similar to PKI, Kerberos (Neuman and Ts'o, 1994; Neuman et al., 2005) 
developed by MIT is a centralised TTP-based trust model and relies on a 
symmetric cryptosystem. The TTP is here referred to a KDC (Key Distribution 
Centre) which holds all shared secret keys for user and server principles. The role 
of a Kerberos service is to become the trust reference for supporting 
authentication and authorisation processes in the system. Kerberos shares different 
key-secrets with each entity in the network and it creates trust tokens (i.e. includes 
session key, a validity period thwarting replay attacks and the requesting node’s 
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identity encrypted with the server’s secret key) which may be used later between 
users and servers. 
2.5.1.2 Distributed Trust Models 
In this type of models for sake of fault tolerance, power saving and trust 
management facilitation, the role of TTP must be shared between different pre-
determined nodes in order to manage trust either independently or dependently. 
However, since these models rely on several nodes to fulfil the purpose, it is 
required to have a form of a routing infrastructure to make those nodes accessible. 
Therefore, the distributed trust models in regards can be classified into two 
classes.  The first one, a so-called routing-based model is based on a common 
MANETs unicast routing protocol (e.g. AODV, OLSR, DSR, etc.) while the 
second one takes advantage of some clustering algorithms to establish a particular 
connectivity infrastructure within intra- and inter- clusters for MANET along with 
handling trust (i.e. cluster heads may take the role of TTPs). 
2.5.1.2.1 Routing-based  Models  
This section presents the specific distributed trust models whose implementations 
depend on a typical routing infrastructure in MANETs like using well-known 
MANET unicast routing protocols (e.g. proactive or reactive routing protocols). 
Besides, most models of this type intend apparently to separate data routing from 
data handling of trust services.  However, these models can be displayed in three 
different themes: (1) non-collaborated, (2) collaborated and (3) hierarchical  
models. Firstly, non-collaborated models refer to distributing a single TTP into a 
number of independent replicas of the original TTP and each replica carries out 
the same duties as the original one. Secondly, collaborated models differ from 
non-collaborated ones in that a group of specific nodes work together to perform 
as a single TTP. These models normally rely on the (k out of n) scheme in 
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Threshold Cryptography (TC) to achieve that cooperative distribution. Finally, in 
contrast to the two types of models aforementioned, hierarchical models take into 
account multiple levels of different TTPs; they may exploit different collaborated 
and non-collaborated security techniques (e.g. threshold cryptography, trust or 
certificate chain, replication, etc.).  
2.5.1.2.1.1 Non-collaborated Models  
To avoid a single point of failure, most non-collaborated models attempt to 
replicate a homogeneous TTP (e.g. CA, KDC, etc.) in a number of nodes which 
can independently act the same as the original TTP. However, those TTP replicas 
need to be well protected as they will become a single point of compromise. In 
other words, if anyone of those TTP replicas is compromised, the whole trust in 
the network will be jeopardised.  
As an example, for adapting centralised Kerberos (Neuman and Ts'o, 1994; 
Neuman et al., 2005) to a dynamic network like MANETs, Pirzada and 
McDonald (2004) have presented certain modifications to the original Kerberos 
protocol. In their proposed model called KAMAN (Kerberos assisted 
Authentication in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks), multiple Kerberos servers have been 
allocated in order to provide distributed authentication and load distribution.  
Those servers periodically and securely synchronise their databases (i.e. having 
session keys) with each other.  If a node N1 is interested in communicating with 
another node N2, it begins to send a request to one of the Kerberos servers. The 
server then generates a token to send back to node N1. Node N1 makes use of the 
token by sending to node N2, which must supposedly admit the token. At that 
point, a secure session can be created between node N1 and N2. Although this 
model mainly caters for distributing a load to multiple servers, it has not discussed 
issues like the availability of servers and the number of servers. 
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2.5.1.2.1.2 Collaborated Models 
As indicated, this type of model should rely on a particular technique which 
enables a set of special homogeneous nodes to cooperatively play a role of a 
single TTP. This collaboration can be implemented through using threshold 
cryptography (TC) which is described before in section (2.3.3.6). TC is basically 
based on the k out of n scheme which it is enough for k specific nodes out of n 
predetermined nodes to do normal tasks of a signal TTP (e.g. issuing, revoking, 
etc.). It is important to recognise that collaborative models in this regard is 
characterised with fault tolerant and protection enhancement. This stems from the 
fact that it sounds hard for adversaries to compromise multiple TTP nodes at least 
k and on the other hand, having several cooperative TTP nodes keeps the system 
up running even there are some failures(<k). According to the way of distributing 
TTP, there are two types can be distinguished, partially distributed or fully 
distributed models. 
 In models where TTPs is partially distributed, only a specific number of nodes 
from total network nodes can be in charge to run TTP services. This entails crucial 
management issues about the node selection criteria (e.g. resource capacity, 
scalability, location, mobility, etc.). There are several proposals that are in favour 
of this model type. For example, Zhou and Haas (1999) have first proposed a 
partially distributed certification authority (CA) based on the (k out of n) scheme 
of Threshold Cryptography (TC). The role of CA (i.e. TTP) is distributed among 
specific nodes: servers, combiners, and a dealer. Servers and combiners perform 
signing public key certificates for users. The dealer is a particular server which 
holds the completely private-key certification authority. For any joining node, if 
all partial signatures are collected, it can then compute the complete signature 
locally to obtain the complete public key certificate. It is worth indicating that this 
model becomes a reference to other approaches adopting threshold cryptography 
for deploying their security service in MANETs. 
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The approach of Yi and Kravets (2003) is based on Zhou and Haas’s (1999) 
solution but with a small modification by making the requesting node to be a 
combiner instead and also considering revocation. This approach describes how to 
select particular nodes according to their best physical security and capability so 
as to be MOCA servers (MObile Certification Authority). The communication 
overhead in this solution is also apparently reduced by using the technique of 
caching routes to MOCA servers. The system utilises unicast instead of flooding 
when sufficient cached routes exist.  
On the other hand, in SEKM (Secure and Efficient Key Management in 
MANETs) proposed by Wu et al. (2007b), the CA trust is distributed to a group of 
nodes, which could be nodes with normal or better hardware in a mesh-based 
topology. SEKM, much the same as MOCA, is designed to offer efficient share 
updating among servers and to quickly reply to certificate updating. For 
efficiency, only a subset of the server nodes initiates the share update phase in 
each round. A ticket-based scheme is developed for efficient certificate updating. 
 Raghani et al. (2006) suggest a similar Zhou and Haas (1999) solution but 
their solution introduces an approach for how to dynamically adjust the value of 
the threshold when required, and by this means decreases the certification delays. 
Also, the proposals of Larafa and Lauren (2009, 2011), Al-Bayatti et al. (2009) 
and  Saremi et al. (2009) which are primarily based on Zhou and Haas (1999), 
aims to present a trust model of distributed access control using an Attributes 
Authority (AA) or Authentication Authorisation Accounting (AAA) services as 
TTPs.  
Alternatively, in the category of fully distributed models, all nodes, instead of a 
number of special selected nodes as in partially distributed models, participate 
cooperatively in establishing and managing trust within the network (i.e. act as a 
TTP). Even though this category shows better efficiency than the other category 
of partially distributed models, it encounters other concerns of self-initialisation, 
self-configuration, and capabilities of all nodes, security robustness and 
requirements of nodes density. Luo et al. (2004) proposed, for MANETs, a 
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completely distributed certification authority model, based on threshold 
cryptography. The model distributes the share of the authority private key among 
all nodes at the time when they join the network. When a new node wants to 
access to get its certificate, it sends a request to its k neighbouring nodes for 
partial certificates. If the coalition decides that the requesting node is a “well-
behaved” node, they issue their partial certificates. These partial certificates are 
then combined together by the target node to create the complete certificate using 
an interpolation function. On the other hand, trust is maintained by the notion that 
all the nodes must observe the direct neighbours behaviour and maintain their own 
CRL (Certificate Revocation List). In case a node discovers one of its neighbours 
is dishonest, it adds its certificate to the list of revocations and disseminates 
through the network an accusation. If the certificate of accusatory is revoked, the 
accusation is ignored. Otherwise, the node is marked suspect by all the nodes 
receiving the accusation.   
2.5.1.2.1.3 Hierarchical Models  
In this subcategory of trust models, trust is implemented by a hierarchy of several 
homogeneous TTPs (e.g. CAs, etc.). In other words, these models offer different 
levels of TTPs which can be exploited in order to improve availability and 
scalability of trust services. However, due to the hierarchical arrangement, these 
models entail much more management overheads in sense of selection, 
maintenance, and complexity. Luo et al. (2005) propose DICTATE (Distributed 
CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness for ad hoc networks). The 
DICTATE architecture presents a hierarchical CA between one mCA (mother 
CA) in wired network, and a group of dCAs (distributed CAs) in MANETs. The 
group of dCAs relies on the TC scheme for signing a certificate of a joining node. 
Nodes in MANETs can cooperatively be isolated from the mCA, but always have 
the need for CA's services. The mCA delegates a group of dCAs in order to 
increase the availability of security services when mCA is offline or out of reach. 
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Hadjichristofi et al. (2005a; 2005b) develop a key management framework that 
provides redundancy and robustness in trust establishment (i.e. creating security 
association between pairs of nodes for IPsec). Their proposal of a key 
management system (KMS) depends upon an adapted hierarchical Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) model where nodes can dynamically play roles of trust 
management. KMS can be realised by a three levels of hierarchy: Root Certificate 
Authority (RCA) (the first level), Delegated Certificate Authority (DCA) (the 
second level) and Temporary Certificate Authority (TCA) (the third level). The 
model aims to provide high service availability based on trust-based SA among 
nodes. 
Omar et al. (2007),  present a hybrid trust solution called  NetTRUST (mixed 
NETworks Trust infrastRUcture baSed on Threshold cryptography). NetTRUST 
exploits two sets of particular CAs for managing PKI: central CAs (CCA) in 
wired network and mobile CAs (MCA) in ad hoc network. MCA servers emulate 
the CA role by using the TC-based (k out of n) scheme, and the CCA servers 
delegate the CA role to MCA servers by using the same TC-based scheme. The 
system leverages decentralisation, supports nodes mobility, and resists against 
MCA failures. This solution also introduces the usage of the standard X509-v3 
certificate issued by CCA or MCA and demonstrates how to get benefits from the 
powerful attributes of  X509-v3 in this context, for more details in Omar et al. 
(2007). 
Composite Key Management (CKM) devised by Yi and Kravets (2004) 
consists of a multiple key management approach which incorporates TC-based 
distributed certificate authority (i.e. TTP) with certificate chaining based on PGP 
(Abdulrahman, 1997). This model relies on two principles: (1) key management 
can be deployed between multiple nodes and (2) a distributed TTP must be an 
anchor of trust for other nodes when using trust chains. As in Capkun et al (2003), 
issued certificates in this proposal are stored and disseminated in self-organised 
way. Furthermore, by using both approaches (distributed CA and certificate 
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chaining) side by side, this enhances the availability of the certificate management 
service through offering two options to acquire certificates. 
To improve the access control in MANETs using the AAA (Authentication, 
Authorization, and Accounting) infrastructure, Khakpour et al. (2008) come up 
with WATCHMAN, a hierarchical distributed AAA architecture using OLSR, a 
proactive routing protocol. This server-based AAA architecture also considers 
resource and location awareness for a mechanism of server election. This 
proposal, essentially based on an overlay, caters for a lightweight and secure 
authentication and authorization model for MANET nodes. However, the design 
of this architecture intends to reduce communication overhead and computation 
cost. In fact, this proposal shows that different tasks are fairly distributed among 
distributed AAA servers. The computation cost and overhead communication is 
insignificant compared to OLSR signalling and routing overheads.  
2.5.1.2.2 Cluster-based Models 
The category of cluster-based models relies on a cluster-based routing 
infrastructure to group nodes according to a particular clustering algorithm (i.e. 
selecting cluster heads (CHs) and members in clusters). On the other side, this 
particular category may take advantage of that infrastructure to handle trust 
efficiently by, for example, distributing a TTP among CHs. In fact, it is usually 
identified as a special case of hierarchical trust and also it can be deployed by a 
form of group authentication, where clustered groups of nodes are considered as 
single trust entities and authenticated as a group. Even though these models 
achieve better scalability and performance comparing to the other models in the 
same classification, they exhibit a number of crucial challenges such as strict 
dependency between routing and trust services and cluster management (i.e. 
clustering algorithms and the selection, configuration, maintenance, and 
replacement of CHs, merging clusters, etc.) (Merwe et al., 2007). There are 
several approaches adopting cluster-based architecture for managing trust.    
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Venkatraman and Agrawal (2000) develop a cluster-based authentication 
model for ad hoc networks. This model is established upon a cluster architecture, 
where the network is divided into clusters. Each of these clusters has an elected 
CH holding cluster membership information and acting as the certificate authority 
(CA) for its cluster. For key distribution, the model requires that when a node 
joins a network, it is provided with public and private system key pair as all the 
nodes in the network must share this key pair. Additionally, each node must also 
obtain a cluster key, created by the CH and shared by all the nodes within a 
cluster. For exchanging session keys between different communicating nodes, 
CHs get involved in facilitating that connection by exploiting a unique 
public/private key pair. However, mutual trust among network nodes is the main 
assumption of this model.   
Bechler et al.(2004)  introduce a model of a Key Management System (KMS) 
applied on a cluster-oriented MANET where CHs are basically assigned the role 
of signing certificates for other nodes (i.e. called warrantors). In order to enable 
new nodes to become full members of the network, nodes in this model are 
required to present a certain number of warranty certificates to a CH in order to 
obtain membership certificates in a similar manner to the approach of Zhou and 
Haas (1999). Those warranty certificates are initially issued by warrantors (i.e. 
existing full members of the network) as a resulted of verifying nodes’ identities. 
Rachedi and Benslimane (2006)  and Rachedi et al. (2007),  present  a similar 
cluster-based model which is based on trust values metric and behaviour 
monitoring. In the cluster a CH also becomes a CA. The trust can be established 
by CAs among clusters by means of recommending nodes with certain trust level 
from CA to another. However, this model also leverages the new term of Dynamic 
Demilitarised Zone (DDMZ) for enhancing the protection of CAs in each cluster 
by using a set of redundant confident nodes, called registration authorities (RAs) 
surrounding a cluster CA. These RAs take role of a check point CA, by handling 
and filtering receiving requests of certification before forwarding them to the CA.  
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Alternatively, Dong et al. (2007)  propose also a CA cluster-based architecture 
where the system  caters for dividing the network into clusters. Each cluster head 
(CH) has a CA information table (CIT), which typically includes a list of CA 
nodes in its local cluster and in the other clusters. The CA information is 
distributed and managed among CHs, which enables a decrease in service 
response delay and system overhead. 
2.5.2  Self-organised Models 
In contrast to authoritarian models discussed broadly in pervious section, self-
organised models cater mainly for allowing network nodes to manage trust by 
themselves (i.e. issuing, maintaining, updating and revoking). This means that 
there is no entity like TTP trusted by all nodes within the network, instead nodes 
which trust each other generate “credentials” based on local trust as shown in 
Figure 2-8.  
 
Figure  2-8: The General Self-organised Trust Model 
Trust direction: (signing credentials) 
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PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) (Abdulrahman, 1997) is a completely distributed 
trust model which was developed by Phil Zimmermann in 1992. PGP is 
developed to be a substitute to the conventional PKI based on trusted authorities 
in order to offer a free practical security solution to protect low value 
communications, such as emails. The fundamental part of PGP is referral 
certification which enables multiple users to “recommend” a certain user (i.e. 
working as an introducer) by signing certificates of its public-key. PGP relies on a 
system, called the “Web of Trust” which mainly facilitates and manages key 
distribution. However, this scheme has a drawback making the system vulnerable 
because, for example, dishonest users may issue false certificates to cheat other 
users. Therefore, the level of confidence for the certificate is relatively low. 
Alternatively, taking advantage of the same approach of PGP, Capkun et al. 
(2002; 2003) offer a self-organised trust model for MANETs, in which trust 
among nodes is maintained through a physical contact. Every node in this model 
issues public key certificates to those who it trusts from its own domain. 
Regardless of the network partitions and without any centralised services, nodes 
are able to authenticate each other with chains of trust. However, in case a trust 
chain cannot be found, a node can solicit neighbouring nodes in one or two hops 
(called helper nodes). This model also includes all required algorithms (e.g. the 
shortcut hunter algorithm) to facilitate the initialization and authentication 
processes, and nodes are expected to store as many certificates as possible by 
means of merging certificate repositories. In this model, trust is established from 
“offline trust relationships”, which are created from general “social relationships”. 
Based on  the same approach as Capkun et al. (2003), Ngai and Lyu (2004) 
apply their trust model on  a cluster-based network model constructed with the 
zonal algorithm. They essentially develop a secure public key authentication 
service to thwart malicious nodes from disseminating false public keys in the 
network. Besides, trust metrics in this model are evaluated according to direct 
monitoring as well as recommendation. However, this work neglects several 
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issues such as the maximum length of trust chains and their effect on the 
performance of their trust management model.  
In contrast to other aforementioned models, Balfanz et al. (2002) describe a 
security solution, called demonstrative identification, which enables nodes to 
establish initial trust relationships with each other without prior relationship or the 
existence of an offline TTP. This proposal normally exploits Location Limited 
Side Channels (LLSC) to support initial bootstrapping and leverages a basis for 
more complex trust establishment. The LLSC is also considered a secure 
proximity-based channel to exchange critical information (e.g. keys or hashes of 
keys for authentication) and thereby it is difficult for adversaries to gain physical 
access to the channel (e.g. to read or inject messages). However, the 
demonstrative identification approach is developed for specifically targeting 
spontaneous, small, and localised ad hoc networks.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced MANETs and issues of security. Several critical 
problem and approaches have been identified. Unlike traditional networks, 
MANETs have many exceptional characteristics which have classified into main 
sets, network-related and node-related attributes as presented in Figure 2-2. 
Additionally, many feasible applications from a wide range of domains such as 
military, civilian and space can take advantage of MANET capabilities. However, 
security is still very crucial subject in any network system like MANETs as this 
issue is dealing with how to protect a system from any damage caused by security 
attacks. Therefore, the most vital security dimensions that need to be taken into 
consideration when securing any network are security requirements, threats and 
techniques. Alternatively, trust management in MANETs can be realised by two 
directions, credential-based and monitored behavioural approaches. For a robust 
security system, both two directions are essential to be incorporated with each 
other. As the research scope of this study is credential-based approaches, they are 
analysed and categorised into a hierarchy of classes according to different criteria 
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as shown in Figure 2-6. The last level in the hierarchy represents the current 
proposals in theses subclasses.  
In conclusion, it appears that securing MANETs is an intricate mission because 
of several factors affecting the security service development for MANETs. These 
factors stem from restrictions in MANET characteristics, a variety of MANET 
application domains, diverse threats and attacks, performance concerns, and 
sophistication in various security mechanisms and trust models being proposed. 
On the other side, some of these factors mentioned above are interrelated with 
each other. Therefore, developing and evaluating an appropriate security 
architecture for such a service in MANETs become very complicated, which 
needs to be simplified and well-defined. Also, there is a lack of systematic 
approaches tackling security from different perspectives cooperatively. the next 
chapter will describe in detail the research approach adopted to fulfil the aim of 
this study. 
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Chapter 3:  The Research Approach   
3.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the methodology and techniques adopted to perform the research 
of this thesis will be discussed. This chapter is initiated with an overview of the 
research methodology for accomplishing the aim of this study and its 
corresponding objectives. Thereafter, the simulation technique and its 
methodology will be described and justified as this research method was used 
mainly for testing SSAM performance and communication. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
In order to achieve the aim of this study and its objectives, the workflow of the 
adopted research approach for this study is summarised in Figure 3-1. A major 
aspect of this work uses computer simulation (a simulation approach (Balci, 1990; 
Law and McComas, 1991; Balci, 1994; Nance, 1994)); the reason for adopting 
simulation is described later in this chapter. To summarise, (1) this research began 
with identifying the scope of the problem area which is in “security service 
realisation in MANETs”. Then, (2) the investigation of this research was initiated 
by reviewing the literature in the topics of the MANET technology and its related 
security issues as presented in Chapter 2. The main purpose was to understand the 
unique MANET properties, potential MANET applications and different 
MANET-related security and trust fundamentals (i.e. security requirements, 
cryptosystems, MANET threats and attacks, trust models, etc.). (3) Because of the 
various features involved in the MANET system, the development of security 
solutions for this system becomes very challenging. On the other side, lack of 
practical approaches, for evaluating the different security models in MANETs 
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under different aspects (performance, an application context, etc.), characterised 
the problem of this research. 
 
Figure  3-1: The flow of the research methodology for this study 
Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 4 – Part A, (4) all relevant aspects (security- 
and non-security-related) that are associated with a security service (i.e. means a 
security/trust infrastructure) were investigated and analysed, such as a security 
operational level, security components, performance, and a MANET context. This 
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exploration of these aspects was in order to conceptualise and simplify them into a 
multi-dimensional design so that MANET developers can easily address all 
interdependencies of these aspects. Based on these identified aspects, (5) the 
methodological approach stages were established for the sake of evaluating 
different security service alternatives in a MANET context. (6) The SSAM model 
was derived from the simplification of the security keystones of security/trust 
infrastructure identified in the multi-dimensional design. It basically consisted of a 
group of different security architectures (i.e. different server architectures and 
different protocols) as detailed in Chapter 4 – Part B. This security model was to 
offer a basic approach of developing the security service in MANETs at the 
service level. Also, this model was intended to be used a case study for validating 
the defined methodological approach. The SSAM conceptual model was created 
and visualised to define all relevant elements and their dependencies existing in 
this model. A computer-aided modelling tool (e.g. MS Visio) was used to produce 
all activity, communication and process models for the SSAM model as presented 
in Chapter 4 – Part B. Then, (7) a simulation technique was used to test the 
performance of this model. Therefore, a simulation approach was defined by 
describing the system boundaries in the SSAM context, the provided services and 
main simulation scenarios. Relying on the OMNeT++ simulator, the SSAM 
prototype was implemented using C++ and NED languages as presented in 
Chapter 5. In addition, all types of necessary configurations (i.e. referred to the 
data input model) are established for the SSAM simulation model and its 
predefined scenarios. Thereafter, (8) the simulation experimentation for SSAM 
was arranged through determining the key metrics, test cases and the number of 
replications. (9) The results of experimentation were analysed and then were 
presented in combined bar charts as displayed in Chapter 6. With incorporating 
some experimental performance results, (10) the evaluation of security strength 
for each security architecture in SSAM was performed in qualitative manner, 
based on the predefined threat model (e.g. single point of compromise (SPC), 
etc.). (11) The results of performance, communication and security strength 
evaluation were employed in the phase of substantiating the feasibility of the 
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proposed methodology through using three real case scenarios. Also, simple 
ranking and weighting systems were used in this methodology to sort security 
alternatives of SSAM based on different criteria for decision support. (12) The 
outcome of this research was to provide the multi-dimensional security framework 
and methodology for evaluation security solutions and the SSAM simulation tool.    
3.3 Simulation Technique 
A major part of this research approach followed the simulation methodology 
(problem definition, model development and decision support stages, based on 
Balci (1990) and Nance (1994)). This stemmed from the fact that the SSAM 
model was required to be implemented and experimented in order to evaluate 
performance and communication of different security architectures in MANETs. 
These evaluations were primarily incorporated in the proposed methodological 
approach in this study. Therefore, simulation was an appropriate scientific 
methodology for this research. The concept of simulation is defined as the 
imitation of some real activities, state of affairs, or processes in any particular 
system whether it can be an abstract or physical system (Nelson et al., 2001). 
Simulation can often be exploited to model natural, machine or human systems in 
order to gain insight into the operation of those modelled systems. Furthermore, it 
is considered as a very important tool for understanding interactions between 
various systems where there may be a lack of physical implementations for those 
systems or it may be difficult to control them in the real world (Sokolowski and 
Banks, 2009). In the domain of technology, researchers widely take advantage of 
simulation tools for testing, performance optimisation and measurement, etc.  
However, simulation is specifically indispensable in the context of this study 
for several reasons. This is because this study is based on using a particular 
wireless network (i.e. a MANET) targeting a large-scale manner (scalability) for 
testing the performance of the SSAM Model. It is almost impossible in terms of 
cost to make use of real wireless devices to demonstrate this research idea since 
there is a scarcity of the real networking systems and applications. Also, it is 
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almost impossible to reproduce the whole wireless propagation environment in 
this particular type of network. Therefore, using a simulator can overcome all 
these challenges. Most network simulators, especially for MANETs, aim to create 
near accurate reproductions of most features in the environment, such as noise, 
probability of loss, routing, queuing, traffic or mobility. In addition, they mostly 
provide a layered-view model of wireless devices for the sake of simplifying the 
network simulation modelling. Hence, using network simulators allows the author 
to focus on the research aim of this study rather than the physical implementation 
details. On the other hand, those simulators facilitate building a valid model 
whose behaviour and operation can be repeated and measured (i.e. leading to a 
statistically verifiable proof of concept). Eventually, for the reasons mentioned 
above, the  Objective Modular Network Test-bed in C++ network simulator 
(OMNeT++), which a MANETs simulation tool, was selected  for developing the 
SSAM model. The justifications for selecting this particular network simulator 
rather than other simulators will be detailed in Section 5.3.1. The next section 
presents the description of standard simulation approach steps along with this 
study reflection on those steps. In other words, it is to show how the research 
approach of this study complied with the simulation approach. 
3.3.1  Simulation Approach 
This approach consists of three key stages, a problem definition, a model 
development and a decision support as proposed in Balci (1990) and Nance 
(1994) (see Figure 3-2). Each stage has a specific number of phases (steps) which 
are recommended to be followed by simulation researchers to successfully 
achieve the aim of each stage as displayed by ovals in Figure 3-2. The dashed 
pointers represent the process being performed to associate the phases to each 
other. However, the solid pointers indicate iterative attempts of evaluation among 
phases for leveraging more accuracy and credibility in phases outcomes by 
conducting  a series of verification, validation and testing (VV&T) as emphasised 
in Balci (1994). A VV&T activity is exploited to discover any deficiencies (e.g. 
errors, bugs, etc.) in the phases. As there are numerous techniques and principles 
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for verification, validation and testing (VV&T) for different simulation contexts, 
only techniques relevant to this study will be briefly highlighted, for further 
details, refer to Balci (1994). In the next sections, the problem definition, model 
development and decision support stages along with their own processes and 
phases shown in Figure 3-2, will be explained and related to this research. (Note 
that not all phases and processes were applicable to this study as this methodology 
targets a wide range of different simulations) 
 
Figure  3-2: The Simulation Approach - Life Cycle (Balci, 1990, pp26) 
Problem Definition Stage 
Model Development Stage 
Decision Support Stage 
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3.3.1.1 The Problem Definition Stage  
This stage is intended to have a well-defined problem required to be solved using 
a simulation technique. It is composed of communicated problem (i.e. a primitive 
form), formulated problem (i.e. an inclusive form), and proposed solution 
technique, and system and objectives definition phases as displayed in Figure 3-2. 
The stage begins with the process “problem formulation” of transforming a 
communicated problem into a formulated problem that is well-defined and well-
structured to initiate an investigation to find the solution for this problem. Then, 
all potential techniques for solving the formulated problem should be researched 
to select the best cost-effective one (i.e. referring to the process of “investigation 
of solution techniques”). However, since this approach is dedicated to simulation 
studies, simulation is presumed to be the most cost-benefit proposed method for 
this context. Thereafter, the properties of the system in which the formulated 
problem is being tackled, need to be examined and characterised, such as system 
environment settings, interdependency and organisation. This is because this helps 
researchers to model this particular system appropriately using a simulation tool. 
Eventually, at the end of this stage, the system and objectives definitions are 
established. 
Briefly, the main problem within this study was to identify and select the most 
suitable security architectures for developing and deploying the security service in 
MANETs that satisfy a set of requirements, such as lower communication and 
better performance. In order to solve his problem, this necessitated 
experimentation for assessing performance and communication for a given 
security architecture in MANETs. The simulation technique was selected as this 
appeared to be appropriate for this context (the justifications of this choice are 
mentioned). However, there were different security architectures proposed in the 
SSAM model for large-scale MANETs. Each security architecture relied on a 
different server architecture and authentication protocol as described in Section 
4.6. The system boundaries were delineated by defining system parameters which 
were related to the SSAM model and MANETs, such as a routing protocol in use, 
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a wireless technology, etc. Most of these issues are discussed in detail in Section 
5.3.3 and 5.3.4. As a result, the goal of simulation was to compare all alternatives 
of these architectures in term of performance and communication so that the 
results would be incorporated in the proposed approach of this study for decision 
support. 
3.3.1.2 The Model Development Stage 
This stage introduces distinct developments to a simulation model throughout the 
simulation study as shown in Figure 3-2. These developments respectively are a 
conceptual model, a communicative model, a programmed model, an experimental 
model, and model results. The stage is initiated by the process “model 
formulation” of constructing a conceptual model which is an abstracted 
visualisation of the system under study. Then, this particular conceptual model 
should be converted into communicative model (i.e. a design specification of a 
simulation model) by using for example documentation and computer-assisted 
graphic tools. This particular model is intended to represent all proposed 
activities, processes and interactions in the simulation model before 
implementation. The specification generated from the previous model should be 
implemented using a high-level standard programming language (e.g. Java, C++, 
etc.) or a specific proprietary simulation language so that a simulation model can 
be compiled and executed on a computer (i.e. referring to the programmed 
model). The design of experiments is the process of creating a plan on how to 
conduct simulation experiments (i.e. an experimental model as shown in Figure 3-
2). This is in order to efficiently obtain the necessary results on which the analyst 
relies, to come up with valid inferences. Various methods can be recognised in the 
design of experiments, such as variance reduction methods, factorial designs, 
replications, etc. After that, the simulation model should be experimented 
according to the predefined experimental model for a specific target such as 
comparison, optimisation, etc., so as to generate model results of simulation. At 
the end of this stage, two processes can be acknowledged, “redefinition” and 
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“presentation of model results”. “Redefinition” is to modify a simulation model to 
adapt new settings of the system in order to study this system from another 
perspective or investigate other different experimental conditions (e.g. amending 
control variables). “Presentation of model results” is the procedure of analysing 
the obtained experimental results and then these results will be presented to 
decision makers to get their approval. Also, the analysed results can be exploited 
by decision makers in their applications. 
For this study, the conceptual model of SSAM was defined which represented  
a new node joining the network to utilise a given security service in order to 
obtain its membership certificate as shown in Figure 4-6, Section 4.6. Also, this 
conceptual model consisted of different server architectures, different 
authentication protocols, and a specific cryptosystem and credential. The 
communicative model was generated as presented in Section 4.7 and 4.7.1. This 
model included the SSAM activity, communication and process models (Figures 
4-10, 4-11, 4-12…and 4-19). The SSAM prototype was implemented in the 
OMNeT++ simulation environment using C++ and NED languages as illustrated 
in Section 5.3.2. This prototype was considered as a programmed model for the 
simulation model of this study. The SSAM experiments was designed (i.e. the 
experimental model) for the SSAM simulation model by defining the important 
performance and communication metrics, test cases and the number of 
replications (using the  confidence interval method) for simulation 
experimentation as described in Section 5.4. The results of simulation experiments 
were interpreted using the simple standard estimation (i.e. averages). Then these 
analysed results were plotted in the combined bar charts, representing different 
scenarios (i.e. Churn and No-Churn node behaviours), node populations and 
different security architectures as shown in Section 6.2. Finally, the results were 
summarised and incorporated in the evaluation stage of the proposed approach as 
demonstrated in Section 6.5 and 6.6.  
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3.3.1.3 The Decision Support Stage 
This stage is relevant to this study as the generated results were used in a simple 
decision making method (i.e. a ranking approach) to compare the security 
alternatives in SSAM based on particular criteria and then to find the best suited 
security architecture for a given application in MANETs, as detailed in Section 
6.5 and 6.6. This particular method consists of achievement rating, reciprocal 
ranking weighting and weighted averaging. Therefore, the phase of integrated 
decision support was involved in this context in accordance with this 
methodology. The outcome of this phase is assumed to enable decision makers to 
take an appropriate action depending on the model results acquired from 
simulation experimentation.  
Last but not least, the Validation and Verification and Testing (VV&T) 
techniques were used through this research approach to substantiate the proposed 
simulation model developed based on the formulated problem as shown in Table 
3-1.  
VV& T Activities Techniques used in this approach 
Formulated Problem  VV&T Walkthrough, Structural Analysis  
System and Objectives Definition VV&T  Walkthrough 
Communicative Model VV&T Walkthrough, Graphical Comparison, and 
Graph-based Analysis 
Programmed Model VV&T Walkthrough, Code Inspection 
Visualisation, Debugging and Graph-based 
Analysis 
Data VV&T Walkthrough, Statistical Techniques 
(Confidence Intervals) and Data Flow 
Analysis 
Experiment Design VV&T Walkthrough  
Experimental Model VV&T Walkthrough, Inspection, Visualisation, 
Graphical Comparison (i.e.  using time-
based series charts) and Graph-based 
analysis  
Presentation VV& T Walkthrough, Inspection  
Table  3-1: Validation and Verification and Testing (VV&T) activities with 
applicable techniques for this study 
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3.4 Conclusion  
The research approach of this study is discussed in this chapter with key steps as 
shown in Figure 3-1. Also, a simulation method was employed for this research to 
evaluate the performance and communication of the SSAM model. The 
description of the simulation approach and its main stages and processes for 
conducting simulation experimentation is presented in addition to The VV&T 
activities and techniques. Eventually, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate 
how the research approach of this study is consistent with the simulation 
approach. The next chapter will discuss the conceptual multi-dimensional security 
framework, the prototypical design of the proposed methodological approach and 
the proposed SSAM model. 
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Chapter 4:  Conceptual Security 
Framework, Approach and SSAM 
Design 
4.1 Overview 
Chapter 2 established the background for MANETs, the fundamentals of MANET 
security, and the MANET-related trust models. To leverage a better understanding 
on how to realise and evaluate a security service in MANETs, this chapter mainly 
presents three key proposals: a conceptual security framework for MANETs, an 
initial proposal of the methodological approach and a model of the Server-based 
Security Architectures for MANETs (SSAM). In this context, the proposed 
security framework is intended to address the key security elements (e.g. security 
roles, security communication protocols, etc.) and the affecting dimensions (e.g. 
an operational level, performance, etc.) in the design and development of a 
trust/security infrastructure in MANET.  Based on this framework, a set of well-
organised steps are formed into a methodological approach in order to enable 
security developers to come up with an effective security solution satisfying a 
given MANET context. On the other hand, as will be seen, the SSAM model is 
proposed to offer a new security design for MANETs relying on the service 
operational level and also to validate the suggested multi-dimensional 
methodological approach stemmed from the framework. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts (i.e. Part A and B).  In Part A, Section 
4.2 describes the operational view and security design of MANETs through 
introducing two key operational levels (“Network” and “Service”) in order to 
handle security issues independently and effectively. In Section 4.3, the primary   
the building blocks of the MANET security/trust infrastructure are formalised into 
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a conceptual security framework by analysing prior works: a security role, 
security-server architecture, security communication protocol, security 
mechanism, and security credentials. In Section 4.4 a multi-dimensional 
framework identifies the important dimensions to be considered for producing a 
well-defined and -designed security/trust infrastructure tailored to the 
requirements of a given MANET context. These dimensions represent the security 
strength (Section 4.4.1), performance (Section 4.4.2), and the MANET context 
(Section 4.4.3). The MANET context consists of MANET constraints (Section 
4.4.3.1) and settings of a given application (Section 4.1.3.2). Section 4.4 presents 
an outline of the methodological approach which is developed to investigate a 
suitable security/trust infrastructure for a certain MANET context. 
In Part B, Section 4.6 conceptualises all relevant elements incorporated in the 
SSAM model: initialisation, server architecture, cryptosystem, credentials 
authentication protocols, strategy of calling, MANET settings. Some of these 
proposed elements are designed producing different alternatives. The server 
architecture may be established on different servers (i.e. CAS, TAS and DAS) and 
there are different architectures which can be recognised (i.e. CAS, TAS, D\CAS, 
CAS_TAS, TAS_DAS and CAS_TAS_DAS). Three standard X.509 authentication 
protocols are utilised in SSAM. In the “strategy of calling” element, AAO and IPS 
are only employed in the hybrid and hierarchical architectures where different 
types of servers participate in providing a security service. Finally, Section 4.7 
presents the SSAM activity model which represents the lifecycle of a new joining 
node utilising a security service in SSAM. In addition, the communication and 
process models in Section 4.7.1 are intended to display the core security-related 
SSAM activities. The communication model (Section 4.7.1.1) specifically 
concerns with describing the sequence flow of creating a single connection 
between a user and server nodes when a particular authentication protocol is 
applied. However, the process model for both user and server nodes (Section 
4.7.1.2) is defined to point out to the flow of internal processes for utilising a 
security service (i.e. calling and then obtaining a membership certificate) in 
distinctive server architectures within SSAM. 
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4.2 MANET Views – PART A 
A typical MANET is composed of wireless mobile nodes forming a dynamic 
network without relying on centralised routing infrastructure where nodes 
communicate through multi-hops as depicted in the MANET physical view in 
Figure 4-1. However, similar to the other conventional networking systems, this 
particular network can be realised by a layer-based architecture complying with 
the standard OSI model as demonstrated in the MANET operational view in 
Figure 4-1. Two given end nodes, representing a user and a service provider, 
interact at the transport and application layers while other network nodes become 
routers for facilitating communication between those two ends in the network 
layer following the OSI reference model.  
This design approach (i.e. layering) aims to facilitate controlled interaction 
among layers so that developing and maintaining single layers can be attained 
independently of the rest of the stack. In other words, this design organises 
protocol and network tasks in layers, splitting the networking system into modules 
in order to enable transparent and efficient improvements of these single modules. 
Thus, in a strict-layered system, protocols can be deployed independently of each 
other and interact through predefined layer interfaces (i.e. each layer 
implementation relies on the interfaces accessible from the lower and upper 
layers). The layer-based design approach supports flexibility to a system’s 
architecture as any amendments introduced into any single level do not affect the 
rest of the system. Furthermore, the separation of networking system activities in 
this regard, would lead to cut down development costs through re-using existing 
code. As presented in Figure 4.1, this design approach leverages “horizontal” 
communication between peer protocol layers on the sender and receiver devices. 
However, the drawback of this particular design is that high overhead 
communications are incurred from interaction of the multiple layers and this may 
be very critical especially in limited bandwidth networks. 




Figure  4-1: The MANET OSI-based Operational View (the Physical and 
Logical Views) 
However, other design approaches can be found in literature. For example, 
Corson et al. (1999) have suggested a design approach for Internet-based 
MANETs in a tactical domain by vertically integrating certain layers (e.g. routing 
network and link layers) in the OSI model. This is to minimise the problem of 
limited bandwidth sacrificing flexibility and interoperation aspects, but they have 
emphasised that it is important to make trade-offs between the traditional layered 
model and the integrated one according to domain context requisites. Also, the 
Conti et al. (2004) and Messerges et al. (2003) proposals take advantage of the 
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cross-layer design approach in order to enhance network performance. This 
specific cross-layer design can allow protocols in different layers to collaborate in 
sharing network-status information or security materials while still keeping the 
layers separated. However, an unrestricted cross-layer design can lead to 
overlapped code which is very difficult to maintain efficiently since every 
amendment must be spread out across all protocols. Also, cross-layer designs 
could trigger unintended interactions among protocols, such as adaptation loops, 
that may cause performance degradation. 
As it is concluded from the discussion of different design approaches, several 
key motivations can be acknowledged to encourage the adoption of the strict-layer 
approach for MANETs. Some of these motivations include (1) the standard “IP-
based” view of MANETS for internet interoperation purposes; and (2) the 
flexibility, (3) modularity and (4) simplicity provided by independent layers, 
which support reuse of existing software. On the other hand, the choice of the 
layered approach is supported by the fact that MANETs offer mobile extensions 
of the Internet, and thereby the standard layer-based stack – the OSI (ISO/IEC 
7498-1) appears to be appropriate.  
Therefore, the next two sections discuss this thesis proposal of the level 
abstraction in the layered operational model for MANETs without violating the 
reference OSI or internet model. This proposal presents the simplification and 
differentiation of two key generic operational levels (Network and Service) each 
of which involves distinct activities and responsibilities. The main purpose of this 
proposal is arguably to offer a guide especially for MANET security designers so 
that they are able to address security issues independently and effectively as 
illustrated in Section 4.2.2. 
4.2.1  Proposed Two-Level-Based MANET Design 
According to the above discussion, it is important that a MANET system should 
abide by the standard layer-based architecture for the sake of maintaining 
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modularity, flexibility and interoperation in networking system design. However, 
having several different layers in a system design, especially for MANETs, may 
introduce more complexity and redundancy in the system development and 
deployment. As a result, without overlooking the layered-based design, the 
operational levels of the MANET system can be simplified and distinguished into 
two key general levels; the Network and Service Levels as presented in Figure 4-
2. The proposed two-level design which represents the abstraction of the OSI 
layers, is justified by the fact that most activities in the “Network Level” address 
only the networking issues, such as node addressing, routing and node-to-node 
communication whereas the “Service Level” concerns with data resources and 
applications (i.e. services available to users) shared within the MANET system. 
Based on the OSI model, the “Network Level” typically represents the network 
(i.e. IP) and MAC layers while the “Service Level” indicates to the transport and 
application layers. 
 
Figure  4-2: The generic MANET operational levels with their typical 
interactive activities (the two-level-based model) 
The “Network Level” represents the networking infrastructure of MANETs 
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handling routing between mobile hosts (i.e. packet sending, receiving and 
forwarding and route discovery). There are various types of reactive and proactive 
routing protocols, such as AODV, DSR, OLSR, etc., developed for this reason 
(for more details, see Section 5.3.4.4). In the “Service Level”, regardless of 
network types being used, the client/server (C/S) and peer-to-peer (P2P) models 
are the most well-known computing paradigms that can be acknowledged for 
running various applications and sharing different data resources (Umar and 
Fraser, 1993; Umar, 1997; Taylor and Harrison, 2006; Tanenbaum and Van Steen, 
2007). The client-server model is realised by the fact that a single or a group of 
servers (where data resources and services reside) process and handle invocations 
initiated from certain clients (e.g. MANET nodes in this study) on the network. In 
this particular model, servers are presumed to be powerful devices with the 
adequate bandwidth network connectivity whereas clients are considered weak 
end points. This model is widely adopted by many internet applications (e.g. 
Grids, Web Services, Clouds, Database systems, etc.). This is due to its generality 
feature (most other paradigms are derived from this model), simplicity of the 
client design, and direct support by single or multiple servers. However, the main 
drawback is that when more clients require service, this may entail more overhead 
on a server, creating a bottleneck (i.e. degradation in system scalability). The 
peer–to–peer (P2P) model, an alternative to the client/server model, was first 
introduced to describe point–to–point communication between two nodes sharing 
equal status, such as a telephone conversation (Taylor and Harrison, 2006). Peers 
still implicitly exploit the client/server paradigm since whenever one peer contacts 
another; it becomes the client node, while the other becomes a server node. In this 
model, every peer takes the role of both a client and a server. Nowadays, this 
model becomes a building block of what is called P2P networks through 
supporting a unique communication paradigm for large numbers of heterogeneous 
nodes and building “virtual” nodal connectivity (Moore and Hebeler, 2002) at the 
application layer. Most P2P networks are intended to use the resources of the 
peers, for example content, CPU cycles, and bandwidth to be shared with other 
peers for sake of augmenting efficient utilisation and decentralisation. For this 
reason, several famous P2P applications, such as Napster, KaZaA, Gnutella and 
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BitTorrent, have emerged to allow for nodes to share information over the wired 
Internet. Therefore, the main advantages of P2P are the exploitation of unused 
distributed peer resources, enhancement in information delivery and system 
scalability due to eliminating the server bottleneck, cost savings stemming from 
minimising the demand of centralised management, storage, and other related 
resources, and improved network fault tolerance. Yet, P2P like other systems 
encounters many challenges which inclusively include, interoperation,  
questionability on availability and performance, lack of network control, potential 
violation of privacy and security (Steinmetz and Wehrle, 2005; Taylor and 
Harrison, 2006).  
Applying P2P over limited MANETs following this proposed level-based 
model would create a burden on the mobile nodes in terms of network traffic 
handling and energy consumption apart from their ad-hoc routing roles. 
Therefore, the majority of proposed P2P-MANET projects, such as Klemm et al. 
(2003), Gruber et al. (2004), Tang et al. (2005), Choi et al. (2006), Boukerche et 
al. (2010), etc., leverage the cross-layer design for adapting P2P applications in 
MANETs in order to reduce the communication overhead and enhance P2P 
delivery. Due to the similarities between P2P networks and MANETs and also 
having specific P2P applications (e.g. commonly file sharing and VoIP 
streaming), the P2P over MANETs has received a great attention by the research 
community studying the advantages of MANET potential in the context of P2P 
implementations. However, this domain is out of this study’s scope. Nevertheless, 
only a specific case of a so-called pure P2P architecture, where only two peer ends 
interact independently (Schollmeier, 2001), can be adapted with the “Service 
Level” in this proposed two-level-based model for MANETs. 
Alternatively, despite the fact that the client/server model may suffer from a 
server bottleneck which can be resolved by using distributed servers, this model is 
still acknowledged as a predominant basic computing paradigm adopted by 
numerous types of applications/services even some hybrid P2P applications. In 
addition, most implementations of this model can be typically found in the 
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transport and application layers based on the OSI model and this is consistent with 
the design of the “Service Level”.  
On the other side, MANETs are usually characterised as a self-organised and 
infrastructure-less networking system (i.e. no need to a pre-established 
infrastructure for deployment). However, these types of system features are 
realistically unachievable in all different levels of MANET operation especially in 
large-scale MANETs. Besides, it is important to realise that being  infrastructure-
less appears to represent only an extreme case for MANETs as stressed by Asokan 
and Ginzboorg (2000). They also stated that it is feasible in these networks to 
have a sort of partial infrastructure to facilitate and support several activities, such 
as security, management, etc. In this regards, in MANETs, two different 
infrastructures can be distinguished: the routing and service (server) 
infrastructures. These two particular infrastructures clearly adhere to two 
operational levels proposed in the two-level-based model as shown in Figure 4-2.  
The routing infrastructure, which intends to establish interconnection between 
network nodes, is self-organised in MANETs since every node has a dual role; a 
host role to handle its own traffic and a router role to route other node traffic using 
a specific ad-hoc routing protocol. The service (server) infrastructure typically 
consists of on-line servers where certain application/services are deployed, such as 
DNS, CA, Database and Web application servers, offering services to network 
user nodes. Furthermore, the presence of this infrastructure depends on the type of 
the application or service being targeted (e.g. Website hosting or P2P VoIP 
streaming). 
4.2.2  Security Level Design for MANETs 
Security is a very demanding element for MANETs. At the same time, it is a quite 
problematic issue. Security MANETs designers still come across many technical 
challenges and complications to develop appropriate security solutions for 
protecting MANETs. This stems from the fact that MANETs, unlike the other 
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typical networks, have unique features, such as infrastructure-less-ness, dynamic 
topology, limited resources and bandwidth, and an open and unreliable 
communication medium (Chlamtac et al., 2003; Djenouri et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, in terms of security, MANETs also show no clear line of defence 
(Yang et al., 2004) and encounter many different vulnerabilities and threats as 
described in Section 2.3.2. 
On the other hand, security is still treated as an add-on feature considered after 
developing the whole networking system. This approach in developing security 
solutions renders more complexities and discrepancies which need to be resolved 
before any security solution can be implemented in the system. Therefore, in the 
first place, security must be handled as a main element involved in the design and 
development of networks like MANETs.  
Although many security solutions, such as trust models shown in Figure 2-6 
and a survey of secure MANET routing protocols in Abusalah et al. (2008), have 
been developed to improve the security of MANETs, none of them takes into 
account designing security from a system architectural view. In addition, there is a 
lack of a clear systematic approach which can efficiently deal with the complexity 
of security requirements in different levels and circumstances. As a result, security 
solutions are prone to suffer from several problems of misplacement and 
overlapping of security mechanisms being applied in those solutions.  
Due to the great success of the standard OSI model, the layer-based design in 
any networking system is still the most effective and flexible design on which 
security designers can rely to develop their security solutions. Furthermore, 
considering different layers from the perspective of security design allows various 
security operations and requirements to be addressed independently and this 
arguably leads to increase robustness, manageability, flexibility, simplicity and 
interoperation in the development of network security. International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in ITU-T recommendation X.805 (ITU, 2003) 
has proposed a global standard  security architecture which is primarily based on a 
layered design (i.e. network infrastructure, network service and network-based 
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application security layers) for telecommunication systems (i.e. cellular and wired 
networks). This particular security architecture logically arranges end-to-end 
security-related network activities into separate layers and planes taking into 
consideration the important security dimensions (i.e. security requirements) that 
need to be fulfilled. In addition, this architecture is intended to offer a 
comprehensive, top-down, and end-to-end approach of networking system 
security which can be applied to network elements, services, and applications for 
the sake of improving protection from attacks and threats and also efficiently 
handling potential vulnerabilities. This approach aims to facilitate the planning, 
development and deployment phases of new security solutions and it can be 
exploited to evaluate the security of the existing networks for maintenance 
purposes (for more details, see ITU-T recommendation X.805 (2003)). However, 
this particular security architecture is developed for networks which rely on 
specific infrastructures for operation, unlike infrastructure-less and dynamic 
MANETs. 
There are few attempts in proposing a fully layered security design to a 
MANET system aiming to attain complete protection, such as Yu et al. (2003), 
Yang et al. (2004), Al-Bayatti et al. (2009) and Sehgal et al. (2011). These 
references have provided a similar layered security design which comparatively 
complies with the standard security architecture proposed in ITU-T 
recommendation X.805 (ITU, 2003). These proposed architectural designs include 
application, networking, routing, and node-to-node security layers along with a 
trust infrastructure layer. Alternatively, some MANET security approaches have 
leveraged layers partially in the implementation of their security solutions (i.e. do 
not adopt all layers in the security design). For example, Verma et al. (2004) have 
considered both application and data-link layers in the implementation of trust 
negotiation between two ends for facilitating confidentiality and authentication. 
Komninos et al. (2006, 2007) have presented a security framework of handling 
security in the data-link and network layers by using suitable authentication 
protocols. Aljnidi and Leneutre (2007) have suggested an access control model for 
securing virtual domains over MANETs and this model is only applicable to the 
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application layer. Obviously, the concept of security layer can still assist security 
designers to easily identify the specific security issues associated with key layer 
activities and to deal with those activities independently and effectively during the 
development of MANET security system. 
The works discussed above suggest the layer-based security architecture with 
several security layers for modularity and flexibility purposes. Those several 
layers however may become a source of undesirable complexity in tackling 
security especially in MANETs. Therefore, in the light of the proposed two-level-
based operational model described in the previous section, the notion of a security 
level can also be introduced for MANETs in order to handle important MANET 
security issues effectively and to facilitate the development of proposed MANET 
security solutions. The two-level-based security design consists of the “Service 
and Network Security Levels”. Having two security levels for MANETs is 
justified by the fact that both levels show different security concerns and 
requirements which can be tackled separately in each level. Also, various threats 
in MANETs according to the OSI layers (as illustrated in Section 2.3.2), can be 
accommodated this security-level-oriented model. The “Network Security Level” 
represents networking activities and procedures that need to be protected, such as 
route discovery, address location, packet forwarding, frame delivery, etc. For 
“Service Security Level”, service-based security is in contrast intended to secure 
service\application infrastructures (e.g. users and service providers, application-
based protocols, etc.) already deployed in this operational level of MANETs. 
Furthermore, most common security services in this level are associated with end-
to-end security, authentication and authorisation (user’s roles and identities, 
access policies, and security authority). However, this does not mean that there is 
no need for network-level security. The main reason is that it is much more 
seamless to reconfigure the security infrastructure at the service level than at 
lower-level (network) especially in MANETs where no fixed routing 
infrastructure typically exists for establishing connections (i.e. infrastructure-less).  
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In conclusion, this two-security-level-based architecture arguably presents a 
pragmatic approach of streamlining the essential security operations in the 
development of MANETs into two key security levels, “Network” and “Service” 
levels. This can be considered as a key enabler to security designers for 
developing their security solutions seamlessly with a balanced view in MANETs. 
In addition, the security architecture aims to instigate more interest in the “Service 
Security Level” to the research community as there is a lack of research in this 
topic and also many published studies in MANET security have only focused on 
routing and networking security (Abusalah et al., 2008; Cho et al., 2011). 
4.3 Conceptual Security Framework 
As described in Section 2.4, irrespective of the operational level being considered,   
establishing trust associations among MANET nodes is very important to enable 
secure interaction and utilisation within MANETs. This stems from the fact that 
almost all types of security services (authentication, authorisation, etc.) rely on 
trust for their deployment and implementation. Various categories of trust models 
can be acknowledged for MANETs (as illustrated in Section 2.4 and 2.5) 
according to the trust form, the architectural type of a trust service, the authority 
reliance and security mechanisms being used, etc. However, this study takes into 
account only trust which is represented by certain credentials (e.g. digital 
certificates) issued by single or multiple authorities (e.g. CA, AA, KDC etc.).  
Involving an authoritarian trust model, especially a centralised one in 
MANETs, may compromise the MANET common desire of having self-
organisation and self-administration. However, for several reasons, this particular 
model is still an effective solution of trust establishment for various applications 
which are required to be under control of a certain body (administration, 
government, etc.). Firstly, using an authority can leverage a high-level assurance 
to secure high-value communications particularly in large-scale networks as every 
node in the network typically trusts the authority with high confidence for 
managing  their security issues (Yi and Kravets, 2004; Luo et al., 2005). Also, the 
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authority often has necessary policies for regulating access, admission and 
membership in the network (Jansen et al., 2003; Keoh et al., 2004). On the other 
side, the self-organised (i.e. non-authority-based) trust models for MANETs, such 
as  Capkun et al. (2002; 2003) and Ngai and Lyu (2004) usually rely on PGP (as 
described in Section 2.5.5) which has some shortcomings, such as questionable 
scalability, low-level assurance and poor and costly certification management. 
The questionable scalability is caused by the fact that finding a complete trust 
chain between a pair of interacting nodes is not all the time possible, especially in 
networks with a large number of nodes. The low-level assurance is instigated from 
the risk of having a malicious introducer within a trust chain, which jeopardises 
the whole trust. The process of certificate revocation in PGP is complicated as 
disseminating revocation lists among all nodes is problematic specifically in 
large-scale networks. Yet, a transitive trust used in PGP can entail a 
computational overhead (i.e. verifying a long trust chain) which is not applicable 
to limited MANETs (Luo et al., 2005). Therefore, the authority-based trust model 
still presents great promises for MANETs and their applications as this is 
appeared from a number of studies in this research field, as shown in Figure 2-6. 
On the other side, an “authority” can play different roles for supporting specific 
security service (e.g. authentication, authorisation, policy enforcement, etc.).  
Generally, a “security infrastructure” is defined to represent all important 
underlying security elements which are utilised to protect networking systems like 
MANETs. However, the intended security infrastructure, in this study, mainly 
concerns with facilitating trust distribution, especially in the service level (i.e. a 
security trust service), using specific security credentials. Therefore, a 
“security/trust infrastructure” is decided to be termed for covering a broad security 
meaning. This is because a trust management system (as explained in Section 2.4) 
is considered a fundamental part of any protection system. Also, some security 
measures (e.g. authentication protocols, intrusion detections, access controls, etc.) 
need to incorporate trust services for achieving security robustness.  
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Catering for more coherent design of a security/trust infrastructure in 
MANETs, a security framework is suggested, as shown in Figure 4-3. This 
framework is composed of five security building blocks: (1) a security role, (2) a 
security-server architecture, (3) a security communication protocol, (4) a security 
mechanism, and (5) a security credential. Arguably, these design elements can 
assist security MANET designers to speculate about relevant aspects and 
challenges of the design of security/trust infrastructure so as to develop a well-
designed and feasible security solution for MANETs. Therefore, the elements of a 
security/trust infrastructure are explained as follows:  
1. The Security Role: refers to the type of security service that is provided by a 
security server in the security/trust infrastructure. Different types of security 
services can be recognised, such as certificate authority (CA), attribute 
authority (AA), policy certificate authority (PCA), key distribution centre 
(KDC), authentication, etc. Typically, the CA server is used to issue, update 
and revoke name or Id certificates for network users. Similar to the CA server, 
the AA server deals with generating and revoking attribute or authorisation 
certificates. The PCA server  is presumed to provide users in the network with 
their policy certificates in order to manage security policy in users’ devices 
(Jansen et al., 2003). The KDC server is used specifically in the Kerberos 
protocol to secure secret keys to network users. The authentication server, 
such as an AAA server is used to handle users’ admission in the network using 
a particular token.  
2. The Security-Server Architecture: describes the distribution model to security 
servers which typically run a particular security role in the security/trust 
infrastructure, such as central, distributed and hierarchical models. The central 
model is where only one server is responsible for providing a security service 
to users (see Section 2.5.1.1). The distributed model involves multiple servers 
which collaborate dependently (see Section 2.5.1.2.1.1) or independently (see 
Section 2.5.1.2.1.2) to offer a security service. The hierarchical model is 
similar to distributed model but with different types of servers arranged in a 
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particular hierarchy (see Section 2.5.1.2.1.3). However, several reasons can be 
perceived behind proposing distributed and hierarchical models in the 
security/trust infrastructure, such as providing fault tolerance, availability, 
more security robustness, etc. 
                                              
Figure  4-3: Security/Trust Infrastructure building blocks  
3. The Security Communication Protocol: denotes to the particular protocol 
which is used to establish connection (i.e. a trusted channel) between user and 
security server nodes in the security/trust infrastructure. This is in order to 
enable user nodes to obtain security credentials from certain security servers. 
However, two distinct communication channels are commonly used in any 
security/trust infrastructure, peer connection and out-of-band channels. The 
peer connection channel relies on MANET routing infrastructure involving 
one-hop or multi-hop networking. The out-of-band channel refers to any 
communication medium other than MANET, such as physical contact, and 
location-limited side channel (Balfanz et al., 2002). This channel has also its 
own interaction approaches for utilisation, but these approaches are out of this 
study’s scope as the focus is on using MANET medium. Therefore, the 
particular security communication protocol can be represented simply by one 
call followed by one successful rely (i.e. one-way protocol), or by a series of 












































 Chapter 4:  Conceptual Security Framework, Approach and SSAM Design 
 
Salaheddin Darwish 83
connection channel. Besides, the protocol (if required) can involve a specific 
authentication protocol (i.e. called “authentication exchange” described in 
Section 2.3.3.4) which aim to validate identities and to create a protected link 
among communicating nodes, for example Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) (Aboba et al., 2004). Eventually, the protocols can vary from 
proprietary to standard protocols.   
4. The Security Mechanism: represents the security cryptographic function 
employed in the security/trust infrastructure to generate and validate trust (i.e. 
security credentials), such as asymmetric, symmetric and threshold 
cryptography. Therefore, this particular security element appears primarily to 
be associated with the type of the security credential and also the specific 
security-server architecture being utilised. For example, using secret keys 
should rely on a symmetric cryptosystem whereas a pair of different keys 
(public and private keys) is typically generated via using asymmetric 
cryptosystem. Also, both symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems are 
distinguished with different configurations, key lengths and algorithms (e.g. 
symmetric algorithms: AES, Blowfish, DES, etc.; asymmetric algorithms: 
RSA, ECC, ElGamal, etc.). It is worth pointing out that applying a symmetric 
cryptosystem often takes less computation cost than an asymmetric one. 
However, as the asymmetric cryptosystem uses a public key, it is much more 
scalable than the symmetric cryptosystem (Smart, 2003; Stallings, 2010). 
Alternatively, threshold cryptography -TC(k , n) (Desmedt and Frankel, 1990), 
as detailed in Section 2.3.3.6, is usually used to allow n multiple trusted 
entities (signers) to generate partial signatures relying on an asymmetric 
cryptosystem using  a particular public-key signing algorithm (e.g. RSA, 
DSA, Schnorr, etc. (Saxena et al., 2003)). Obtaining k partial signatures can 
be enough to produce a valid complete signature on a particular credential. 
Therefore, threshold cryptography is intended to create a collaboratively or 
dependently distributed model of a signing service (i.e. deployed in multiple 
security servers) for more security and availability. This technique however 
experiences a number of challenges: (1) adjusting adequate threshold values k 
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and n to provide strong security and low delay, (2) the complexity of sharing 
management (i.e. distributing and updating and verifying secret shares among 
active security servers). 
5. The Security Credential: indicates a type of a credential being used in the 
security/trust infrastructure to facilitate the building of trust associations and 
secure utilisation. However, each credential type is associated with a particular 
security-server role involving in the infrastructure. For example, a CA server 
is typically used to provide users with digital certificates (as described in 
Section 2.3.8). Various formats of credentials can be acknowledged, such as 
public and secret keys, certificates, and access tokens and tickets. 
Furthermore, the same credential type, like a X.509v3 digital certificate 
(Chokhani et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2008), can be exploited for different 
purposes, identification (i.e. using name or Public-Key certificates), 
authorisation (i.e. using attribute or role-based certificates) and security policy 
management (using a policy certificate). Access tokens and tickets can be 
created in particular Kerberos (Neuman and Ts'o, 1994; Neuman et al., 2005)  
and AAA security systems (Larafa and Laurent, 2009), respectively. Different 
security credentials differ in terms of size, generation and distribution 
overheads and security robustness. Therefore, this may instigate some 
challenges in using particular credentials, especially in limited and vulnerable 
networking systems like MANETs.  
A number of existing relevant security proposals for MANETs (discussed mostly 
in Section 2.5) are selected to be analysed against the proposed building blocks in 
the security/trust infrastructure, as presented in Table 4-1. Some authority-based 
security proposals, such as cluster-based solutions are out of scope of this design. 
The reason for this is as follows. These specific proposals show a strict 
interdependency between routing and trust infrastructures leading to apparent 
violation the proposed two-level design described in Section 4.2. On the other 
side, the clustering domain for these security proposals also entails more 
management and operation complexities (i.e. clustering algorithms and the 
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selection, configuration, maintenance, and replacement of CHs, merging clusters, 
node cluster membership management, etc.). This indicates the necessity for this 
domain to be tackled in its own for an effective evaluation. 
In Table 4-1, various security roles can be realised in these presented 
proposals, such CA, AAA, TGS, coordinator & PCA, etc.  Almost all security 
proposals are established on a distributed architecture irrespective of  a 
distribution type (duplicate, hierarchical, etc.), excluding the centralised 
proposals, Keoh et al. (2004)  and Jansen et al. (2003). Regarding the security 
communication protocol being used, many proposals leverage the simple one-way 
communication protocol, such as Zhou and Haas (1999), Luo et al. (2004), 
Pirzada and McDonald (2004), Keoh et al. (2004) & Jansen et al. (2003),  Luo et 
al. (2005), Raghani et al. (2006), Omar et al. (2007), and Al-Bayatti et al. (2009). 
Some other proposals incorporate their own proprietary protocol for facilitating 
communication between user and security servers, such as Yi and Kravets (2003, 
2004), Hadjichristofi et al. (2005a; 2005b), Luo et al. (2005), Wu et al. (2007b), 
Saremi et al. (2009) and Khakpour et al. (2008). Only two proposals make use of 
a standard authentication protocol, the (EAP) protocol in Larafa and Lauren 
(2009, 2011)  and Kerberos protocol in Pirzada and McDonald (2004). Few 
proposals have proposed the out-of-band channel as the main means to obtain 
security credentials in their security infrastructure, for example  Luo et al. (2005) 
and Hadjichristofi et al. (2005a; 2005b). It is noticed that 11 out of 16 presented 
security proposals take advantage of asymmetric cryptography and threshold 
cryptography (TC), for the sake of more protection robustness and better 
availability and scalability. Several proposals make use of a certificate credential 
with different purposes (name, authorisation, policy, etc.), and sometimes adopt 
the standard X.509 certificate  (Chokhani et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2008). Some 
proposals rely on a particular standard security system which generates its own 
unique credential, such as a Kerberos ticket in the Kerberos system and AVP 
access token in the AAA system. 
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Table  4-1: Security proposals against the building blocks of the proposed 
security/trust infrastructure 
Eventually, since the proposed security/trust infrastructure is primarily designed 
for the MANET and its applications, building blocks aforementioned in the 
security/trust infrastructure should arguably be tailored to the demands of this 
network and its applications. These demands can stem from the unique MANET 
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characteristics (i.e. limitations), the focused operational level (Section 4.2.1) and 
requirements of the application domain. On the other hand, some of the building 
blocks, discussed above (Figure 4-3), may be susceptible to different security 
threats and attacks (e.g. Man-In-The-Middle, credential forging, Denial of Service 
(DoS), etc.). For this reason, it is important to take this security concern into 
consideration when dealing within these particular building blocks for an effective 
infrastructural design. The next section discusses the key dimensions each of 
which has an influence on the design and implementation for a certain 
security/trust infrastructure. These dimensions will be involved in the proposed 
approach of this study for facilitating the development of an applicable 
security/trust infrastructure matching context requirements. Prototype  
4.4 Multi-Dimensional Framework for MANET 
Security 
The design and development of the security/trust infrastructure appear to 
significantly be affected by a number of key dimensions: security strength, 
performance and context, as shown in Figure 4-4. Especially, some related 
building blocks of the security/trust infrastructure described in the previous 
section such as security-server architecture, a security mechanism, a security 
credential and a security communication protocol can be shaped by these 
particular dimensions as this will be addressed in Section 4.4.1 , 4.4..2  and 4.4.3. 
Generally, even though most security solutions are proposed originally to solve 
particular security problems (e.g. trust facilitation), these solutions may still 
experience security weaknesses (i.e. vulnerabilities, etc.) as there is no security 
panacea. Hence, a security solution should allegedly show a sufficient level of 
robustness against potential threats and attacks. However, any enhancement in 
security will definitely lead to increase the cost of computation, communication, 
and management, as a result of extra measures that must be applied for supporting 
protection. Also, as many existing proposals look at their security solutions from 
the cryptographic angle, they unintentionally neglect the aspect of performance 
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(Yang et al., 2004). Therefore, security performance becomes an important factor, 
especially for developing a security solution for resource-constrained MANETs. 
Thus, both dimensions of security strength and performance are very crucial to be 
equally considered for better security design of MANETs. This can be typically 
realised by making an appropriate trade-off between them, based on the 
requirements of a certain context being tackled. In this study, the dimension of the 
MANET context is proposed primarily to describe MANET capabilities (e.g. 
constrained resources) and application settings (e.g. requirements, environment, 
etc.). This is due to the fact that information extracted from these two scopes can 
arguably assist to identify the importance of some related issues (i.e. security and 
performance dimensions) to the security design of MANETs.  
 
Figure  4-4: Key dimensions related to the security/trust infrastructure 
Developing an effective and efficient security solution for MANETs is still a 
challenging task since several dimensions, operational levels and restrictions, 
which have a significant impact on the security design of MANETs, are involved. 
Few attempts have addressed some of these issues, for example, in Balakrishnan 
and Varadharajan (2005), three dimensions (i.e. cryptographic function, and  
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into account when securing MANETs. Only two of these proposed dimensions, 
cryptographic function and resources management are relevant to the proposed 
multi-dimensional framework of this study. The aspect of cryptographic function 
can be involved in the proposed building blocks of the security/trust infrastructure 
whereas the aspect of resource management can be considered in the context of 
MANET constraints. Cayirci and Rong (2008) only highlight the five key 
attributes (i.e. applicability, security, robustness, scalability, usability) which are 
used specifically for analysing different existing key management schemes for 
MANETs, not for design purposes. Similarly, Merwe et al. (2007) present a list of 
detailed security attributes relevant to a key management system (e.g. 
confidentiality, key freshness, forward secrecy, availability, robustness, etc.). 
Some of these attributes (applicability, security, robustness, and availability) in 
both works are selected to be integrated in the dimensions of this proposed 
framework. It appears that there is a lack of a systematic approach to design a 
security solution from different perspectives (i.e. an operational level, 
performance and context). The perspective of the operational level particularly 
shows an absence in the design view of MANET security even thought this 
perspective is crucial in design. A different operational level can usually introduce 
different security concerns and performance assessment (i.e. different metrics). 
For example, security threats and attacks vary in the service level (application & 
transport layers) and the network level (MAC & network layers), as shown in 
Figure 2-3. Also performance assessment in the network layer (different 
protocols, secured routing overheads, bandwidth utilisation, etc.) differs from 
performance assessment in the application layer (a response time, security server 
availability etc.). However, in this study, the proposed service operational level is 
the main focus on applying this framework. The next subsections will discuss in 
detail each of the proposed dimensions in this multi-dimensional framework. 
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4.4.1  Security Strength  
The dimension of security strength presents all security concerns and protection 
issues that the security/trust infrastructure (considering its building blocks 
discussed in Section 4.3) may encounter. This dimension is intended to examine 
the resistance of the security/trust infrastructure against any potential threats and 
failures (e.g. denial of service (DoS), single-point-of-compromise, man-in-the-
middle, etc.). This stems from the fact that security building blocks involved in 
the security/trust infrastructure are expected to suffer from weaknesses. For 
example, adopting distributed servers in the infrastructure may alleviate the 
disruption caused by a DoS attack. Alternatively, security strength of the 
security/trust infrastructure can also reflect the security requirements (i.e. 
confidentiality, non-repudiation, mutual authentication, etc.) being already 
satisfied in this infrastructure for more protection. For example, taking advantage 
of a different security communication protocol can show different security 
features applied, such as the one-way pass protocol attains unilateral 
authentication and a two-way pass protocol can fulfil mutual authentication (Boyd 
and Mathuria, 2003). 
However, in contrast to other networks, MANETs are vulnerable to different 
threats and attacks, especially in the network layer, as detailed in section 2.3.2. 
Therefore, the security/trust infrastructure which is originally developed for 
MANETs, could inherit most of security problems from this type of network. As 
this study proposes two levels of operations (i.e. service and network levels) for 
MANETs, security problems can be tackled independently, especially when 
designing the security/trust infrastructure for MANETs. Eventually, the 
security/trust infrastructure should demonstrate enough security strength through 
withstanding any potential threats and attacks, and satisfying most important 
security requirements. However, enhancing “security strength” may result in a 
performance overhead due to additional measures that are required for more 
protection.  
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4.4.2  Performance  
Performance is a very important dimension for the design of a security/trust 
infrastructure for MANETs since any security enhancement (e.g. using security 
end-to-end protocols, asymmetric cryptography, etc.) in this infrastructure would 
entail a performance overhead (more processing and communications). This 
particular dimension is fundamentally associated with security service availability, 
rapidity, reliability, scalability, etc. (Yang et al., 2004; Merwe et al., 2007; 
Cayirci and Rong, 2008). High-availability and good-reliability attributes are very 
desirable in order to avoid any degradation in security service and to ensure that a 
credential is provided to user nodes in the network when anticipated. Also, 
satisfying a low-delay feature in the response time of security services is very 
crucial as in some situations, such as rescue mission and battle field applications 
time is very critical for particular applications,. High scalability can be realised 
when the security/trust infrastructure is able to seamlessly handle many nodes 
invocations regardless of the varying network sizes and node densities. 
However, unlike the other conventional networks, MANETs experience unique 
performance challenges which may affect the service security utilisation. This is 
due to the fact that bandwidth in MANETs is shared for routing and utilisation 
purposes at the same time, in other words, each MANET node has a dual role (i.e. 
a router and host). Hence, it is vital to keep network traffic as low as possible. 
This is because any increase in traffic leads to limit the available bandwidth for 
loading data and consequently this will have an impact on the whole performance 
of MANETs including security services. Furthermore, node mobility and churning 
in MANETs introduce more network partitioning and broken links which may 
cause performance disruption in the network. MANETs are typically characterised 
with limited resources (i.e. a battery, small memory and CPU, etc.) which results 
in more restriction on the network performance (i.e. long delays, etc.) as well. 
Therefore, the MANET attributes need to be considered carefully for achieving 
desired performance. 
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Eventually, performance of a security/trust infrastructure can be affected by a 
number of factors in MANETs, for example MANET specifications, an 
application scope, and the strength of security measures being involved in the 
service\trust infrastructure. Therefore, the so-called security performance is 
arguably still a very key element that must be taken into consideration in order to 
enable security designers to produce a successful and effective security design in 
MANETs. 
4.4.3  MANET Context 
Generally,  the term “context” in computing can refer to many aspects, such as 
environment, location, computing capabilities, application types, time, etc. (Dey, 
2001). Accordingly, a MANET context can be perceived in different ways. In this 
study, the context boils down to two principal scopes: MANET constraints and 
applications settings. This is due to the fact that these two scopes can arguably 
shape most of features in the MANET networking system (i.e. hardware and 
software specifications). Hence, in the design phase, these features can be taken 
into account for selection an applicable design of a security/trust infrastructure for 
MANETs. The first scope (“MANET constraints”) describes the substantial 
physical and networking limitations in MANETs, whereas the second scope 
(“MANET application settings”) mainly highlights MANET application 
requirements (complexity and functionality) and environment settings that need to 
be satisfied. The next subsections discuss these two scopes in more details. 
4.4.3.1 MANET Constraints 
As explained in Section 2.2.2, several attributes of MANETs can be 
acknowledged, such as infrastructure-less-ness, dynamic topologies, poor physical 
security, limited resources, etc. (Chlamtac et al., 2003; Djenouri et al., 2005; 
Savola and Uusitalo, 2006; Merwe et al., 2007; Chadha and Kant, 2008). 
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However, some of these attributes imply some critical limitations (e.g. limited 
resources, etc.) in MANETs which instigate more considerations especially when 
a security/trust infrastructure is being designed for MANETs. For example, as 
MANETs usually have limited resources in terms of power and capabilities, light-
weighted cryptographic functions should be proposed. Therefore, in this section, 
these particular limitations are identified to create a model of constrains for 
MANETs. This constraint model can be incorporated in this study approach to 
support designing an effective security/trust infrastructure which matches actual 
MANET potentials. Table 4-2 summarises the key MANET constraints and 
possible consequences if these constraints are not taken into account in the design. 
It is worth mentioning that most of these constraints presented herein appear to 
mainly affect the availability of connectivity in MANET (i.e. disrupting routing 
and networking activities).  
Constraints Possible Impacts/Consequences 
Limited resources (i.e. battery power, 
small memory and CPU, etc.)   
Having frequent node failures, and 
experiencing long latency 
An unstable topology ( i.e. stemming 
from node mobility,  joining  and 
leaving common behaviours 
Incurring  frequent  network 
partitioning 
A limited wireless bandwidth Creating unreliable and broken links  
Poor physical security 
Easy to be compromised especially in 
hostile environments.  
Routing protocol shortcomings Leading to lower packet delivery rates 
Table  4-2: MANET constraints and their potential consequences  
However, for a security/trust infrastructure design, the model constrains 
mentioned above introduce different security design challenges. It is crucial to 
search for inexpensive-computation cryptographic mechanisms and lower-
communication-overhead reliable security protocols as to efficiently manage 
power, capacity and bandwidth restrictions in MANETs. Taking advantage of 
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well-distributive adaptable security architectures is desirable so as to overcome 
topology instability in MANETs. A robust device security technique, for example 
using biometric identification, can alleviate serious consequences of poor physical 
security in MANETs. To conclude, it is important to involve MANET constraints 
in developing the security/trust infrastructure for MANETs as these constraints 
become MANET boundaries to which each security component in the 
infrastructure should adhere. 
4.4.3.2 MANET Application Settings 
Many potential MANET applications in different domains can be acknowledged, 
as presented in Section 2.2.3. This stems from the fact that this particular network 
has an elegant way for providing nodes with interconnection support where no 
communication infrastructure is available, or where the installation of a permanent 
infrastructure is economically not workable. However, MANET applications 
differ in terms of their usage requirements (e.g. third-party-configuration, self-
initialisation, self-management, etc.) and their domain settings (e.g. small- or 
large-scale MANETs, hostility, urgency, etc.). These two factors (i.e. 
requirements and domain settings) in the application context define the 
complexity and cost of a MANET initialisation, operation, and management. 
Furthermore, the scope of the application context is very influential in this 
study. This is due to the fact that the well-defined requirements of a certain 
application enable security developers to characterise the importance of the other 
related dimensions, such as performance and security. Therefore, the different 
choices of security/trust infrastructures for that MANET application can be 
prioritised accordingly. For example, depending upon the network application 
purpose, its security and performance requirements in the military settings vary 
according to the encountered circumstance. Confidentiality and availability are the 
most important issues in a battlefield, whereas in a humanitarian rescue mission 
scenario, availability is more important than confidentiality. Hence, the security 
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and performance requirements in every case can be formulated from the tackled 
application context. For better understanding the demand of applications, several 
general properties can be acknowledged for applications over MANETs, such as 
dependency, lifetime, capacity, and environment settings. These particular 
properties described in this section are representative, but not exhaustive as other 
new application properties can be considered, if relevant. In addition, The 
properties of dependency, lifetime, and capacity are based on Hoeper and Gong 
(2004) and Dawoud et al. (2011). 
The network application dependency (i.e. planned or self-organised) indicates 
whether the application relies on an independent governing body (i.e. an 
administration or authority) or not (i.e. a self-organised application) for 
configuration and management before the nodes start participating or joining the 
network. The planned MANET application is proposed to be pre-configured by a 
certain body with necessary materials, such as, certificates, policy documents, 
shared secret keys, etc. However, in the self-organised network application, nodes 
are allowed to use the application without any assumptions of prior configuration 
or security associations. This feature can be realised usually in applications for 
pure ad-hoc networks as the nodes, in these applications, can join and use the 
network freely without complicated initialisation. Also, it is worth pointing out 
that in the planned applications, different authority involvements (i.e. 
initialisation, operation and management) and different types of authority 
structures (i.e. flat or hierarchical authorities) can be distinguished. This presents 
more complexity and overhead to the initialisation, operation and management of 
applications in MANETs. 
The network application lifetime describes a time period that a certain type of a 
MANET application lasts (i.e. in operation until the end of the application 
mission). It can be short time or long time. For the short time application, all 
nodes with a simple initialisation are expected to establish a MANET and then 
interact with each other on a specific purpose for a relatively short period of time, 
for example few hours. When these nodes meet the target of this application, all 
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information about these nodes and their relations (e.g. certificates, session ids, 
etc.) will be eliminated. However, in the long-time applications, all nodes intend 
to stay longer (e.g. days or months) in MANETs and they may join or leave the 
network frequently. Therefore, these nodes need to retain previous associations 
and relevant information for future interactions in particular resources, for 
example directories, databases, etc. The long-time application, unlike the short-
time application, shows much more complexity in initialisation (e.g. trust 
establishment) and introduces more concerns in resource consumption (i.e. 
resource limitation). 
The network application capacity (i.e. small-scale and large-scale) stands for a 
MANET space and node population which a particular application can serve. This 
is because the MANET depends on all nodes for handling the routing activities as 
well as for running its existing applications. On the other hand, some applications 
require nodes to be in close vicinity (i.e. a localised area) in order to be functional 
(e.g. applications for meetings or classes). Also, these applications are typically 
involved in small-scale manner (i.e. a small number of nodes and a limited space) 
working with short range communication (e.g. one-hop or physical interactions).  
In the large-scale applications, several MANET nodes are distributed within a 
fairly large area. Hence, these applications, as opposed to the small-scale 
application, need a multi-hop routing infrastructure for allowing far dispersed 
nodes to interact with each other. Also, in these applications, the MANET must 
have sufficient distributed resources for performing application’s activities 
effectively. Nevertheless, the initialisation cost and complexity in the large-scale 
application are often greater than in the small-scale as a result of dealing with 
numerous nodes. 
The application environment settings refer to specific characteristics a certain 
application may require to suit domain demands, or describe specific conditions a 
certain application may experience. For example, a particular application, working 
in a hostile environment (contrary to a non-hostile one), poses much more risk to 
this application to be violated by adversaries. Hence, this entails much more 
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considerations (security issues) to the application protection measures that are 
necessary to be implemented in order to avoid such breaches within this particular 
environment. On the other side, some environments, such as a rescue mission and 
ambulance service and law enforcement scenarios, are time-sensitive (i.e. 
urgency), so any applications running in these environments should take into 
account the time factor seriously. Therefore, the MANET applications must be 
responsive and reliable in all times. In conclusion, the highlighted properties of a 
MANET application can be a cornerstone for establishing a model of application 
settings for MANETs. This model can be incorporated into the MANETs design 
for more effective and efficient solutions, especially in designing a security/trust 
infrastructure as summarised in Table 4-3. 
Application Settings Description 
Dependency 
Describing whether a particular MANET application 
requires a third party (a governed body) for 
configuration and management. Two different 
settings can be distinguished, planned and self-
organised features ones.  
Lifetime 
Indicating a time duration in which a certain type of a 
MANET application is on operation. Two types of 
lifetime can be identified, short-time and long–time.  
Capacity 
Representing a MANET space and node population 
in which a particular application can serve over this 
network. The small-scale and large-scale settings can 
be recognised. 
Environment 
Reflecting specific characteristics and conditions a 
certain application may necessitate for achieving 
demands of this application domain such as urgent 
and hostile environment. 
Table  4-3: Application settings and their summary descriptions 
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4.5 Methodological Approach Discussion, 
Justification and Motivations 
An approach, which is established on the relevant elements and dimensions of 
security/trust infrastructure clarified in previous sections, is developed in this 
study in order to guide MANET security designers to effectively design the 
security/trust infrastructures. This proposed approach, as shown in Figure 4-5, 
consists of well-structured stages allowing for exploring all possible security 
alternatives and evaluating those nominated security alternatives against the 
criteria of security strength, performance and MANET context. Firstly, in this 
approach, (1) security designers should decide about the operational level being 
targeted in MANETs (as discussed in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). This helps them to 
consider only specific security/trust infrastructures and their related security 
elements that are linked to this particular chosen level. Also, the possible 
security/trust infrastructures should be narrowed down according to the suitability 
for a domain study. Therefore, (2) a list of all potential security/trust 
infrastructures characterised in previous stage will be created and prepared for the 
next assessment stage. In the assessment stage, (3) all listed infrastructure 
alternatives should be examined regarding their security strength and performance 
and the MANET context being involved. (4) The outcome of infrastructures’ 
evaluation will be compared to find the best suited security design satisfying the 
MANET context requirements by using a certain decision making mechanism. 
However, during applying this approach, security designers can develop their own 
security/trust infrastructure which be involved in this approach in case there is a 
lack of a feasible infrastructure matching MANET context demands. 




Figure  4-5: The initial proposal of methodological approach for designing the 
security/trust infrastructure for MANETs 
Eventually, most of security proposals in this domain appear to focus on 
cryptographic and protocol-based viewpoints and ignore other aspects, 
performance, context, level which may have a significant impact on those 
particular solutions when implemented and deployed over the network. Hence, 
this approach aims to establish a balanced view of how to design and develop a 
multi-objective security solution (i.e. a security/trust infrastructure) for MANETs 
taking into consideration (i.e. a right trade-off) other dimensions associated with 
security such as an operational level, performance, and a MANET application 
context. In addition, this approach arguably becomes a key enabler for producing 
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an effective and efficient MANET security design through providing a set of 
guidelines to which security designers can adhere. Eventually, this approach will 
be applied to the proposed model of SSAM as will be seen in the next section and 
the following chapters throughout implementation and evaluation phases. 
4.6 Server-based Security Architectures for 
MANETs (SSAM) – PART B 
In order to put all aspects discussed before into practice, it is essential to conduct a 
case study to prove the feasibility of the proposed approach. Therefore, a novel 
suite of standard security/trust architectures, known as the Server-based Security 
Architectures for MANETs (SSAM), is proposed in this study for two main 
objectives. Initially, (1) the SSAM model will offer a new security model for the 
“Service Level” in large-scale MANETs where there should be hundreds of nodes 
joining the network in order to make use of  available offered services (e.g. video 
streaming, internet gateway etc.). Secondly, (2) this model can be exploited to 
perform the evaluation and validation of the proposed methodological approach in 
this thesis. However, proposing this particular model in this context is as a result 
of the complexities and unresolved overlapping interdependencies in the current 
security solutions for MANETs, such as using proprietary protocols, integrated in 
different layers, etc. Also, there is a lack of a standard and organised model 
shaping most of those solutions for effective design and evaluation. 
Therefore, the model of SSAM is fundamentally derived from the exploration 
of different trust models for MANETs discussed in Section 2.5. In addition, this 
model is designed and established based on the key specific security building 
blocks which are illustrated in detail in Section 4.3. These building blocks are 
briefly suggested for formalising any security/trust authority-based infrastructure 
for MANETs to handle trust and authentication. On the other side, the “Service 
Level” is considered as the main design aspect of a security level for SSAM. This 
level indicates to where the components of SSAM are assumed to be implemented 
and utilised. The reason is that this particular design level appears to be neglected 
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by a MANET research community and the focus is more on the “Network level”, 
especially the routing issue (Cho et al., 2011). Thus, the client-server model is 
adopted for performing security services proposed in SSAM as this particular 
model is very popular in this design level (as discussed in 4.2.1). This solution 
practically describes how to make use of available different alternatives of trust 
infrastructures under particular settings of MANETs for the sake of fulfilling the 
following properties: 
• Maintains higher availability and better scalability to security services. 
• Improves performance and efficiency of security services (an optimal round 
trip time or delay). 
• Provides a standard level of protection through securing nodes and their 
communications. 
• Take into consideration MANET resources limitations and application 
requirements. 
• Enhances manageability in certification (issuance, renewal and revocation). 
• Be more flexible in managing security policy. 
Therefore, SSAM is dedicated to offer an appropriate security service 
infrastructure (i.e. security servers) which takes the role of issuing and distributing 
membership certificates to user nodes in large-scale MANETs. These generated 
certificates are intended to be a general-purpose credential which can be used for 
different security purposes, such as proofs of authenticity, admission and 
authorisation. In addition, having these membership certificates would arguably 
allow user MANET nodes to utilise available services (e.g. streaming, 
downloading, browsing, etc.) like in a civilian context, or to take a decision when 
receiving orders like in a battle field (e.g. initiate an air strike). However, in this 
study, SSAM only concerns with the issues of security service providers (i.e. 
generating and delivering credentials) whereas the utilisation of other service 
providers (i.e. establishing associations between service users and service 
providers) is out of the SSAM scope in this study.  
 




      Figure  4-6: The SSAM Conceptual Model 
Complying with the taxonomy of a security/trust infrastructure highlighted in 
Section 4.3, SSAM consists of different security architectures each of which is 
represented by the types of the server architecture and the authentication protocol 
being used. However, the term “Security Architecture” is intended to express the 
partial security design of the whole security infrastructure. The server architecture 
presents the form of security servers involved to run security services, such as 
central and distributed server architecture. The authentication protocol denotes to 
a specific security communication protocol which is used to secure a connection 
between a calling user node and a particular security server over MANETs, for 
instance, a three-way pass authentication protocol, etc. In addition, in the SSAM 
model, a standard digital certificate (i.e. X.509-v3 (Chokhani et al., 2003; Cooper 
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et al., 2008)) and asymmetric and threshold cryptograph (e.g. RSA) (Gennaro et 
al., 2008; Dossogne et al., 2013) are incorporated. The next subsections will 
explain the details of system model in SSAM, as shown in Figure 4-6. 
• Initialisation (Configuration): 
At the enrolment stage, a Master Root Authority (MRA) is devoted to manage the 
admission of a node (either a server or a client) to the network (i.e. MANETs) 
following the predetermined authority rules and policies. This is through issuing a 
node’s certificate (i.e. user or server ID certificates) which confirms the binding 
between the node identity and its initial public key. In addition, MRA is presumed 
to provide all enrolled user nodes with required certificates in order to enable 
those nodes to use available security services in SSAM, such as membership 
validation certificates and ID server certificates. On the other side, all 
management processes in all types of existing authority servers should be 
managed by a MRA, similar to Luo et al. (2005), for example, generating and 
updating secret keys used in issuing, refreshing secret key shares in threshold 
authority servers (TASs) and checking servers still in operation. 
• Server architectures  
As presented in Table  4-1, different security-server architectures can be 
acknowledged to deploy and provide security services in a MANET. It is noted 
that most of them obviously have certain common themes, as shown in Figure 4-
7. These themes can be identified by four key types of security servers: (1) a 
single standalone server, (2) multiple collaborated servers, (3) multiple standalone 
duplicated servers and (4) multiple standalone delegated servers. For consistency 
and avoiding confusion, a “Security Server” is intended to be described in SSAM 
as an “Authority Server” to imply both authority and security roles at the same 
time because the SSAM model is established on the authoritarian security 
schemes in MANETs. On the other hand, this term is believed to implicate a 
broad meaning (i.e. including authority and security tasks). Therefore, these key 
authority servers (shown in Figure 4-7) on which different proposed server 
architectures rely, are described as follows: 
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1. A Central Authority Server (CAS) is a single standalone server whose mission 
is to offer a security service (i.e. issuing, renewing and revoking credentials) 
exclusively for all nodes within the network. Despite the fact that the CAS 
architecture often suffers from a single point of failure; this architecture still 
presents promising potentials to exploit. These potentials can be realised by 
administration simplicity (i.e. manage only one server) and easy integration in 
other security solutions (e.g. hierarchical and combined architectures). On the 
other side, as CAS is typically working a standalone system, this server is 
usually assumed to be fully protected and well-equipped. 
 
Figure  4-7: The common authority server architectures in SSAM along with 
corresponding examples for MANETs 
2. Threshold Authority Servers (TASs) are considered multiple collaborated 
servers which count on the Threshold Cryptography (k , n) scheme (illustrated 
in Section 2.3.3.6). The architecture, involving this particular scheme, requires 
a coalition of certain authority servers (i.e. generating k partial certificate from 
different servers) to provide a fully-functioning security service. A user node 
can produce a valid membership certificate in this server architecture through 
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architecture demonstrates better fault tolerance and security robustness because 
of depending on the distributed dependant servers. 
3. Duplicated Central Authority Servers (D\CASs) are multiple standalone 
duplicated servers which perform the same job as CAS with distributed 
independent instances. The D\CAS architecture is proposed to avoid single 
point of failure and to increase security service availability through having 
several identical server copies within the architecture. However, this 
architecture is vulnerable to a single point of compromise. 
4. Delegated Authority Servers (DASs) are realised as multiple standalone 
delegated servers which are similar to D\CAS but with a small difference. Each 
of these servers must have their own delegation certificate (i.e. as a proof of 
authority permission) which allows these servers to issue their own certificate 
to users on behalf of the delegator (i.e. the Master Root Authority (MRA)). 
Hence, both delegation and generated user certificates should be piggybacked 
in the reply back to user nodes when DAS is invoked. It is important to mention 
that the DAS architecture is intended to be incorporated, particularly with the 
TAS architecture, and be used only in hybrid and hierarchical server 
architectures for a number of reasons. Initially, the DAS architecture alone 
appears to be similar to the D\CAS architecture in terms of functionality and 
independency of security services but with a little difference, an extra 
delegation certificate being shared with user nodes. On the other hand, for 
reducing the overhead of performing server election (TASs are typically elected 
with high confidence by MRA), each TAS is proposed to work as a DAS when 
required, in the TAS_DAS and CAS_TAS_DAS architectures. In other words, 
both security services of the TAS and DAS architectures are suggested to be 
deployed in one server as these two types of servers have the same distribution 
feature (i.e. a number of servers), which facilitates server integration in the 
combined architectures.  
In the hybrid and hierarchical server architectures, various types of servers 
discussed before can participate jointly to offer security services to users, such as 
 Chapter 4:  Conceptual Security Framework, Approach and SSAM Design 
 
Salaheddin Darwish 107
the TAS_DAS, CAS_TAS and CAS_TAS_DAS architectures. There are two 
categories of the hybrid and hierarchical server architectures which can be 
recognised, two-level and three-level server architectures. The first one involves 
different two security services (i.e. TAS&DAS and CAS&TAS) whereas the second 
one involves three security services (i.e. CAS&TAS&DAS). 
However, in SSAM, the degree of security service distribution, especially in 
the collaborated distributed server architectures, is proposed to be partial among 
MANETs node. This means that only a specific group of nodes (i.e. a predefined 
number of security servers) take the role of  offering security services, unlike the 
other approach (i.e. fully distributed architectures) which gets all nodes to take 
part in providing security service, such as in Luo et al. (2004). Even though 
involving all nodes in the network would increase security service availability, 
this approach, especially in large-scale MANETs, entails more overhead and 
complexity in node configuration and management as a result of potentially 
handling a large number of nodes. In addition, allowing all nodes which usually 
have a physical vulnerability (i.e. a common MANET characteristic) to participate 
in the core security service would introduce security robustness concerns. For 
example, compromising few nodes may lead to compromise the whole security 
service and also this approach is prone to suffer from Sybil attacks (i.e. node has 
multiple forged identities) (Yi and Kravets, 2004). 
• Cryptosystem and Credentials  
Along with using digital certificates, most security proposals for MANETs shown 
in Table  4-1 make use of public-key cryptography, specifically the RSA 
cryptosystem (Rivest et al., 1978), for managing credentials and securing 
communication and utilisation. Even though this particular cryptosystem is 
computationally expensive, especially in the case of limited MANETs, it still 
demonstrates substantial promise that compensates that particular drawback. This  
stems from the fact that public-key cryptography unlike the symmetric one shows 
effective and robust trust handling and provides the non-repudiation (using 
digitals signatures) and anonymity in communication (Boyd and Mathuria, 1998). 
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On the other hand, the type of cryptosystem plays a key role in defining the type 
of a credential that should be utilised, such as public-key cryptosystem typically 
involves public keys or digital certificates. 
Therefore, the RSA cryptosystem (Rivest et al., 1978) (i.e. an asymmetric 
cryptographic function) and the standard X.509 version 3 digital certificate (i.e. a 
security credential) (Chokhani et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2008) are adopted for 
SSAM. This is due to the fact that these two security elements are standardised 
and broadly used in telecommunication security systems too (Stallings, 2010). In 
addition, due to the standard format of the X.509-v3 certificate, using this type of 
credential will leverage seamless interoperation between different systems. Also, 
the X.509-v3 digital certificate is part of the standard which promotes particular 
standard authentication protocols (i.e. X.509 One-Way-Pass (1WP), Two-Way-
Pass (2WP) and Three-Way-Pass (3WP) protocols (ITU-T, 2008)).          
The X.509-v3 digital certificate: 
According to Chokhani et al. (2003) and Cooper et al. (2008), the standard format 
of the X.509-v3 certificate, as presented in Figure 4-8, includes the following 
main fields: version, serial number, signature algorithm name, authority name, 
validity period, user identity, public-key information (e.g. a public key value), 
extensions (e.g. user attributes and roles, policy, revocation list, etc.) and the 
certification authority signature. All types of certificates which are involved in the 
SSAM model are generated based on this particular standard format. On the other 
side, a “membership user certificate” (e.g. full or partial certificates) generated 
and updated by different proposed authority servers (i.e. CAS, TASs and DASs) in 
SSAM are presumed to comply with this standard.  
In addition, this certificate is termed as the “membership user certificate” 
aiming to indicate a certificate which can be used for general purposes (e.g. 
admission, authorisation, authentication, etc.). This is because a membership 
credential often may contain a holder identify, holder attributed and roles and a 
membership granted authority. Alternatively, this certificate is also planned to be 
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a short-lived certificate available to a succeeded joined user node for utilising 
offered services in MANETs. This is intended to reduce the overhead of managing 
certificate revocation. In other words, there is no requirement to proactively 
refresh certificate revocation lists among nodes as a certain certificate will expire 
shortly and needs to be renewed by available authority servers. Finally, the other 
standard identity certificates which are pre-installed in network nodes 
(initialisation phase) are used as initial credentials only for facilitating SSAM 
authentication (i.e. employed in authentication protocols) and for securing SSAM 
utilisation. 
 
Figure  4-8:  The X.509-v3 digital certificate format 
The RAS and Threshold RSA cryptosystems 
The RSA cryptosystem relies on the hardness of factoring large integers for 
leveraging its security robustness. These integers are defined as the product of two 
large prime numbers. However, extracting the original prime numbers from the 
result of multiplying these two numbers (using total factoring) is very difficult 
because of the long time being consumed even with using powerful machines. 
RSA computation begins with selecting two random secret prime numbers p and q 
to compute modulus integer n = p×q. The defined public key exponent e along 
with n represents the public key, and the associated private key is estimated by d 
X.509-v3 





 mod ((p-1)×(q-1)). For encrypting a message m, the cipher text c is 
generated as follows: c = m
e
 (mod n). To decrypt the cipher text, the message can 
be obtained from using the private key d as follows: m = c
d 
(mod n) = m
e.d
 (mod 
n). The key length in RSA is very crucial as indicating the level of encryption 
strength. However, increasing the RSA key length would entail an overhead. RSA 
keys can usually be 1024 or 2048 bits long. For more details about using RSA 
cryptography, see Rivest et al. (1978), Menezes et al. (1996), Smart (2003) and 
Stallings (2010). 
MRA and all types of authority servers take advantage of RSA cryptographic 
procedures for generating digital signature on ID and membership certificates 
being used. However, in the TAS architecture unlike the other architectures, a 
group of servers collaboratively create partial certificates based on “Threshold 
Cryptography” and these partial certificates can be combined to produce one full 
valid certificate accordingly. The “Threshold RSA algorithm” is chosen to be used 
by TASs because of two vital properties: (1) standard signature generation and (2) 
non-interaction between participants for generating signatures as stated in  
Gennaro et al.(2008). Hence, two phases of performing this algorithm (i.e. TC(k, 
m) scheme, k << m), based on Luo et al. (2004), Raghani et al. (2006) and Omar 
et al. (2007) are proposed for the TAS architecture, as presented in Table 4-4 
(Note that the formulas below are taken from Luo et al. (2004)): 
Phase1: Secret Share Generation (Initialisation) 
(1) During SSAM initialisation, MRA initially creates the corresponding RSA keys for 
the threshold authority. 
Public key: (e, n) 
Private key: (d, n) 
where  
e is Public exponent 
d is Private exponent 
n is the modulus 
 
(2) MRA determines a k-1 degree polynomial which is considered a fundamental part for 




a0 = d. and a1, a2,.., ak-1 are random 
values over a finite field. 
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(3) The value k is the threshold value of the TAS architecture. The MRA initialises m 
servers (TASs) via providing them with the private-key shares of the threshold authority. 
Each TAS obtains its private share Pvi from MRA as: 
 
where vi is a unique identifier of TASi 
 
The private share can be calculated from a coalition of k initialised TAS nodes v1, v2,..., 




Therefore, the private key of the threshold authority can be recovered by: 
 
 
Phase2: Threshold RSA Signature (Operation) 
(1) In this phase, in order to create a valid signature of the threshold authority’s private 
key, it requires a coalition of at least k TASs (k Threshold value). Therefore, when a user 
node demands to obtain its certificate, this node should send requests (called cert) to all 
accessible TASs in order to get signature on those certs accordingly. A cert may include 
general certificate information relevant to the certain calling node and coalition TASs. 
Typically, without sharing the private key, a certificate of the calling node cert can be 
signed using the private key threshold authority d as follows: 
 
 
(2) Once TASs receive the cert value, they start to produce a corresponding partial 
certificate by signing it using their additive private shares. Additive share SKvj of  TAS vj 
can be computed as: 
 
 
(3) TAS vj constructs the partial certificate for the calling user node taking advantage of 
the additive share value determined above, based on the following method: 
 
 
 Chapter 4:  Conceptual Security Framework, Approach and SSAM Design 
 
Salaheddin Darwish 112
(4) Afterward, TAS vj sends the partial certificate back to the calling user node. When this 
user node receives all required partial certificates, it begins to combine them by product 
so as to generate an initial certificate CERT΄ as: 
 
 
(5) In certain cases, CERT΄ may vary from actual certificate CERT as a result of an 
additional exponent representing k-bounded multiple of n. CERT can be restored from 
CERT΄ via employing the “k-bounded coalition offsetting algorithm” which is developed 
by Kong et al. (2001) and Luo et al. (2004). 
 Table  4-4: Threshold RSA Cryptosystem (phase 1: Secret Share Generation 
Initialisation, phase 2: Threshold RSA Signature Operation) 
• Security communication protocols 
As illustrated in Section 4.3, a particular security communication protocol in a 
security/trust infrastructure indicates a facility of securing connections between 
user and security server nodes, for the sake of allowing user nodes for utilising 
security services in the side of server nodes (providing security credentials). This 
protocol may involve exchanging of few or several specific messages (e.g. one-, 
two-, and three-way pass handshaking possibly for authentication purposes) for 
creating those connections. Furthermore, some protocols could rely on a specific 
propriety interconnection infrastructure (e.g.  an overlay of servers, or multicast 
protocols) for accessing security services in servers, such as Yi and Kravets 
(2003) and Wu et al. (2007b) and Luo et al. (2005). In SSAM, a security 
communication protocol is proposed to be generic (i.e. a call follows by a reply 
similar to calling services on a server) and not reliant on any propriety 
interconnection infrastructure since this is believed to be common theme of 
calling for interoperation purposes.        
However, since different server architectures in SSAM can be requested 
differently especially in hybrid and hierarchical architectures, a security 
communication protocol is defined here to represent all procedures that 
incorporate in establishing and maintaining connections. Three main procedures 
can be identified, an authentication protocol, a re-authentication scheme and a 
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strategy of calling. An authentication protocol is considered an important element 
as this protocol is typically used to confirm identities, and to create a secure 
individual link, between user and server nodes. A re-authentication scheme is 
exploited to alleviate potential connection failures by allowing a server invocation 
to be systematically renewed. A re-authentication scheme includes a waiting time 
interval and a number of re-try; however this issue will discussed in detail in 
Section 5.3.3.2. A strategy of calling is proposed specifically for hybrid and 
hierarchical architectures to denote to approach how to call different servers in 
those architectures.  
The Authentication Protocol  
Although a variety of authentication protocol types, as shown in Boyd and 
Mathuria (2003), could be involved in SSAM, The three standard X.509 ISO/IEC 
9594-8 authentication protocols (ITU-T, 1989, 2008) are adopted for a number of 
reasons. Initially, these protocols are standardised and non-strict-layered 
protocols. Also, for coherent comparison, these three protocols belong to the same 
pool of authentication protocols (i.e. asymmetric key transport authentication 
protocols). However, other authentication protocols can be considered, if it is 
appropriate to a study. This is because this component of the authentication 
protocol is suggested to be a placeholder which can be altered freely (if needed). 
These protocols are the “One-Way-Pass” (1WP), “Two-Way-Pass” (2WP) and 
“Three-Way-Pass” (3WP) protocols. These protocols mainly are used to provide 
entity authentication (i.e. unilateral or mutual authentication) between two ends 
with optional key transport for a confidentiality purpose. Each protocol as its 
name implies is distinguished with different number of passes (message 
exchanges) involving timestamps and nonce values. These protocols are 
developed to satisfy a number of requirements: identity confirmation, message 
freshness, non-repudiation, and key transport secrecy. However, each protocol has 
different techniques to meet these requirements (e.g. using timestamps in 1WP 
and 2WP protocols for freshness unlike 3WP which uses nonce values). In 
addition, the protocols are characterised with different robustness, for example, 
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the 2WP and 3WP protocols achieve mutual authentication whereas the 1WP 
protocol only ensures unilateral authentication. Table 4-5 addresses all relevant 
issues of initialisation and operation for these three authentication protocols.    
Notation:  
PubX(m): the cryptographic function of encrypting m using  public key to data y. 
SecX(m): the cryptographic function of singing m using the X’s private key.  
rA, rB:  nonce values are used for preventing from impersonation and replay.  
tsA, tsB: timestamps are obtained from synchronised time clock.  
certX: a certificate linking entity X with a public key is to facilitate encryption and   
signature verification.  
A: a user node, B: a server node, k: an optional private transport key, *: refers to items 
that are optional.  
Initialisation: 
(I) Each entity (i.e. A or B) requires its pair of public key and its certificate typically 
issued by an authority (MRA) for signatures, authentication and encryption. 
(II) (b) A should have encryption B public key by obtaining CertB from the authority 
using an out-of-band method, for example. 
The 1WP protocol in operation: 
One message (I) is exchanged in this protocol 
 data DA = (tsA, rA, B, data1∗, PubB(k1)∗) 
A → B : certA, DA, SecA(DA) (I) 
• A generates tsA and rA used for checking an expiration time and message freshness. A 
secret key k1 and data1 can optionally be used in this message-I if required. Message-I, 
which contains certA and DA along with its signature, is sent to B.  
• B validates certA (checking the signature, expiry date, etc.) and verifies A’s signature on 
DA using A’s public key. Then, the items within DA will be checked (e.g. the identifier in 
message, intended recipient B, the validity of timestamp and nonce to avoid any replay. 
The secret key (if included) will be extracted for furthered usage. If all checks are 
approved, B confirms that A has successful authentication (unilateral authentication). 
The 2WP protocol in operation: 
Two messages (I & II) are exchanged in this protocol,  
Let DB = (tsB, rB, A, rA, data2∗, PubA(k2)∗) 
A ← B : certB, DB, SecB(DB) (II) 
• Following the same process of sending and checking message-I shown in the 1WP 
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protocol, B continues to do the same of creating tsB, rB, and the DB’s signature and 
sending message-II to A.  
• Similarly, A performs the same checks carried out by B. If all those checks are 
successful, A grants B successful authentication (i.e. in this case, mutual authentication 
is satisfied). In case, k2 is provided, both A and B have mutual secrets k1 and k2 for 
securing interaction. 
The 3WP protocol in operation: 
Three messages (I & II & III) are exchanged in this protocol.     
A → B: (rB,B), SecA(rB,B) (III) 
In this protocol, there are few differences from the other two protocols described above: 
• Timestamps tsA and tsB should be ignored (set to zero). 
• On receiving message-II, A detects the rA value matches that value included in message-
I. Then, message-III, which contains rB, B and the A’s signature, is generated and sent to 
B.  
• B validates the signature and then checks identifier B and rB received is similar to that in 
message-II. 
Table  4-5: The three standard X.509 ISO/IEC 9594-8 authentication 
protocols 
Alternatively, the SSL/TLS protocol (Dierks, 2008) is considered a standard 
and widely used protocol developed for the service level (i.e. transport and 
application layers). This is by allowing two parties to authenticate each other and 
to set up a secret key which is used to protect the communication session. 
However, it is argued that this protocol may not be feasible to apply in the SSAM 
model because of a number of reasons. The SSL/TLS protocol is strictly TCP-
related and also several handshakes (more than three) required in this protocol 
would entail more communication overheads which become very problematic in 
limited MANETs. Therefore, the three standard X.509 protocols still appear to be 
the best candidates which can be involved in the security communication 
protocols of SSAM for this study.  
Strategy of Calling & Trust Pattern 
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There are two types of strategies that are suggested for requesting heterogeneous 
servers in the hybrid and hierarchical security architectures: “All at Once” (AAO) 
and “In priority sequence” (IPS). The AAO strategy means that node begins to 
simultaneously create multiple connections for calling all types of server 
architectures that are pre-deployed in MANETs. For example, in the CAS_TAS 
architecture, all connections for each different individual server architecture will 
be created concurrently as follows: 1 connection for CAS and n connections for 
available TASs.  However, calling DAS in the CAS_TAS_DAS security architecture 
is proposed not to be concurrent with calling other servers (CAS and TAS).This is 
because, according to SSAM specifications, this particular calling should be 
initiated as a result of failure on calling the TAS architecture. 
 
Figure  4-9: A trust policy for utilising different servers 
Alternatively, the IPS strategy relies on a priority to request different server 
architectures. A certain priority sequence: (1)CAS  (2)TAS  (3)DAS, follows 
the proposed trust level model for SSAM, as shown in Figure 4-9. The high 
priority is appointed to the CAS architecture due to the highest trust and confident 
architecture among user nodes. The second priority is given to the TAS 
architecture as certificates obtained from this architecture are characterised with 
intermediate trust. The DAS architecture has the third priority in calling because of 
the TAS architecture reliance and having basic trusted credentials. Finally, this 
priority sequence is applicable for any predefine two- or three-server architectures 
(i.e. CAS_TAS, TAS_DAS, and CAS_TAS_DAS). On the other side, using this 
proposed trust policy along with different servers enables service provider to 
generate their own flexible access control policies, similar to Martucci et al. 
A certificate chain 
with Basic Trust  
A certificate with 
Intermediate Trust
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(2004). For example, a certain service provider offers its service only for user 
nodes which possess their certificates from the CAS architecture. 
However, it is important to highlight that the strategy of calling a group of 
servers specifically in the homogenous multi-server architectures (e.g. the D\CAS 
and TAS architectures) is intended to be only all at once. The reason is to avoid 
complexities in prioritising calling these multiple servers and making decision 
about a desired number of servers that should be requested especially in the TAS 
architecture. 
• MANETs Settings  
Unlike other conventional networks, a MANET is distinguished with different 
characteristics, specific constraints (as detailed in Section 2.2.2 and 4.4.3), and 
various settings, for example, mobility, churning, MAC and routing protocols, a 
channel type, space, node density, and a traffic model being involved. As shown 
in Figure 4-6, these features can have a significant impact on the SSAM model 
when applied. This stems from the fact that all these settings would contribute 
either positively or negatively to the communication medium of MANETs 
(establishing connected routing infrastructure). Most MANET settings, which are 
defined for this study, are discussed exhaustively in Section 5.3.4. On the other 
side, this part of the SSAM is considered very crucial as it defines the majority of 
issues which are relevant to the part of MANET context in the proposed approach 
for this study.   
Ultimately, the SSAM model with its components is developed to provide an open 
solution which meets various security objectives for the operational service level 
of MANETs. As distributed security architecture is quite demanding for 
enhancing performance and robustness, especially in MANETs, the SSAM model 
presents a pool of distributed server architectures (e.g. CAS_TAS, TAS_DAS and 
CAS_TAS_DAS). On the other hand, involving standard authentication protocols 
(i.e. 1WP, 2WP, and 3WP protocols) and a standard credentials (i.e. X509-v3 
certificate) in SSAM would facilitate interoperation with other different systems 
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using those security standards as this feature becomes a key incentive towards 
widespread employment (Corson et al., 1999). SSAM flexibility can be realised 
from offering different security alternatives which can meet different requirements 
of several applications for MANETs. For example, an authentication protocol 
which meets node and MANET capabilities can be easily selected, a proper trade-
off between different server architectures for a rescue mission, in terms of 
availability and security strength, can be simply made in SSAM.  
However, it is important to mention that the SSAM operation consists of two main 
sides, usage and management sides. All the above description of the SSAM model 
represents the usage side only. However, the management side deals with all 
issues that are related to server management (e.g. choosing a number of servers, 
defining a threshold value for the TAS architecture, updating secret shares and 
checking server availability). Considering the management side in SSAM is out of 
this study’s scope. The next section presents SSAM activities model and relevant 
workflow diagrams. 
4.7 SSAM Activity Model 
This section describes the basic activity model which represents the lifecycle of a 
new node joining MANETs when a certain security architecture is applied in 
SSAM, as shown in Figure 4-10. The activities in this model represent different 
stages, such as node search-for-connection, node authenticating and node 
churning. As this study’s focus is the usage of security architectures for 
authentication in SSAM, some authentication-related activities in this model will 
be detailed and mapped with appropriate diagrams (i.e. sequence diagrams and 
flowcharts) in the next section.  
Initially, (1) a user node joins the playground, based on pre-determined time 
arrival model being applied (e.g. Poisson- arrival rate λ). Then, (2) this node starts 
to roam according to a certain mobility pattern, aiming to find in its range at least 
one node in order to establish a connection in MANETs (i.e. access-to-network). 
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When the node becomes a part of the network (i.e. to activate its routing role), (3) 
it initiates the necessary server requests according to the predefined server 
architecture in SSAM by opening a connection to each server accordingly. In each 
server connection, (4) the node starts handshaking with accessible security servers 
using a certain security communication protocol (i.e. 1WP, 2WP or 3WP 
authentication protocol) in order to create an authenticated channel and to obtain 
its own membership certificate (i.e. this certificate can be full or partial). 
However, in SSAM, each server architecture has different requirements in terms 
of the requisite number of successful server connections for attaining full 
successful authentication. This matter will be discussed in detail in the next 
section. If the calling node satisfies the requirements of the predefined server 
architecture, (5) this node is considered successfully authenticated, and then (6) it 
triggers traffic from available traffic generator nodes (i.e. used to keep MANETs 
always in operation) in the playground. Otherwise, this node is considered 
unsuccessful in authenticating and it fails to receive its certificates. Hence, (7) the 
node terminates all current active server connections. 
At this point in the activity model, the node is offered to stay or leave based on 
its states of authentication and Churn flag. The Churn flag is used to indicate 
whether the node must leave or stay. If the flag is set off, regardless of the node’s 
state of authentication, (8) a node is allowed to stay and take part of operating 
MANETs. If the flag is set on, (9) the node with unsuccessful authentication must 
leave the playground, whereas the node with successful authentication has two 
distinct circumstances (i.e. staying with/out node lifetime). One of  these two 
circumstances are proposed to present node churning for some nodes with 
successful authentication as this issue will be elaborated in Section 5.3.4.6. 
Relying on a random selection (e.g. 50% population of successfully authenticated 
nodes are marked to stay), the node is either allowed to (8) stay, similar to the 
case of without churning, or (10) forced to leave after finishing its predefined 
lifetime.    




Figure  4-10: The Node Activity Model in SSAM 
As mentioned earlier, the activities described above represent three stages, 
“search-to-access” 1-2, “authentication process”  3-7, and “Churning” 8-10. The 
core components of the SSAM model appear to be realised implicitly in the 
“authentication process” stage, as shown in Figure 4-10. Hence, the next section 
illustrates in detail these activities which typically represent the processing and 
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communication occurring between node and server nodes with different SSAM 
case scenarios (i.e. different authentication protocols, different server 
architectures, different calling strategies and traffic generation). 
4.7.1  Node and Server Communicative Models 
This section discusses the workflows of key security operations in SSAM. Two 
different level models (i.e. the communication and process level models) are 
proposed to describe these workflows. The communication level model 
specifically is intended to present the flow of establishing a single connection 
between user and server nodes through using a particular authentication protocol 
(i.e. performing a sequence of particular communications), irrespective of the 
server type being involved. The process level model for both user and server 
nodes represents the internal processes which handle a security service (i.e. 
providing and obtaining a membership certificate) in different server architectures 
within SSAM. 
4.7.1.1 Communication Level Model 
For the communication level model, the 1WP, 2WP and 3WP authentication 
protocols which are based on  the X.509 standard - ISO/IEC 9594-8 (ITU-T, 
1989, 2008) are adopted in SSAM to facilitate authentication between user and 
server nodes. The sequence diagrams for each of authentication protocols are 
shown in Figure 4-11, 4-12 and 4-13 following operation section in Table 4-4. 
The goal is to build a secure channel enabling a user node to obtain its 
membership certificate from a single server node in a secure manner (integrity, 
authentication, etc.). Each authentication protocol consists of different control and 
data messages being exchanged. The required control messages are expected to be 
the main body of the proposed authentication protocols. This is because control 
messages aim to prepare a secure connection whereas data messages are used to 
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carry membership certificates back to user nodes from specific servers according 
to the server architecture in use. In the 1WP authentication protocol, within the 
state of the “Protocol Msg State 1”, a user node begins to generate a request for a 
certain server by sending the first control message (CMsg1). This control message 
mainly includes timestampuser, nonceuser and Id certificateuser fields along with the 
CMsg1 signature created by user node private keys for authentication and 
integrity purposes. This message, in this state in the protocol, is used to achieve a 
unilateral authentication (i.e. a user to be authenticated by a server). When 
CMsg1is received and verified by a certain server, the server generates and sends 
a membership certificate to the calling user node within a data message (DMsg). 
A state of “Data Msg” in the protocol is used to denote to a particular state where 
DMsg is generated or validated by server and user ends, accordingly as shown in 
Figure 4-11. 
 
Figure  4-11: The sequence diagram of the One Way-Pass authentication 
protocol (1WP) 
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As shown in Figure 4-12, the 2WP authentication protocol varies from 1WP 
with one extra control message (CMsg2) and an additional protocol state, 
“Protocol Msg State 2” in the user node side, for handling this particular control 
message. CMsg2 is exploited in this protocol to complete the mutual 
authentication between user and user nodes. Also, this control message comprises 
timestampserver, nonceserver, nonceuser and Id certificateserver with the signed CMsg2 
field. 
 
Figure  4-12: The sequence diagram of Two Way-Pass authentication 
Protocol (2WP) 
The 3WP authentication protocol, as shown Figure 4-13, makes use of three 
different control messages unlike the other authentication protocols discussed 
above. Furthermore, the third new message (CMsg3) contains nonceserver, 
serveraddress  and  signature of CMsg3 and it is considered a confirmation reply in 
this protocol for making this authentication more robust against certain threats, 
such as Man-in-the-Middle (Burrows et al., 1990; I'Anson and Mitchell, 1990; 
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Boyd and Mathuria, 2003). Similar to 2WP, the state of “Protocol Msg 2” in 3WP 
is added to the server node side in order to represent the processing of CMsg3.  
 
Figure  4-13: The sequence diagram of Three Way-Pass authentication 
Protocol (3WP) 
Eventually, as shown in the sequences diagrams, Figure 4-11, 4-12 and 4-13, 
using the suggested states in authentication protocols enables both sides to 
describe a current message that needs to be exchanged or processed within the 
protocol. However, it is important to point out that an entire sequence of control 
messages in any particular authentication protocol is intended to be seen as a join 
request (i.e. called a certificate request), while a received data message represents 
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an admission response for this request. This particular vision will be used to 
simplify the process model which is presented in different flowcharts below.  
4.7.1.2 Process Level Model 
For the process model, apart from the authentication protocols, eight different 
server architectures can be recognised, for which the process model needs to map 
out their internal processes in both server and node sides for better understanding 
of the SSAM logic and behaviour. Also, this process model can arguably facilitate 
the SSAM implementation and deployment. As all different server architectures in 
SSAM rely on certain primitive servers (CAS, TAS and DAS), the process models 
of these primitive server architectures should be presented initially. Most process 
models shown in this section, involve user and server node instances. Server 
instances differ according to a certain server architecture being involved. 
In the CAS architecture, as shown in Figure 4-14, a new user instance starts 
initialisation of necessary elements (e.g. current and maximum attempt variables 
(CNA and MNA), a session ID, waiting time (Timeout) etc.) for the process of 
calling CAS. A join request with a new session ID is initiated according to a 
specific authentication protocol being pre-configured. At the same time, a timeout 
timer is activated for re-authentication purpose and the variable of a current 
number of attempts (CNA) is increased. If this timer expires without completing 
the control messages’ handshaking of the authentication protocol to receive an 
admission answer “DataMsg”, another join request with a new session ID will be 
generated unless the current number of attempts (CNA) reaches the max number 
of attempts (MNA). In this case, the user node instance ends up with unsuccessful 
authentication. On the other hand, if the admission response “DataMsg” is 
received successfully, the session ID of “DataMsg” will be checked to verify 
whether this response is fresh or expired. If the answer is “expired”, the message 
will be dropped. Otherwise, the current timeout timer will be cancelled and the 
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received “DataMsg” will be validated by checking the extracted membership 
certificate. Then, the user node instance is marked with successful authentication. 
 
Figure  4-14: The flowchart of user node and CAS process models 
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In the server side, the server node instance starts to set up the service buffer 
and then this instance waits for new join requests. In case of receiving a new 
request, a control message handshaking will be handled for the particular request. 
Afterwards, this processed request made by a calling user node will be checked to 
verify whether it is the first or not. If this request is the first, a record for the 
specific user node will be created and user own membership certificate will be 
issued, accordingly. Otherwise, the membership certificate will be retrieved and 
the user node own log record will be updated. Finally, “DataMsg”, including the 
membership certificate, will be generated and will be sent back to the user node. 
For avoiding repetition, almost all process models in the server side are quite 
similar regardless of the server architecture, as shown in all flowcharts presented 
in this section. However, the only noticeable difference is the type of a 
membership certificate which is generated based on the server type being used, 
usually a full certificate, a partial certificate or a certificate chain. 
The TAS architecture relies on (n) number of security servers (i.e. TASs) to 
generate a valid certificate from received partial certificates using the TC (n,k) 
scheme. Therefore, a user node instance simultaneously creates a corresponding 
number of similar server-connection instances (i.e. called “calling TAS[i] 
instance”	 ∀ i= 1,2,..,n, n>1), as shown in Figure 4-15. At the same time, all 
needed variables are initialised, such as the number of received partial certificates 
(NPC), the number of calling instances in progress (NIP), and (k) necessary 
number of partial certificates for a successful certificate generation. Along with 
relevant variables, the procedures of handshaking for the authentication protocol, 
setting re-authentication timer and handling “DataMsg” in the TAS architecture 
are similar to those procedures in the CAS architecture. However, a few variations 
can be acknowledged. Firstly, in the case of expiring timeout timer without 
allowing for more attempts, the active calling instance will check whether (NIP -
1) is less than k as this instance fails to obtain its own partial certificate for the 
corresponding TAS. 




Figure  4-15 : The flowchart of user node and TASs process models 
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If the condition (NIP-1< k) is not satisfied, NIP will be updated (i.e. NIP--) and 
the current calling instance will be ended up. Otherwise, if this condition (NIP-1< 
k) is satisfied, this leads to cancel all active timeout timers in the other calling 
instances and also to terminate all existing calling instances including the current 
calling instance. Then, this user node instance becomes in the state of 
unsuccessful authentication. Secondly, after successfully receiving “DataMsg” 
and cancelling timeout timer for this calling instance, the NPC variable has an 
increment. Then, this variable will be checked. If it is less than k, this means that 
the parent user node instance still expects more partial certificates to be received 
from other active calling instances. Therefore, NIP will be decreased by one as 
this calling stance will be closed. Otherwise, if NPC is equal to k, this causes the 
cancellation of all active timeout timers in other existing calling instances and also 
the termination of all remaining calling instances including the current calling 
instance. Finally, the user node instance combines all partial certificates delivered 
to produce a valid membership certificate in order to be marked with successful 
authentication. 
In the D\CAS architecture, a number of security-server copies (i.e. CASs) are 
involved in providing a security service to user nodes in MANETs similar to the 
CAS architecture. After initialising NIP with the number (n) of available security 
servers, a user node instance begins to form the same number of calling instances 
accordingly (i.e. “calling D\CAS[i] Instance”, ∀ i= 1,2,..,n) for the sake of  
broadcasting join requests. Like the other server architectures discussed above, 
each calling stance includes similar process flows for re-authentication, 
authentication protocol and “DataMsg” delivery, as shown in Figure 4-16. 
However, the user node instance is considered unsuccessfully authenticated, if all 
calling instances fail to receive “DataMsg” from their associated D\CASs. This 
can be realised by checking the number of calling that are still in progress (i.e. 
testing the value of NIP). When “DataMsg” is delivered successfully and then a 
user membership certificate extracted from this message is verified, this enables 
the user node instance to have successful authentication.  




Figure  4-16 :  The flowchart of user node and D\CASs process models 
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It is important to point out that it is proposed that the DAS architecture in 
SSAM always exists along with the TAS architecture in the compound or multi-
level server hierarchical architectures. The reason is that when the TAS 
architecture fails to provide a certain user node with its membership certificate, 
the DAS architecture will take over (i.e. TASs become DASs). Clearly, the separate 
DAS architecture appears to be quite similar to the D\CAS architecture in terms of 
single-server dependency since a user node depends only on one admission 
response (i.e. containing membership certificate) to announce this node 
successfully authenticated. However, in the integrated DAS architecture, after TAS 
authentication failure, one of reachable TASs included in a defined list will be 
randomly selected to be a DAS, as shown in Figure 4-17. This is in order to 
initiate a request (“DAS Request”) for calling this particular DAS. Since the user 
node and the particular DAS are already associated from previous interaction 
(between the user and TAS nodes), it is decided to skip the part of handshaking 
protocols from this process model in order to avoid more communication 
overhead. Therefore, “DAS Request” will be sent directly and then a timeout timer 
for the request re-try will be managed similar to the other architectures of 
handling re-authentication timers. If a message of “DAS Data Msg” is received 
successfully, the re-try timer will be cancelled and a certificate chain (two user 
membership and server delegation certificates) extracted from “DAS Data Msg” 
will be validated. Then, successful authentication can be realised for the user node 
instance. If the list of accessible TASs at the beginning is empty or the 
(MNA<CNA) condition for timer is met, as presented in Figure 4-17; the user 
node instance will be unsuccessfully authenticated. 
All process models of the server architectures discussed previously are 
established only on one server type (i.e. CAS, TAS, D\CAS and DAS). However, 
other multi-level server hierarchical architectures in this study are developed to 
involve different server types in one compound server architecture, such as TAS-
DAS, CAS-TAS, and CAS-TAS-DAS. Furthermore, the two different calling 
strategies (i.e. In Priority Sequence (IPS) and All At Once (AAO)) are proposed to 
represent potential approaches of utilising the distinct fundamental servers within 
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these specific compound architectures. In IPS, a user node sequentially calls 
principal server architectures according to a particular priority whereas in AAO a 
user node broadcasts invocations simultaneously for all types of servers in the 
architectures. 
 
Figure  4-17 : The flowchart of user node and DAS process models 
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Therefore, all user node process models of the two- and three-level server 
hierarchical architectures are presented collectively in Figure 4-18. However, their 
server process models are intended to be ignored as these models are similar to the 
other architectures discussed before. The process flows in these compound 
architectures vary based on the different server types being involved and the 
calling strategies being adopted. Thus, Figure 4-18 is divided into two main 
sections relevant to the type of calling strategies: Part (A) is for IPS and Part (B) 
is for AAO. Also, in this figure, the different colour dashed lines indicate the flow 
of processes for the two-level server hierarchical architectures, such as CAS_TAS 
and TAS_DAS, and the solid line indicates the flow of processes for the three-level 
server hierarchical architectures, such as CAS_TAS_DAS. It is important to 
mention that each rectangle notation in these process models, in Figure 4-18, 
typically embodies the complete user process model for one of those basic server 
architectures (e.g. CAS, TAS or DAS architectures), as described in Figure 4-14, 4-
15, and 4-16. Accordingly, the output of this notation denotes to the current state 
of authentication (i.e. whether successful or unsuccessful) from calling a 
particular architecture. In the TAS_DAS architecture, a new user node instance 
starts to initialise and activate the calling process of the TAS architecture initially. 
Then, if this process fails to get successful authentication, the calling process of 
the DAS architecture will be initiated accordingly, as shown in Figure 4-18. In the 
CAS_TAS architecture, two calling cases can be recognised, IPS and AAO. A new 
user node instance with IPS begins to call the CAS architecture. When this call is 
not fulfilled, the calling procedure of the TAS architecture will be triggered. 
However, in the case of using AAO, both CAS and TAS architectures are invoked 
simultaneously and then the new user node instance waits until receiving their 
replies. If calling CAS is completed successfully, the TASs’ calling, which is still 
in progress of handshaking, will be cancelled. In both cases of the IPS and AAO 
calling strategy, the process models of the CAS_TAS_DAS architecture, like the 
CAS_TAS architecture, consist of requesting the CAS and TAS architectures either  
all at the same time (i.e. the AAO calling strategy) or one after another (i.e. the IPS 
calling strategy). On the other hand, the DAS architecture is proposed to be 
utilised after a complete failure in calling both CAS and TAS architectures. 





Figure  4-18:  The user node process flowchart for the two- or three- server 
hierarchical architectures: (A) In Priority Sequence - IPS and (B) All At 
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According to the node activity models, shown in Figure 4-10, if a user node 
succeeds in authentication, this node is proposed to instigate traffic in the 
MANETs. This is performed by calling (i.e. sending “Traffic Request Msg”) a 
particular traffic generator node (i.e. Traffic Source Server - TSS). When “Traffic 
Request Msg” is received by the traffic generator node, this node becomes a traffic 
sources generating traffic and the corresponding calling user node works  as a 
traffic sink, as presented in Figure 4-19. A timeout timer is used for allowing a 
user node to produce several attempts of traffic requests (if required) as to ensure   
the “Traffic Request Msg” delivery since MANETs usually suffer from broken 
links and network partitioning. In this process model, the traffic generation design 
is proposed to be generic in order to fit most of popular traffic models (i.e. using 
the rectangle notation of processing traffic as placeholder). It is worth pointing out 
that there are different ways of processing and sending traffic in the traffic 
generator nodes, which normally relies on a certain traffic model being adopted 
(e.g. ON/OFF Pareto, ON/OFF Exponential, Constant Bit Rate, etc. (Giannoulis et 
al., 2009; Pal et al., 2011)). The amount of traffic created by a traffic generator 
node is supposed to be delivered to the corresponding requesting user node. When 
the user node is marked with “Churn” (i.e. leaving), the calling instance of this 
node will be terminated. Also, the new node instance stops once it fails to reach 
any available traffic source servers in the playground. 
Eventually, the process of traffic generation shows no direct involvement in the 
security services of SSAM. However, this part is still very crucial for a number of 
reasons. Initially, more traffic in MANETs, unlike other networks, would entail 
much more disruption for utilising security servers in SSAM since the majority of 
MANETs’ nodes play a dual role (i.e. both router and host). On the other hand, 
this process may be perceived differently as a user node is calling a service 
provider to get served although this particular interaction is out of this study 
scope. This interaction can also be a vital point of furthered research for 
supporting SSAM in terms of security and performance. 




Figure  4-19: The flowchart of user node and traffic generator node process 
models 
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This chapter is split into two main parts to present (A) the proposed multi-
dimensional security framework along with a systematic approach for evaluating 
the security/trust infrastructure in MANETs and (B) the proposed SSAM model. 
The first part highlights the design of two different operational levels for MANET 
security operation, the building blocks of MANET security/trust infrastructure and 
the key dimensions affecting the design of the security/trust infrastructure. The 
second part presents the proposal of SSAM with its relevant elements and the 
SSAM activities, process and communication models.  
Part A: The two-security-level-based architecture (i.e. Network” and “Service” 
levels)   derived from the MANET operation view is suggested to manage crucial 
MANET security issues effectively. This architecture is intended to be a key 
motivation to security designers to develop their security solutions smoothly, with 
a balanced view in MANETs. To perceive the design of the security/trust 
infrastructure, a security framework is introduced with five security building 
blocks: (1) a security role, (2) a security-server architecture, (3) a security 
communication protocol, (4) a security mechanism, (5) a security credential. 
Tackling these particular building blocks would facilitate an effective and 
efficient design of security/trust infrastructure. However, a security/trust 
infrastructure can be affected by a number of dimensions: security strength, 
performance and the MANET context. The MANET context describes MANET 
constraints and application settings.  Therefore, the multi-dimensional framework 
is created to shed light on those dimensions in order to build a methodological 
approach which can leverage for well-designed security/trust infrastructures, as 
shown in Figure 4-5. 
Part B: The SSAM model is developed to offer different security architectures 
which can be exploited in the service level in MANETs and also to become a case 
study for evaluating and validating the proposed methodological approach 
discussed in Part A. The SSAM conceptual model, as shown in Figure 4-6, 
presents its core related components. These components are server architectures, 
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cryptosystem, digital certificates, authentication protocols, “strategy of calling”, 
and MANET settings. Some of these components are characterised with different 
properties. The server architecture component proposes different servers (i.e. CAS, 
TAS, DAS) to generate different architectures, CAS, TAS, D\CAS, CAS_TAS, 
TAS_DAS and CAS_TAS_DAS. The authentication protocol component involves 
three standard X.509 authentication protocols (1WP, 2WP and 3WP protocols). 
The two strategies of calling (AAO and IPS) are suggested to be used in the hybrid 
and hierarchical security architectures. In the SSAM design phase, the SSAM 
activity model is generated to demonstrate the lifecycle of a new joining node 
when a certain security architecture is deployed in MANETs. The Two different 
level models (i.e. the communication and process level models) are recognised to 
define the workflows of particular activities in the activity model. The 
communication level model specifically is used to show the flow of creating a 
single connection between a user and server nodes via using a particular 
authentication protocol. The process level model for both user and server nodes 
refers to the internal processes which occur while performing a security service 
(i.e. providing and obtaining a membership certificate) in different server 
architectures within SSAM. 
The next chapter illustrates the implementation of the SSAM prototype (i.e. the 
OMNeT++ simulation model) and describes the necessary configurations and 
design of experiment for conducting performance testing. 
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Chapter 5:  Implementation and 
Experimentation  
5.1 Overview 
This chapter initially discusses the proposal of model assumptions for the sake of 
facilitating the implementation and experimentation of the SSAM model 
demonstrated in the previous chapter. As the simulation approach is adopted for 
the SSAM implementation in this study, the OMNeT++ simulation tool has been 
appropriately selected for creating the SSAM prototype. This prototype consists 
of defining the necessary network and node structures and creating the related 
C++ classes. Furthermore, all important configurations and initialisations for this 
prototype are thoroughly addressed in order to properly conduct performance 
testing. Two types of configurations can be recognised in this chapter; the security 
and network configurations. The security configuration concerns with the SSAM 
server architecture, massage sizes in different authentication protocols, processing 
time in authentication process and the re-authentication scheme being used. The 
network configuration refers to various related MANET components, such as 
mobility, traffic, transport, routing and MAC protocols and churn mode.  
Eventually, the experimental design for running SSAM simulation is well 
illustrated. This includes selecting performance and communication 
measurements, defining test cases & experimental parameters and deciding the 
required number of replications for simulation. 
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5.2 Model Assumptions of SSAM Experimentation 
The proposed SSAM model relies on the following assumptions so that the design 
of this model can be implemented and then be experimented with to study 
performance and communication cost using simulation. A number of these 
assumptions are derived from Venkatraman and Agrawal (2000), Messerges et al. 
(2003), Hadjichristofi et al. (2005a), Hadjichristofi et al.(2005b), Luo et al. 
(2005) and Yang et al. (2006): 
• Each node before joining the network is presumed to be initialised with all 
required information and documents (e.g. an identity certificate, a membership 
validation certificate and self-signed root CA certificate) by using reliable out-
of-band methods, such as biometrics. This is because services deployed in 
MANET in this study are controlled by some independent governing body 
(e.g. a company, university, army, medical association, etc.) to manage a 
security policy for participation and also facilitate registration and 
initialisation. This is the task of MRA in the SSAM model 
 
• Regardless of a security architecture being investigated in SSAM, all security 
servers are predefined and configured with necessary information and 
certificates to deliver the security service to other user nodes. 
 
• At the beginning of simulation, all security servers are supposed to be static at 
predetermined locations along with the other source traffic nodes (i.e. service 
provider servers). This is in order to create and maintain a central point for the 
network since server mobility is not taken into account in this study. 
 
• All nodes that join the network trust all security servers. Also, in certain cases, 
this trust is presumed to be mutual. 
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• The MANET is operated in a non-hostile environment. In other words, no 
malicious node exists. 
 
• Each network node, especially a server node, has adequate energy and 
bandwidth to take part in MANET operation and has enough computational 
power to run the encryption algorithms and key generation algorithms.  
 
• Each node has a sufficient storage resource to store security materials like 
certificates. 
 
• Each node has a unique non zero ID or address (e.g. a real IP address); 
dynamic address allocation issue is outside of the scope of this study. 
5.3 The SSAM Simulation and Implementation 
A simulation approach has been applied for this study, in order to test the SSAM 
model and investigating its potentials.  This section illustrates all key subjects of 
the SSAM prototype and its key configurations. This prototype is based on the 
SSAM conceptual model discussed in Section 4.6 and 4.6. The OMNeT++ 
simulation tool is used for realisation of the prototype. The OMNeT++ simulator 
appears to have versatile features and capabilities (e.g. strong GUI, acceptance 
with the research community, etc.) which will be detailed in the next subsection. 
The key configurations, which are required for applying SSAM over MANETs, 
are highlighted and justified. 
This section is structured as follows: The choice of OMNeT++ simulator is 
justified in Section 5.3.1. The OMNeT++-based components of the SSAM 
prototype are defined in Section 5.3.2. The SSAM and network configurations for 
experimentation are described in Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.3.4 accordingly. 
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5.3.1  Choice of Simulation Tool 
There are several simulation tools that can be used to simulate MANETs, such as 
“NS2”, “GloMoSim” and “OMNeT++”. The OMNeT++ simulation tool has been 
selected to implement the SSAM model. This is due to the fact that this particular 
simulator is one of the best MANET simulation tools as emphasised in Hogie et 
al. (2006), Lessmann et al. (2008) and Mallapur and Patil (2012).Also, several 
reasons of this choice will be highlighted. 
 OMNeT++ (Objective Modular Network Test-bed in C++) is an open source 
and open architecture discrete-event simulator whose kernel is written in C++. It 
is used mainly for academic and educational purposes. It is also regarded as a 
general-purpose tool that can simulate any system consisting of devices 
communicating with each other. OMNeT++ exhibits many features that support 
wireless and mobile networking simulation. Its components are primarily 
established by nested hierarchical extensible modules using a simple text-based 
language, Network Description (NED) which can be easy to learn, while being 
very easy to read. All components and modules must be coded in C++ using C++ 
class libraries which includes the simulation kernel and utility classes for random 
number generation, topology discovery, statistics collection, etc. In OMNeT++, 
there are main object classes, such as “module”, “gate”, “connection” that any 
new modules can be derived from. NED is used to compose individual 
components into larger components and models. In addition to the simulation 
kernel library, OMNeT++ offers a number of useful tools for setting up the 
simulation environment, such as a Graphical Network Editor (GNED), a NED 
compiler, graphical (Tkenv) or command line (Cmdenv) interfaces for simulation 
execution, graphical tools for simulation result analysis (Eventlog, Scave), and a 
model documentation tool. 
Therefore, it is worth pointing out that unlike most common simulators, 
OMNeT++ apparently offers a user friendly extensive GUI supporting graphical 
network editing, animation, configuration and analysis of simulation runs as 
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shown in Figure 5-1. GNED normally facilitates the construction of network 
topologies graphically so as to provide an easy way of defining network 
simulation scenarios. GNED uses (*.ned) files to store all settings of the 
predefined topologies. The Tkenv environment alternatively leverages interactive 
execution of the simulation, tracing and debugging. Also, simulation execution 
can be easily managed in Tkenv (i.e. using start/stop buttons or changing variables 
or objects inside the model at runtime). Accordingly, Tkenv allows the user to 
have detailed view of the simulation state at any point of execution. 
 
Figure  5-1: OMNeT++ GUI during SSAM simulation execution 
A building block in OMNeT++ is a module that can be identified by one of the 
two available types (simple or compound). The simple single module is normally 
used to capture and process simulated behaviour whereas the compound modules 
can consist of the other linked sub-modules whether those sub-modules are simple 
or compound modules. Modules can be connected through their gates so they can 
interact with each other by sending and receiving messages. OMNeT++ also 
allows the user to associate gates with propagation delay, error rate and data rate. 
Also, these gates can promote only one-to-one communication. Consequently, any 
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simulation model can be realised as an instance of a compound module type (i.e. 
hierarchically nested modules). All the details of components and topology can be 
found in (NED) files. During simulation execution, each module can generate, 
read or react to messages (i.e. events). The messages can be for internal use (i.e. a 
self-timer) or for external use (i.e. communication with other modules).  
Regarding MANET simulation, OMNeT++, through its INETMANET 
extension, provides a number of specific modules that can simulate some layers of 
the OSI model (e.g. Application, Network, MAC, etc.) and also few mobility 
models (e.g. Random Waypoint, GaussMarkov, and Manhattan Grid mobility 
models). However, not many OSI  or mobility relevant models are complete in 
OMNeT++ (Mallapur and Patil, 2012). Nonetheless, the OMNeT++ framework is 
still very extensible and amendable. This compensates to a certain extent the 
unavailability of some models. Hence, OMNeT++ appears to be a good choice 
when a lot of customisation or development is expected for the simulation. 
Release version 4.1 of OMNeT++ is used in this work. After searching the 
literature, there are many legitimate reasons for taking advantage of this particular 
simulator. These reasons are listed below:  
1. As opposed to the other simulators mentioned earlier in this section, 
OMNeT++ offers the richest set of GUI features with extensive GUI support 
(e.g. Tkenv, GEND, Eventlog, Scave, etc.). This feature enables much more 
efficiency in editing, verifying, tracing, debugging and analysing the 
simulation. 
 
2. OMNeT++ is open source software, and its source code written in C++ can be 
amended easily. Also, it is regarded as a scalable simulator dealing with large 
scale simulation (Mallapur and Patil, 2012) . 
 
3. OMNeT++ is distinguished with its flexible hierarchical and modular 
architecture for defining its components and modules (e.g. nodes, networks, 
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MAC Layer) using an easy-to-learn text-based language. This helps to speed 
up the modelling process and reduce the level of unnecessary details during 
research development by focusing only on the targeted component or module. 
 
4. OMNeT++ supports some standard modules, queues, channel control etc., 
which can be easily extended too, using basic C++ notation. Also, OMNeT++ 
includes the INETMANET package which includes the most accurate models 
necessary to MANETs (e.g. the AODV routing protocol, IEEE802.11g, etc.). 
 
5. OMNeT++ offers a mobility suite with a sufficient number of models. This 
was the main motivation (or reason) for using OMNeT++ in this project. In 
addition to providing basic mobility models, OMNeT++ can generate a 
dynamic infrastructure to deploy links between nodes that can be dynamically 
established at runtime, and also to implement node churning. 
 
6. OMNeT++ has very convenient documentation (available on the internet) and 
has active discussion forums for learning and solving problems. Additionally, 
it has a good level of acceptance in research and academia.  
The next section explains SSAM implementation. This implementation includes 
the network infrastructure definition and the development of related MANET and 
SSAM C++ classes used in this simulation experiment. 
5.3.2  SSAM Prototype 
This section discusses the SSAM implementation using the OMNeT++ simulator. 
This SSAM tool, which is based on the conceptual model of SSAM (see Section 
4.6 and 4.7), facilitates the simulation of MANETs. Furthermore, this tool makes 
use of the OMNeT++ package (“INETMANET”) which includes the essential 
C++ classes to build and simulate MANETs (e.g. MAC and routing protocols, 
etc.). This “INETMANET” package has been amended to suit SSAM 
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requirements. To find the source-code of the SSAM tool, visit 
http://code.google.com/p/ssam/. 
There are three key components, that can be identified (the MANET 
infrastructure, message types and SSAM implementation classes) to illustrate the 
prototype of SSAM tool in this study. The MANET infrastructure refers to 
network elements and their links following a top-down scheme (i.e. from the 
playground and channel control type to transport and application protocols being 
used in any node). The message types represent SSAM messages (i.e. 
authentication protocol messages) since other types of messages possibly 
generated are outside of scope of this study (e.g. routing discovery messages, 
MAC frames, etc.). The SSAM C++ classes represent the active elements (i.e. 
C++ classes) which are created to fulfil all SSAM specifications (i.e. procedures, 
protocols, a client-server architecture, etc.). 
5.3.2.1 MANET Infrastructure  
As described in Section 5.3.1, OMNeT++ modelling using the NED language 
typically relies on the hierarchical structure to design network simulation 
(compound and simple modules). Therefore, two main infrastructural levels 
(network and node levels) can be used to describe the MANET structure where 
SSAM is deployed. The network level deals with a network topology in the 
simulation playground (i.e. simulation area) and nodes’ connections and positions. 
The node level presents the modular structure of a MANET node that is primarily 
tailored to the OSI model (e.g. MAC, “manetrouting”, IP, TCP). In addition, this 
particular level also includes other non-OSI modules such as mobility. However, 
in terms of the SSAM simulation model, three different types of nodes can be 
distinguished in the network infrastructure (security server, traffic server and user 
nodes). There are presented as follows: 
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1. Network Level Topology  
By using GNED editor in OMNeT++, the SSAM network level is described in the 
following NED file as shown in Figure 5-2.  
 
Figure  5-2: The NED file for defining the SSAM network level 
The main definition of the network infrastructure in OMNeT++ begins with the 
key word “network Net_Manet_AAM_Temp_TG” which contains all necessary 
elements to generate the network. The “numHosts”, “numManagers” and 
“numTaffGen” parameters indicate the actual number of different nodes that 
need to be created at the simulation runtime. “numHosts” denotes the total 
number of user nodes whereas “numManagers” and “numTaffGen” refer to the 
network Net_Manet_AAM_Temp_TG 
{ 
    parameters: 
        int numHosts; // Numbers of user nodes  
        int numManagers; // Numbers of server nodes  
        int numTaffGen; // Numbers of traffic nodes 
        double playgroundSizeX; 
        double playgroundSizeY; 
 
    submodules: 
 
        channelcontrol: ChannelControl { 
            parameters: 
                playgroundSizeX = playgroundSizeX; 
                playgroundSizeY = playgroundSizeY; 
                @display("p=31,63;i=misc/sun"); 
        } 
         
AAMDynamicNetworkConfigurator: AAMDynamicNetworkConfigurator { 
            parameters: 
                dyNetworkAddress = "145.236.0.0"; 
                netmask = "255.255.0.0"; 
                numHosts = numHosts;          @display("p=7,33"); 
        } 
        configurator: FlatNetworkConfigurator { 
            parameters: 
                networkAddress = "145.236.5.0"; 
                netmask = "255.255.0.0";     @display("p=7,6"); 
        } 
        TrafGenSrvHost[numTaffGen]: MobileManetRoutingHost_AAM_TSrG { 
            parameters: 
                @display("r=50,,grey,1;is=l"); 
        } 
        
AuthNMAN[numManagers]: MobileManetRoutingHost_AAM_F { 
            parameters: 
                @display("i=device/wifilaptop_l;r=50,,grey71,1"); 
        } 
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number of security and traffic server nodes. However, as shown in Figure 5-2, 
each of these declared parameters are involved in a specific module, such as 
“AuthNMAN” (i.e. a security server node module) and “TrafGenSrvHost” (i.e. 
a traffic server node module). This is to enable the network model to have a 
flexible number of node instances in initialisation phase (e.g. numHosts= 100, 
numManagers= 7, numTaffGen= 2). 
The “control channel” module is used to define the size (i.e. the 
“playgroundSizeX” and “playgroundSizeY” parameters) of a geographical 
simulation area (“Playground”) where all generated network nodes exist and also 
where they are allowed to roam according to their mobility model. Furthermore, 
this module handles issues of radio channel transmission (e.g. signal fading and 
loss, a signal range, etc.). The AAMDynamicNetworkConfigurator module is 
specifically developed to dynamically create and delete user nodes in the 
playground and update the results of simulation. Also, this module allocates IP 
addresses to those generated user nodes relying on the value of its 
“networkAddress” and “netmask” parameters. All functionalities of this 
module will be explained in Section 5.4.2.3. Finally, the “configurator” 
module manages the IP addresses only for particular server nodes since those 
servers are assumed to already exist in the playground before starting the 
OMNeT++ simulation. 
Figure 5-3 shows the initial state of simulation playground in OMNeT++ 
which includes configuration and channel control modules along with the initial 
network topology of most servers in SSAM (CAS, TAS, etc.). Figure 5-4 depicts a 
snapshot of a current state of MANET infrastructure after some nodes have joined 
the playground. 




Figure  5-3: The simulation playground with the initial topology of all types of 
servers being used in SSAM.  
 
Figure  5-4: The screenshot of a SSAM simulation run in OMNeT++  
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2. Node Level Structure   
The MANET node structure in OMNeT++ involves several modules (e.g. 
mobility, Wlan, network layer, etc.), each of which has its own role and 
connections with other modules. Some of these modules are organised and linked 
to match the layers of the OSI model, for example, the transport layer (a UDP 
module), the network layer (routing table, IP & “manetrouting” modules),  data 
link layer (the WLAN module contains radio and MAC sub-modules), as shown 
in Figure 5-5. The NED file, defining the structure of a MANET node, can be 





Figure  5-5: The node level structures in SSAM tool - (a) Security server node, 
(b) User node, (c)  Traffic server node.  
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The mobility module (i.e. a non-OSI module) is used to enable the node to 
mobilise according to the mobility pattern being defined in initialisation (e.g. 
random walk). The “Wlan” module represents the physical and data link layers in 
the OSI model where signal transmission in radio channels and MAC protocols 
can be handled in wireless networks (e.g. IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol). The 
“manetrouting” module, along with the “network layer” and “routing table” 
modules, manages routing between nodes in MANETs (i.e. includes the 
implementation of a particular MANET routing protocol). The “udp” module is 
defined to implement the UDP transport protocol. 
In SSAM, three distinct nodes can be identified (user, security server, and 
traffic server nodes) as presented in Figure 5-5. Every node is distinguished from 
each other by the type of the application module being used. In user node, the 
“updApp” module (i.e. called an authentication agent) handles user invocations 
and servers’ replies (i.e. processing according to a specific authentication protocol 
and a server architecture). Also, a user node contains the “TraffGentHostMan” 
module which is used to interact with traffic server nodes to trigger traffic in the 
network. While, in the security server node, the “updApp” module (i.e. called an 
authentication Manager) to take a role of security service which provides calling 
user nodes with authentication (i.e. distributes membership certificates). In the 
traffic server node, the “TraffGentSrMan” module is used to generate traffic in the 
network following particular traffic patterns (e.g. CBR, etc.). 
5.3.2.2 Message Declaration 
Each of the authentication protocols being used in SSAM depends on the 
handshaking of different messages (i.e. control and data messages) between user 
and security server nodes. Also, it is important in simulation to differentiate 
between those messages as they are the key part of the authentication process in 
SSAM. OMNeT++ offers a message file editor which is used to create the “msg” 
file. This text-based file, which uses C++ notations, normally contains the 
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definition of requisite messages (along with their fields) for OMNeT++ 
simulation. After compiling this “msg” file, a number of specific C++ class files 
are automatically generated. These particular class files will be used to simulate a 
message object at simulation runtime. 
 
Figure  5-6: The message file (“*.msg”) for declaring messages for 
authentication protocols in SSAM 
As shown in the SSAM “msg” file (see Figure 5-6), three authentication 
protocols are identified by the “AAuthNProtoType” variable while the 
“AAMMessageType” variable refers to different types of messages available for 
use. Those two variables are also acknowledged as a variable type that will be 
exploited in the body of any defined message. “CommonAAM” is a generic message 
(i.e. packet superclass) which contains all shared fields among other messages 
enum AAuthNProtoType // Authentication Protocol type 
{ 
    X509_One_Pass   = 1; 
    X509_Two_Pass   = 2; 




    // Authentication Protocol Control Messages type        
    AAM_AUTHN_PROT_MSG1 = 1; 
    AAM_AUTHN_PROT_MSG2 = 2; 
    AAM_AUTHN_PROT_MSG3 = 3;  
   
    // Authentication Protocol Data Messages type          
    AAM_AUTHN_ACK = 5; // Successful Authentication 
    AAM_AUTHN_NOACK =6; // Unsuccessful Authentication (Not in use) 
}; 
packet CommonAAM  // Common Auhority Architecture for MANETs Message 
{ 
    int MsgType enum (AAMMessageType); 
    int indxSrv ;  // Server Index in for user use 
    int SeqNum ;  // call Freshness  
} 
packet AuthenProtocolMsg extends CommonAAM  // a control message  
{ 
    int Nonce; 
    string Timestamp ; 
    string IdCertificate; 
    string Signature; 
    int AuthNType enum (AAuthNProtoType);     
} 
packet DataMsg extends CommonAAM  // a data message 
{      
    string AttrbCert; // User Membership Certificate 
    string ThreshAttrCert ; // Partial Membership Certificate 
    string AuthorityDeleCert; // Authority delegation Authority 
} 
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(e.g. “MsgType”, “SeqNum” and “indxSrv”). Both “AuthenProtocolMsg” 
and “DataMsg” messages, which are derived from “CommonAAM”, denote the 
body of control and data messages. “AuthenProtocolMsg” has a number of 
distinct control fields based on the authentication protocol being used, such as 
“Nonce”, “Timestamp”, “IdCertificate”, “Signature” and “AuthNType”. 
“DataMsg” is used to carry a user membership certificate and other relevant 
credentials according to the server architecture in use. By using the OMNeT++ 
message compiler (opp_msgc), the “CommonAAM”, “AuthenProtocolMsg”, and 
“DataMsg” C++ classes are automatically generated with all necessary variables 
and methods from the SSAM “msg” file described above. These specific classes 
are also considered a part of SSAM implementation classes as shown in Figure 5-
7. This figure illustrates the class diagram of SSAM. Both “AuthenProtocol-
Msg” and “DataMsg” classes are derived from superclass “CommonAAM” classes. 
All classes in this regard include specific methods which are used to manage 
message fields (i.e. obtain or set fields in the message object). For example, the 
“setMsgType()” and “getMsgType()” methods are used to obtain and set the 
“MsgType” field in the “CommonAAM” class.  
5.3.2.3 SSAM C++ Classes   
After defining the network, the node structures, and the messages in the previous 
sections, this section demonstrates the main classes (written in C++) of SSAM 
application so as to be integrated with their predefined modules or messages. 
These particular classes, which include all necessary data and methods, are 
utilised to implement and simulate the related SSAM activities, processes and 
workflows (see Section 4.7) in OMNeT++ environment. As shown in the class 
diagram in Figure 5-7, various classes along with their associations, can be 
recognised based on their own roles in SSAM, such as “AuthNAgent” (user 
node), “AuthNMAN” (security server), etc. Furthermore, a number of these classes 
are derived from particular built-in superclasses (e.g. “cMessage”, 
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“BasicModule” “UDPAppBase”, etc). To understand the classes’ roles in 
SSAM, key functionalities and dependencies of each class are highlighted in the 
following sections.   
 
Figure  5-7: The SSAM Class Diagram  
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1. The “AAMDynamicNetworkConfigurator”  Class 
 
This class mainly deals with user node creation, stay and deletion (i.e. joining, 
staying and leaving) dynamically at the simulation runtime. Those events can be 
simulated by using a number of methods in this class. Initially, it is essential to 
schedule joining times for potential nodes and this is implemented by setting up 
arrival timers in the “initialize()” method, as shown in Figure 5-8. These 
timers, which are self-messages (msgTimer) marked with “CREATE_NODE_MSG”, 
are created according to the joining model being adopted, such as the Poisson 
arrival model. 
 
Figure  5-8: The lines of code to generate user node arrivals in the 
“initialize()” method 
On the other hand, the “scheduleToDelete()” method is used to initiate a 
timer for a user node which needs to be removed from the playground (i.e. a 
leaving event). This particular timer is triggered based on certain conditions (i.e. 
an authentication failure or lifetime) and also it is marked with 
void AAMDynamicNetworkConfigurator:: initialize () 
{ 
 . . . . . . . . . 
 for (int i= 0; i <nH; i++) 
      { 
          int * xp = new int(); // Number ID 
          *xp = i ; 
 
          std::stringstream msgName ; 
          msgName <<"CreateNode["<<i<<"]"; 
          cMessage *msgTimer = new cMessage ((msgName.str()).c_str(),CREATE_NODE_MSG); 
          msgTimer->setContextPointer(xp); 
 
          // The Type of arrival 1 . Uniform , 2. Possion Process 
          switch(indxs) 
          {   
              case 1 :     // Uniform Arrival 
              . . . . . . . . .; break;         
 
              case 2 :  // Poisson Arrival 
 
              x = x+ exponential (BlockUnit/(double)par("JoinRate")); 
              break; 
 
          default: opp_error("Error in Arrival Type"); 
          } 
} 
 . . . . . . . . . 
} 
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“DELETE_NODE_MSG” for identification purposes. As the “handleMessage()” 
method typically handles messages (i.e. timers or inbound packets) in any classe 
in OMNeT++,  both “DELETE_NODE_MSG” and “CREATE_NODE_MSG” markers 
are utilised to indicate the method “createNode()” or “deleteNode()” that 
needs to be called accordingly within the “handleMessage()”. The  
“createNode()” method concerns with creating a new node in the playground 
and initialising  with all necessary configurations, such as an initial node position, 
a node IP address, display features, etc. Whereas, the “deleteNode()” method 
is used to remove  a particular user node from the playground. The 
“UpdateStatistic()” method is used to support result collection for specific 
metrics, such as success ratio, failure frequency, etc. 
2. The “AuthNManager” Class (Security Server Node) 
 
The “AuthNManager” class takes the role of managing the security service in the 
server side. This is by handling the calls of user nodes through completing 
authentication protocol handshaking in order to provide the nodes with their 
membership certificates, according to the SSAM flowcharts and sequence 
diagrams, see Section 4.7.1. This class is also derived from the main 
“UDPAppBase” class, in order to be embedded in the “udpApp” module (i.e. 
application layer) in security server node as described in the node level structure 
in Section 5.4.1. In initialisation phase, various parameters should be initialised in 
this class, such as “AuthorityServerType”, “respMsgLengthAK”, 
“localAuthnManPort”, “MaxServicesCapacityBuffer”, etc. Different 
types of servers (CAS, TAS and DAS) can be distinguished in this particular class. 
This is by setting up the “AuthorityServerType” parameter. In addition to 
handling self-messages (i.e. timers), the “handleMessage()” method controls 
the flow of  user messages that are received from the gate of this module using a 
queue (i.e. a service buffer) as it is supposed to handle many invocations from 
various nodes. On the other hand, there are a number of timers with distinct 
markers (e.g. “Verification_Timer”, “Protocol_Process_Timer”) along 
with a number of methods (e.g. “verifyAuthnRequest()”,“processUser-
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Request()” and “SendRespToUser()”) which incorporate in this class in 
order to simulate the processing of user requests, as shown in Figure 5-9.  Also 
those particular timers can be initiated based on the processing time model being 
adopted as this issue will be elaborated in Section 5.4.3. 
 
Figure  5-9: The body of “handleMessage()” for handling user messages 
and self-message timers  
The “verifyAuthnRequest()” method is used to verify a user request 
released  from the service buffer, whereas the “processUserRequest()” 
method is used to process a user request after verification (e.g. updating a user 
record and preparing credentials for authentication). The “SendRespToUser()” 
   if (msg->arrivedOn("udpIn"))  
        { 
          if(reqBuffer.length()< MaxServicesCapacityBuffer) 
            { 
              // buffering a user node request if thesecurity service is busy 
 
                if(reqBuffer.empty() && currentAtrrCreaThreads <MaxThreads) 
                { 
                    verifyAuthnRequest(PK(msg)); 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    reqBuffer.insert(msg); 
                } 
            } 
            else 
            { 
              delete msg; // drop the request due to full buffer 
            } 
        } 
        else if (msg->isSelfMessage()) 
        { 
          switch(msg->getKind()) 
          { 
            case Verification_Timer     : processUserRequest(msg); break; 
 
            case Protocol_Process_Timer : SendRespToUser(msg); break; 
 
            case Req_Release_Timer      ://for releasing a request from buffer 
 
                if (reqBuffer.empty()) 
                { 
                    ev<< "No Request to serve -------->  " ; return; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                  ev<< "RELEASE REQUEST FROM REQUEST BUFFER)(:)**** "<<endl ; 
                  verifyAuthnRequest(PK(reqBuffer.pop())); 
                } 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
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method is used to generate a server reply and send it back to the relevant user 
node (i.e. may carry a user membership certificate). 
3. The “AuthNAgent” Class (User Node) 
 
The “AuthNAgent” class, similar to “AuthNManager”, as shown in Figure 5-7,   
is derived from the main “UDPAppBase” class, to be integrated in the “udpApp” 
module (i.e. application layer). In the “initialize()” method, many 
parameters in this class should be initialised according to the particular security 
architecture being applied. An example of these important parameters and the 
value that they can take are presented in Table 5-1.  
Parameters Description 
AuthenticationType 
To indicate the authentication protocol being used  
1  1WP ; 2 2WP ; 3 3WP  
SrvTypTestCase 
Refer to server architecture being deployed  
1  CAS, D\CAS;  2 TAS; 3  CAS_TAS, 
TAS_DAS (disableCAS= true); 4  CAS_TAS_DAS 
strategyType 
Indicate to the strategy with calling when considering 
two- or three-level server architectures. 
0 All at Once (AAO); 1 In Priority Sequence 
(IPS) 
fix_Exp_WT 
The re-authentication scheme being used  
0  the fixed model;   1  the exponential model 
WTime 
Waiting time Unit  between two consecutive 
authentication attempts  (e.g. T0=30s) 
MaxReAuthNCounter A number of Attempt for authentication  (e.g. 3 tries) 
Table  5-1: indicative parameters in “initialize()” 
The “handleMessage()”  method in this class includes two main sub-
methods, “handleTimer()” and “processAuthnResponse()”. 
“handleTimer()” manages timer messages when expired, whereas 
“processAuthnResponse()” processes authentication protocol messages, 
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received from security server nodes, such as “AuthenProtocolMsg” marked 
with “AAM_AUTHN_PROT_MSG2” and “DataMsg” marked with 
“AAM_AUTHN_ACK”. For managing invocation, the “ScheduleAuthn-
Request()” method aims to prepare necessary server calls related to the 
particular server architecture being used via using certain timers marked by 
“MSGKIND_START_REQ”. Besides, the “sendAuthnRequest()” method  
generates different server invocations that comply with different authentication 
protocols as shown in the sequence diagram for each authentication protocol, see 
Section 4.7.1. There are other supporting methods in this class that handle 
authentication states, such as “AuthnStateDataProcess()”, “delaySendTo-
UDP()”, “DataProcessInProgress()” and “CancelTimer()”. 
On the other hand, various timers, which are handled by “handleTimer()”, 
are developed to model different conditions (e.g. waiting for server replies) and 
processes (e.g. verification and generation in authentication). For example, once a 
user node is created in the playground, this node should search for another node to 
connect (exploration). The “SearcForConnection” timer marked with 
“MSGKIND_SRCH_FOR_CONN” enables a new user node to explore other active 
existing nodes in its vicinity (i.e. radio range) while it is roaming. In other words, 
a user node cannot initiate a server call until initially this node can find at least 
another active node to start communicating. This can be implemented by the lines 
of code in “initialize()” and “handleTimer()” methods that are presented 
in Figure 5-10. 
 




Figure  5-10: The search to connect implementation in SSAM  
The “BM->isAnyNeighbourAround()” method is associated with the basic 
mobility module which collaborates with the control channel module in 
OMNeT++ to check any other nodes within the radio range for a certain user 
node. The other timers, which primarily represent a processing delay, are briefly 
described in Table 5-2:  
Timer Marker Description 
MSGKIND_START_REQ Processing an initial authentication request  
MSGKIND_ReREQ Processing authentication re-try 
MSGKIND_PR_PROS_TIMER Only used for validating a control message 
2 (CMsg2) in 2WP authentication 
protocol.   
MSGKIND_DATA_PROS_TIMER Validating membership certificate 
obtained from security server. 
MSGKIND_COMBINPR_TIMER Combining partial certificate received 
void AuthNAgent::initialize(int stage){ 
... . . . . . 
if(par("SearchForConnection").boolValue() && !BM->isAnyNeighbourAround()) 
{ 
 std::stringstream Natimer; 
 Natimer<<"Serch4Conne-"<<getParentModule()->getFullName(); 
 cMessage * SearcForConnection =  





... . . . . .              
} 
void AuthNAgent::handleTimer(cMessage *msg) 
{ 
 . . . . . .  
 case MSGKIND_SRCH_FOR_CONN : // Search for nearby node to access 
 
     if(!SetMobilMod) BM->Registration(true); turn on signal 
     if (!BM->isAnyNeighbourAround())  
     
scheduleAt(simtime_t(simTime()+par("updateSearchTimer").doubleValue()),msg); 
            else 
                { 
                    SchduleAuthnRequest(strategyType,TTimer); //call servers 
                    delete msg; 
                } 
            TotalSrcTime = simTime()- timeToStart; 
     if (!SetMobilMod) BM->Registration(false); // turn off signal  
         break; 
. . . . . .  
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from servers in the TAS architecture.  
MSGKIND_DAS_REQ Generating initial DAS request when DAS 
is involved. 
MSGKIND_DAS_ReREQ Processing authentication re-tries only for 
the case of DAS 
MSGKIND_DAS_PROS_TIMER Validating membership certificate (Chain) 
obtained from DAS. 
Table  5-2:  Timer markers used in the “AuthNAgent” class 
The “UserTrafficTrigger()” method is used to enable the 
“TraffGenHostMan” module within the user node to call available traffic servers 
in order to generate traffic in the network. 
4. The “TraffGenHostMan”  Class (User Node) 
This class is the implementation of the “TraffGenHostMan” module in the 
structure of user node. The role of this class is to trigger traffic by calling 
available traffic server nodes. This class includes a number of methods that 
support traffic handling in the user side. The “TriggerTraffic()”  method is 
utilised to initiate the process of traffic generation between traffic server and user 
nodes. The “handleSelfMsg()”  method is used to deal with recalling timers, 
whereas the “handleLowerMsg()” method processes traffic that is received 
from traffic server nodes. 
5. The “AAMBonnMotionMobility” Class (User Node) 
This class is the implementation of the mobility module in user node which task is 
to update node’s movement (i.e. coordination) in the playground according to the 
mobility model being used. Also, this class is created based on the built-in 
superclass in “INETMANET” package for mobility, such as “LineSegments-
MobilityBase” and “BaiscMobility”.  On the other hand, the trace file, 
generated from the “BonnMotion” tool (see Section 5.3.4.1), is imported into this 
class to create a node journey in the playground when a certain user node joins. 
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6. The “TraffGenSrMan” Class (Traffic Server Node) 
The “TraffGenSrMan” class is developed to simulate a source of traffic in the 
network. Furthermore, this class typically interacts with the “TraffGenHost-
Man” class in the user node to implement the particular traffic model being 
proposed (e.g. CBR, ON/OFF Pareto, etc.). A number of methods are coded to 
facilitate traffic generation, such as “handleSelfMsg()”(i.e. handling sending 
timers), “SendTraf()” (i.e. managing traffic dispatching), 
“handleLowerMsg()” (i.e. processing user traffic request), etc. 
The next section addresses the issues of configuration and initialisation for 
SSAM simulation model. These issues concern with both the SSAM model and 
network characteristics. 
5.3.3  The SSAM Security Configurations 
The security model apparently relies on two elements for deployment: security 
servers and authentication protocols. However, these two elements can be 
associated with several settings and these certain settings may represent different 
situations where and how the model can be implemented and tested. To prepare 
the model for experimentation, all settings are therefore defined which are tailored 
to this study’s goal in the next subsections. 
5.3.3.1 The Server Architecture (Security Servers) 
In accordance with the SSAM described in Section 4.6, four specific types of 
security servers (i.e. CAS, TAS, DAS and D\CAS) are used to give security services 
(i.e. generating membership credentials of user nodes when authenticated) to other 
user nodes to establish trust in MANETs. Each particular server type has its own 
properties in terms of the number of servers required, server placement, 
independency and mobility. In the light of assumptions made for this study, some 
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of these properties are vital that they are identified and justified for performance 
experimentation to avoid any misleading experimental results. Therefore, these 
properties will now be discussed for each security server type.   
 
 Figure  5-11: Simulation Area “Playground” and Server Location  
Regarding the requirements of multiple servers, the CAS case needs only a 
single standalone server for providing a security service whereas the TAS, DAS 
and D\CAS cases are based on a scheme of multiple servers. However, the TAS 
case is distinguished from DAS and D\CAS because the TAS case relies on a group 
of particular servers cooperating together in the security service provision (i.e. 
dependant servers). In the cases of DAS and D\CAS, each server can 
independently provide the whole security service even though each one has 
different procedures for providing the security service as discussed in Section 4.6. 
Six server nodes for each case of TAS, DAS, and D\CAS are predetermined and 
uniformly distributed in six regions of the square space (i.e. a simulation area 
“playground”) while one server in the CAS case is located in the centre of the 
space. Each server is presumed to belong to its region and may be responsible for 
offering services to nodes of its region. Figure 5-11 displays the all proposed 
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architecture being considered, a circle shape can take one or two of the available 
three forms (TAS, DAS and D\CAS). On the other hand, the TAS architecture is 
built on the TC(k = 3, n = 6) scheme (i.e. threshold value k is estimated based on 
Gennaro et al. (2000)), in other words, any 3 TASs is sufficient to provide a 
security service to user nodes. 
In this study, the main target is to test the performance of different security 
architectures with a fixed number of servers. This is due to the fact that increase in 
the number of servers in these particular cases would entail proportional impact 
on output performance metrics. It is arguable that SSAM is developed in this 
study to offer different types of server architectures to user nodes (i.e. usage side) 
ignoring the different server counts for multiple-server-based cases as these can be 
further researched in the server management dimension. Eventually, all types of 
servers are uniformly located and fixed (i.e. static) in the middle of separate 
symmetrical regions. For server topology balancing, this particular distribution 
would enable those static server nodes to cover the most space of playground 
during simulation, especially in multi-server architectures. 
5.3.3.2 The Authentication Protocols 
As the three security communication protocols (i.e. One Way Pass, Two Way 
Pass and Three Way Pass protocols), as well as the threshold cryptosystem, are 
considered to be a means of performing authentication between user and server 
nodes, they have different settings that need to be identified. According to each 
protocol workflow shown in Section 4.7.1.1, the message size, processing time, 
and the re-authentication scheme (i.e. waiting time and a number of attempts) are 
the key parameters in configuring each protocol model for the simulation.  
• The Message size Model: 
Each protocol is normally distinguished with a particular count and type of 
messages exchanged between two ends (i.e. control and data messages). Also, 
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each certain message in every protocol includes different contents (e.g. timestamp, 
nonce, an encrypted session key, etc.). Due to the fact that the type of adopted 
authentication protocols involved in SSAM is asymmetric for processing 
authentication (i.e. unilateral or mutual authentication), X.509-v3 certificates must 
be piggybacked on certain protocol messages for facilitating authentication. 
Therefore, the size of protocol messages differs from one another according to 
their sequence and required contents and the type of server architecture in use. All 
message protocol sizes are summarised in Table 5-3. 
 Authentication Protocols (Security Communication) 
Three Way Pass 
(3WP) 
Two Way Pass 
(2WP) 



















CMsg1 1110 Byte 1110 Byte 1110 Byte 
CMsg2 1110 Byte 1110 Byte  
CMsg3 512 Byte   
Table  5-3: Message sizes in the authentication protocols 
The average size of a standard certificate is proposed to be 1KB corresponding 
to the approximate size of actual X.509 digital certificate generated by the most 
famous toolkit, OpenSSL (Cox et al., 2002) as certain protocol messages may 
contain a certificate like DMsg1, CMsg1 and CMsg2. However, in the particular 
case of using DAS, the size of the protocol data message (DMsg1) becomes 
double because the authentication protocol specifications, as explained in Section 
4.7.1.1, indicate that message should include two types of certificates, a node 
membership certificate along with a server delegation certificate. 
• The Processing Times Model: 
Processing time (T) is typically defined as a delay or cost that each operation in 
the sequence flow of a particular authentication protocol needs in order to be 
completed (e.g. signature creation and validation, certificate issuing, partial 
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certificate combining, etc.), as shown in Figures 4-11, .. , 4-18. Processing time 
can vary because this cost depends upon three elements which are the device 
capability, the operating system utilisation, the cryptographic function in use (e.g. 
asymmetric or threshold algorithms). 
In the literature, there are several studies that conduct primitive operation 
evaluation to the real implementation of different cryptographic algorithms on 
particular devices such as Luo et al. (2004), Raghani et al. (2006), Komninos et 
al. (2007) and Saxena et al. (2007). However, the outcomes from those 
cryptographic algorithm evaluations are restricted to the particular context and 
time. This is because these outcomes are realised from testing specific 
cryptographic algorithms in a specific hardware in the past. In recent times, there 
has however been rapid development of hardware and many efficient 
cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, considering processing time in certain cases 
possibly becomes insignificant. Nonetheless, This study makes use of  generic 
processing time as in Salmanian et al. (2010) following a standard uniform 
distribution. Processing time in a real network system, where devices may run 
different operating systems, depends not only on the cost of running cryptographic 
functions of authentication protocols but also on other factors, for example, device 
capacities, pipelines in operating systems, reading/writing to storage resources, 
buffering, etc.. Therefore, generic processing time is considered for this context. 
Additionally, this study does not take into consideration any specific power and 
capacity model for the network nodes. 
According to the design of these authentication protocols, presented in the 
sequence and workflow charts in Section 4.7.1, there are miscellaneous types of 
processing time for generating and validating protocol messages, creating new 
user record and combining received partial certificates. Table 5-4 outlines all 
types of processing time alongside with their value model. As can be seen from 
Table 5-4, uniformly distributed values between 0.3 and 3 seconds are used for 
modelling processing time in this study. It is obvious that, in the case of DAS, the 
time of validating data messages is two times greater than others server models 
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due to validating a certificate chain with a length of two certificates. On the other 
hand, the procedure of creating a data message including the membership 
certificate for a particular user arguably takes more time than the process 
validating the same message at the other end. In the control message processing 
times for the Three Way Pass (3WP) protocol, as shown in Table 5-4, the third 
message operations (i.e. generating and validating) are specified to take less than 
the half processing time of the other two messages within the protocol. This is due 
to the fact that according to the 3WP design specifications, processing in this 
specific phase includes only the generation or verification of a comparatively 
small acknowledgment message (i.e. CMsg3) without having any extra 
cryptographic operations, such as certificate validation. 
 Authentication protocols (Security Communication) 
Three Way Pass 
(3WP) 
Two Way Pass 
(2WP) 














uniform(2,3)  uniform(2,3) uniform(2,3) 
TAS uniform(2,3) uniform(2,3) uniform(2,3) 





D\CAS uniform(1,1.5) uniform(1,1.5) uniform(1,1.5) 
TAS uniform(1,1.5)  uniform(1,1.5)  uniform(1,1.5)  








TGCM1 – Generating CM1 uniform(0.8,1) uniform(0.8,1) uniform(0.8,1) 
TVCM1 – Validating CM1 uniform(0.8,1) uniform(0.8,1) uniform(0.8,1) 
TGCM2 - Generating CM2 uniform(0.8,1) uniform(0.8,1)  
TVCM2 – Validating CM2 uniform(0.8,1) uniform(0.8,1)  
TGCM3 - Generating CM3 uniform(0.3,0.5)   
TVCM3 – Validating CM3 uniform(0.3,0.5)   
Server side - User Record Processing Time (TUsrRec) =  uniform(1,1.5) applied once at the first invocation   
• User Side – Processing Time of combining partial certificates (TComb) = uniform (1.5, 2) 
(combining   partial certificates) in the TAS model. 
• *Uniform (x , y) is a standard uniform distribution function between lower-bound x and upper-
bound y  
Table  5-4: The processing times model in SSAM for simulation 
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• The Re-authentication Scheme: 
It is unrealistic to ensure that each distinctive attempt of a server invocation for 
authentication will lead to a successful authentication, especially in dynamic 
networks as MANETs. Therefore, it is important to consider the case of attempt 
failure by using a re-authentication scheme which enables a server invocation for 
authentication to be systematically renewed in order to overcome connection 
limitations. There are a few number of studies such as Yi and Kravets (2003), Luo 
et al. (2004), and Larafa and Laurent (2011), that have drawn attention to the re-
authentication process. 
Complying with the approach of Larafa and Laurent (2011), it is essential to 
consider the three settings that the proposed re-authentication scheme is based on. 
These settings are the total waiting time (Timeout) before giving up calling, time 
interval (T) for waiting before triggering a new attempt, and a maximum number 
of attempts (MNA). However, larger Timeout values, regardless of a maximum 
number of attempts, can improve the chance of authentication success because the 
node waits longer for completing the request via the predetermined message-
based handshaking protocol with certain servers to obtain its membership 
certificate. Yet, if some of those protocol messages are dropped or lost in 
transmission, this will entail failure in the request and the larger Timeout values 
can lead the node to back off unnecessarily. In the case that the Timeout value is 
defined too small, even if there are sufficient replies on their way back to the user 
node for completing the request, the user node abandons too early resulting in 
being discarded. On the other side, with having large MNA, the chance of 
authentication success would typically be increased, however an increase in MNA, 
incurs extra traffic in the network. Hence, these parameters must be carefully 
defined for a more effective and efficient re-authentication scheme. There are 
different ways to model this scheme by using different trends in increasing 
waiting time (i.e. linear, exponential, etc.) and numbers of attempts. 
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Two common parameter models have been identified for this study, the fixed 
and the base-2 exponential interval models. In the fixed interval model, the time 
interval between attempts is constant during Timeout. The base-2 (2
x
) exponential 
model uses a variable time interval (i.e. initial waiting time unit T0 = 30 seconds) 
as a time interval between two consecutive attempts differs exponentially. This 
allows more relaxed time for authentication comparing to the fixed model. 
Besides, three attempts are defined to be the maximum number of attempts for 
server invocation and accordingly the total Timeout in the base-2 exponential 
model is 210 seconds, as presented in Figure 5-12, whereas it is 90 seconds (i.e. 3 
Tries ×	(T0 = 30s ) ) in the fixed model. 
 
Figure  5-12: The base-2 exponential re-authentication scheme in SSAM 
The base-2 exponential model is used in SSAM for facilitating the invocation 
of almost all server types (i.e. CAS, TASs and D\CASs) as this scheme arguably 
offers flexibility in the time interval within Timeout. Therefore, the time intervals 
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Figure  5-13: The description of different alternatives in the adaptable fixed 
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Timeout  presented above for calling a chosen TAS  is based on the exponential interval model. 
There are three different states:   1 A successful call is achieved in the first slot.   
           2 A successful call is achieved in the second slot.  
               3 A successful call is achieved in the third slot. 
The following re-authentication schemes to call a DAS adapts to the three defined time slots: 
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Alternatively, in the multi-level security architectures where DASs are 
integrated, the adaptable fixed interval model is adopted for the sake of efficiency 
and optimisation since calling a DAS unlike other servers is associated with the 
prior TAS invocation according to SSAM specifications (i.e. DASs and TASs are 
deployed in the same server).The proposed adaptable fixed interval mode is 
similar to the normal fixed model but the time interval (Tx) can be amended, based 
on a state of prior successful calling for a particular TAS, every time a DAS 
invocation is initiated. This state in this regard indicates the waiting time slot 
within Timeout that a successful call of TAS occurs. Also, it is normally calculated 
based on the unit of waiting time (T0) and the current number of attempts in the 
base-2 exponential interval model obtained from the previous successful 
connection to a certain TAS. The three different cases of adaptable re-
authentication DAS schemes are clarified in Figure 5-13. 
5.3.4  The Network Configurations 
In addition to security-related SSAM configurations mentioned in the previous 
section, this section presents all necessary network components of MANETs that 
need to be defined and then justified in order to conduct performance testing of 
the SSAM model using simulation. Thus, the network model configuration mainly 
includes the mobility model, traffic model, transport, routing, and MAC protocols 
and churn model. Each has its own settings that will be detailed in the following 
subsection. 
5.3.4.1 The Mobility Model 
Node mobility is a very common feature in MANETs and this feature normally 
leads MANETs to suffer from network partitioning and unstable topologies. 
According to a MANET domain being tackled (e.g. human, vehicles, etc.), node 
mobility can also take several forms in terms of direction, speed, path shapes, 
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pause time, etc. There are various popular mobility models in MANETs such as 
Random Waypoint, GaussMarkov, Manhattan Grid and Reference Point Group 
Mobility models (Camp et al., 2002). In spite of numerous existing mobility 
models in MANET literature, the Random Waypoint Mobility model (RWM) is 
still regarded as the most widely used mobility model. As stated in Kurkowski et 
al. (2005),  the authors have found that the sixty four percent (64%) of total 
simulation papers were using the Random Waypoint Mobility model (RWM) in 
creating their simulation scenarios (see Figure 5-14).  
 
Figure  5-14: Mobility model usage from the study of Kurkowski (2005). 
The RWM model is based on two key parameters, speed and a pause time 
between changes in direction. In this model, each node starts waiting in one 
location for a certain period of time (i.e. called a pause time). After pause time 
finishes, the node selects a random destination in the simulation area and a speed 
which is uniformly distributed between [MinSpeed, MaxSpeed]. The node herein 
moves towards the new destination at the predefined speed and then stops at 
destination for a period of pause time to repeat the whole scenario again. 
Therefore, the Steady-state Random Waypoint Mobility model (SRWM), is 
chosen for this study, which is a modified version of the normal RWM. This 
particular version enables nodes to begin in the steady-state distribution of the 
RWM (i.e. to resolve the problem of having  zero speed, as addressed in Yoon et 
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al. (2003)) and it also facilitates analysing a simulation scenario from time zero, 
without considering initialisation bias incurred by initial node movement (Navidi 
and Camp, 2004; Navidi et al., 2004). 
Besides, “BonnMotion” (Aschenbruck et al., 2010) is a Java-based package 
developed to generate mobility trace files to simulate and analyse many mobility 
models (e.g. Random Waypoint, Manhattan Grid, etc.). Also, those generated files 
can usually be exported easily into simulators. This is in order that each node can 
have its own trip (i.e. its positions and movements) during simulation runs. 
Therefore, this tool is used to create SRWM trace files for all nodes (see section 
A.1 in Appendix A for more details about the configuration and implementation of 
“BonnMotion” tool). 
To conclude, the parameters of the selected SRWM model for this study are set 
to comply with human mobilisation (e.g. walking, jogging, etc.) especially in 
terms of speed and pause time. Thus, node speed can be between [0.5 m/sec, 1.5 
m/sec] following the speed of human walking  based on Carey (2005) and 
TranSafety (1997), while pause time is between  30 and  90 seconds. Since having 
different configurations for mobility is out of the scope, it is proposed that the this 
mobility scenario can be characterised as a base mobility scenario so that it can be 
compared with other new scenarios tackling higher values in their mobility 
parameters. Also, note that SSAM in this project can be adapted to any other 
mobility model that is considered appropriate by any researcher.  
5.3.4.2 The Traffic Model  
Apart from traffic stemming from interaction between server and user nodes in the 
SSAM model, the amount of additional traffic herein is intended to be generated 
in order to create a situation closer to the real network traffic during running the 
simulation of SSAM. Although, there are many traffic models (e.g. ON/OFF 
Pareto, ON/OFF Exponential, etc.) that can be exploited in MANETs (Giannoulis 
et al., 2009; Pal et al., 2011), the Constant Bit Rate (CBR) traffic model is 
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selected to produce traffic for this simulation similar implementations can be 
found in Larafa and Laurent (2011). This is because SSAM is developed to 
accommodate general-purpose context not only for a specific domain of MANET 
applications or service providers, such as multimedia streaming or data services. 
On the other hand, CBR traffic model is acknowledged as a very popular traffic 
model used in network simulation. It normally produces traffic at a predefined 
constant rate along with some randomising fluctuation in the inter-packet 
departure interval. The type of traffic generated by the CBR model can usually 
match the properties of real data service traffic. In this particular traffic, the data 
rate and the delay remain constant during the packet transmission (Pal et al., 
2011). For this simulation, two CBR sources are dedicated to cover the whole 
simulation area; each one is located in the middle of the half area (as shown as a 
triangle shape “Traffic Source” in Figure  5-2). Additionally, these traffic sources 
are configured with a rate 2.5 KB/sec and a packet size 512 Bytes and each one 
generates and sends a traffic volume of 25 Kbytes for every user node attempting 
to connect. Both CBR generators in this experiment are hypothetically regarded as 
service providers (i.e. traffic sources.) invoked or triggered only by successfully 
authenticated nodes. 
5.3.4.3 The Transport Protocol  
UDP (Postel, 1980) and TCP (Postel, 1981) are the most dominant transport 
protocols employed by networking applications. In contrast to UDP, TCP offers 
network-level services with reliable delivery. This reliability is implemented by 
TCP via sending packets and waiting for confirmation from destination about 
successful delivery of those packets. In case, no reply is acknowledged from the 
destination within a specific period of time at that point the packet must be resent. 
As such, in an environment like MANETs where packet loss is quite frequent 
having limited bandwidth or physical-layer congestion, using TCP can bring 
about a high increase in traffic owning to either the loss of the acknowledgement 
or original packet entailing more retransmission. This can clearly lead to 
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conditions where the MANET becomes jammed, making the TCP protocol 
present worst case performance. For that reason, it can be argued that by 
evaluating the effectiveness of jamming under each protocol, UDP rarely exhibits 
congestion comparing to TCP. On the other hand, UDP is lightweight and 
connectless and these features make it preferable in the light of MANET 
limitations. Besides, a number of works, for example Luo et al.(2004), Raghani et 
al.(2006) and Salmanian et al. (2010), make use of the UDP protocol for 
implementing their security model. Therefore, only the UDP transport protocol is 
adopted in this performance experimentation. 
5.3.4.4 The Routing Protocol  
As described in Section 2.2.2, there is a variety of routing protocols exploited 
mainly to establish a multi-hop routing infrastructure for MANETs. Proactive and 
reactive unicast routing protocols are the two large categories used in this field 
(Chlamtac et al., 2003; Conti and Giordano, 2007). Proactive routing protocols 
are table-driven protocols which are based on legacy Internet distance-vector and 
link-state protocols such as the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol 
(Clausen et al., 2003) and the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) 
routing protocol (Perkins and Bhagwat, 1994). In this particular category, the 
routing table in every node is maintained and periodically updated to reflect the 
current state of links or paths with other nodes in the network. While, reactive 
routing protocols are distinguished with an on-demand attribute by finding the 
route to a destination only when required such as Ad hoc On-Demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) routing protocol (Perkins et al., 2003) and Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) protocol (Johnson and Maltz, 1996). In the route discovery 
process, the route request is typically launched by the source node. Once a route is 
formed, it is retained by a route maintenance procedure until either the destination 
becomes unreachable or the route is no longer utilised. 
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The AODV protocol (Perkins et al., 2003) is considered one of the most well-
known on-demand ad hoc routing protocols used in the research community and 
also investigated extensively by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Broch et al., 1998; Royer 
and Perkins, 2000; Perkins et al., 2003; Chakeres and Belding-Royer, 2004; 
Rahman and Zukarnain, 2009; Gupta et al., 2010; Klein-Berndt, 2010). This 
routing protocol is identified by two main features: (1) using on-demand 
broadcast discovery mechanism to learn about the network topology and (2) using 
a sequence number to guarantee that routing information is up-to-date. The path 
discovery is performed whenever a node needs to communicate with another, and 
only if it has no routing information of the destination in its routing table. Path 
discovery begins by broadcasting a route request control message “RREQ” which 
disseminates in the forward path. In the case of a neighbour having information 
about the route to the destination, it responds with a route reply control message 
“RREP” that propagates in the backward path. Otherwise, the “RREQ” will be re-
broadcasted by the neighbour. The process will be repeated by other intermediate 
nodes until finding the destination node or meeting a limit criterion on “RREQ” 
dissemination which is configured by a source node (i.e. a mechanism known as 
“Expanding Ring Search”). To detect that neighbours are still in range of 
connectivity, AODV makes use of heartbeat control messages, called “Hello” 
messages, in order to maintain up-to-date paths. When, for any reason, a link is 
broken, an unsolicited route error control messages “RERR” is generated and 
broadcasted to all active source nodes that are currently using this link. Once the 
“RERR” is delivered to a source node, the node may re-initiate the path discovery 
process if necessary. 
Eventually, despite the fact that there are several routing protocols in MANET 
that could be examined for this study, it is decided to involve AODV in the 
routing infrastructure of MANETs. This routing protocol is broadly used and there 
are a number of security models taking advantage of this particular protocol , such 
as Hadjichristofi et al. (2005a) Raghani et al. (2006), Al-Bayatti et al. (2009) and  
Larafa and Laurent (2011). On the other hand, using this protocol is meant to be 
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an illustrative example of a routing element contributing to the overall proposed 
approach of this study. Note that SSAM would be configured to use other routing 
protocols if relevant to a study. 
5.3.4.5 The MAC Protocol 
For establishing node-to-node (one-hop) communication in MANETs, there is a 
variety of wireless technologies that can benefit, such as, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, 
Infrared-IrDA. However, the IEEE 802.11 (IEEE802.11, 1997) current wireless 
standard (i.e. MAC protocol) for interconnection is acknowledged as the most 
extensively used standard in MANET research community. Also, this particular 
standard provides an ad hoc mode connection that can suit MANETs and it is 
characterised by high-speed (54Mbp) and medium-range attributes. For this 
reason, The MAC protocol is included in the simulation model (Cocorada, 2008; 
Bredel and Bergner, 2009) of the IEEE 802.11g standard (IEEE802.11g, 2003). 
The configurations of the MAC layer is 150 meter fixed radio range for each node 
using a path loss radio model for propagation. 
5.3.4.6 The Churn Model and Network Scenarios 
MANETs are distinguished by their dynamic topologies. These dynamic 
topologies clearly stem from the features of node mobility and churn which are 
discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2. However, it is noticeable that, in the MANETs 
simulation field, most security proposals, which are simulated for testing the 
performance, only consider mobility with a fixed node density (i.e. a specific 
number of nodes) and ignore the situation of having volatile (i.e. growing and 
shrinking) MANETs.  In other words, the network scenarios of those proposals 
are normally generated from the assumption that all MANET nodes come to 
existence all at once and are randomly distributed in the simulation area where 
those nodes start roaming based on the predetermined mobility model (e.g. the 
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RWM, etc.). Also, there is no consideration for the state of a node that leaves its 
network even though node churning in particular circumstances is justified and 
important to be acknowledged. Unlike Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks regarding 
churn modelling (Stutzbach and Rejaie, 2006; Herrera and Znati, 2007), there is a 
lack of churn models for MANETs because there is no real and fully installed 
MANET application to rely on and to derive a model of churn behaviour for a 
particular use of MANETs. The author believes that node churning would have an 
impact on the availability and performance of the whole networking system due to 
incurring more broken links. Hence, node churn should arguably be taken into 
account for more accuracy and validity of simulating the real environment of 
MANETs. 
Besides, since this study targets large-scale MANETs, the SSAM model is 
investigated under three different sizes of node population, 100 nodes, 250 nodes 
and 500 nodes within a space of 1500 m
2
. However, in contrast to other typical 
works, those different populations refer to the total number of nodes that would 
participate in the network during the network’s lifetime (i.e. total simulation 
time). In other words, node density varies over the time through having few nodes 
at the beginning and evolving until reaching a total population predefined in the 
experiment. 
Therefore, for this study two main distinct scenarios are proposed to describe 
and represent different levels of dynamism in MANETs: (1) the moderately 
dynamic topology (i.e. called “No-Churn” as the churn rate is zero) and (2) the 
highly dynamic topology (i.e. called “Churn”). The goal of the two particular 
scenarios is arguably to scrutinise and understand the basic effects of various node 
densities (i.e. instigated by dynamic population with/without churning) in 
MANETs on availability and performance of SSAM. On the other hand, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, it is considered that this is the first attempt to 
involve the notion of node churn (i.e. a churn behaviour model) in this context of 
MANET performance and security. The author believes that this churn model will 
open a new direction incorporating with other metrics of interest (e.g. 
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performance, security, management, etc.) in dynamic MANETs for future 
research. This churn model mainly consists of three parts, node joining, leaving 
and lifetime. Every part can be modelled and configured differently. 
For the case of node joining, a join rate (λ) can be defined as a node arrival 
rate. This rate can be variable or fixed depending on certain characteristics of 
context being undertaken in MANETs (i.e. rescue mission, education 
environment, etc.). Since no empirical results are available to represent joining 
behaviour (i.e. arrivals) of nodes in MANETs, a joining rate (λ) can be modelled 
to typically follow a standard distribution. For example, stationary or non-
stationary Poisson process distributions where the inter-arrival times between 
joining nodes are independent exponential  are  widely utilised by authors such as 
Yang et al. (2010) and Papadopouli et al. (2005). These two works have discussed 
employing these distributions in modelling user arrival to connect to access points 
of the Wi-Fi network. However, the communication models of MANETs and Wi-
Fi networks have common features in term of wireless technologies and mobility; 
the author alleges that these distributions can be employed for modelling node 
arrivals for MANETs. This approach can be considered as a starting point for 
further amendments and also a new direction for future research. For model 
simplicity and result stability, only the Stationary Poisson Process (SPP) 
distribution is adopted in this study (i.e. fixed joining rate λ = 1 node/min). Figure 
5-15 describes how to generate arrival times for nodes joining using SPP. 




Figure  5-15: Stationary Poisson Process (SPP) Generator 
Correspondingly, in the case of node leaving or churning, a MANET node 
would leave the network for several reasons, for example service unavailability, 
power failure or willingness. In accordance to the model assumptions, power 
issues are out of the study scope. Hence, as the SSAM model generally offers 
security service model and needs to be tested under a particular churning 
condition, node churn can be realised by two scenarios so either (1) when a node 
fails to be authenticated or (2) when a node is willing to leave voluntarily even if 
it is authenticated. The former scenario of node leaving is different from the latter 
one by the type of a reason making a node leave the network (i.e. compulsory and 
voluntary conditions). 
Additionally, node lifetime in the network is a very important aspect that 










4. Return		 = T − Z[P 		
5. End	For	
Note	that	− Z[P 	is	the	desired	exponential	variate	with	mean		P		
 Chapter 5: Implementation and Experimentation   
 
Salaheddin Darwish 181
Due to that fact that there are very scarce empirical studies in node lifetime 
schemes  in dynamic MANETs, a lifetime scheme is proposed in this study to 
tailor the simple normal distribution function in order to alleviate the stochastic 
nature of simulation and facilitate result reproducibility. The average lifetime in 
any networks varies, however the empirical studies in Yung-Chih et al. (2012) 
and Hutchins and Zegura, (2002) are relied on to decide about the value as a point 
of reference. These two studies have investigated a session length (i.e. lifetime) 
for users connecting to the Wi-Fi network on a university campus and they have 
found that the average of session length is approximately 10 minutes (i.e. 600 
sec). Accordingly, the standard normal distribution function with a mean average 
(600s ± 200s) is applied for the lifetime scheme in this study. In addition, the 
random selected the 50% of successfully authenticated nodes takes that lifetime 
scheme into consideration and the rest of nodes stay until the end of simulation in 
order to keep MANETs up running. 
In conclusion, the two key scenarios that are taken into account in this 
experimentation study are to create different settings of a node density in 
MANETS so as to evaluate performance of SSAM under different conditions. 
With three different volumes of population, the first scenario, the so-called 
moderately dynamic topology, can be accomplished only by a growing MANETs 
without churning (“No-Churn”). While, the second one, the so-called highly 
dynamic topology along with the same three settings as in the first one can be 
applied by using growing MANETs with node leaving (“Churn”). This node 
leaving can be achieved by either having unsuccessful node authentication or 
having a certain lifetime scheme employed as explained above. 
5.4 Experimental Design 
This experimental design consists of defining (1) the key performance and 
communication cost metrics, (2) the number of experiments based on the number 
of factors, their levels and also the final experimentation parameters and (3) the 
number of replications of each experiment. This experimental study basically aims 
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to produce comparative results in order to determine the best alternative out of 
various scenarios according to different criteria (e.g. security, performance, 
communication cost, etc.). This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
5.4.1  Performance & Communication Metrics 
Since the main goal of this study is to validate the performance of the SSAM 
model with different settings and under distinctive scenarios, there are a number 
of common indicators that can be measured to reflect the performance of any 
networking system, for example latency, throughput, failure rate, etc. (Jain, 1991). 
Along with performance metrics, the cost measurement in terms of 
communication load and resource consumption must be acknowledged because 
the SSAM model is developed to be deployed in MANETs where the networks 
are often characterised with limited resources (i.e. bandwidth, power, storage and 
processing). Hence, it is important to take into consideration this measurement. 
All metrics identified in this regard are listed below: 
• The Success Ratio measures the ratio of the number of successful 
authenticated node over the total size of node population that join the network 
during the simulation time.             
Success Ratio [%] = 
	^_``abbc_Z	d_efae`geah	ijhabkjegZ	ijha	ljm_Zgej 	× 100 
• The Failure Frequency estimates the number of failures (i.e. unsuccessful 
authenticated nodes) that occur during a time unit. 
Failure Frequency [Node/ Time Unit] =  
		[b_``abbc_Z	d_efae`geah	ijhabkna	[e  
 
• The Round Trip Time (RTT) refers to the average latency for successfully 
getting the credentials for a user node. As the SSAM model has different 
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authentications and server architectures, RTT is chosen to reflect time cost. 
RTT is calculated as the average time when the first message of the 
authentication protocol calls a particular server architecture until the time of 
completing calling when a user node obtains its credential. Also the RTT 
standard deviation (RTT-STDev) is considered to demonstrate the variance of 
the RTT. 
Round Trip Time [Time Unit] = 	oa`apa 	− 	 ̂ ah	
• The Communication Overhead expresses the total amount of traffic (i.e. 
security communication messages) that is required to enable a joining new 
node to have successful authentication and obtain its credentials (i.e. 
membership certificate).  
 
Communication Overhead [Byte] = 	∑#roa`apa 	+ ∑#r^ah 
 
There are other supporting metrics (e.g. certificate type and count Acquisitions) 
for evaluating effectiveness productivity and manageability of security 
architectures in SSAM that will elaborated in the next chapter. 
5.4.2  Test Cases & Experimental Settings  
As discussed previously (see Section 5.3.2), the model implementation of SSAM 
is established upon three key components (i.e. authentication protocols, types of 
security server and calling strategies in certain hierarchical server arrangements). 
These components can be considered as the main factors that need to be 
investigated in the performance testing experiment. Therefore, depending on 
levels of each factor, as shown in Table 5-5, there are 18 different security test 
cases that are proposed for carrying out effective performance experimentation 
and evaluation of this model under particular scenarios (i.e. three population sizes 
with\out churn). Also, these security test cases are grouped into three sets 
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according to the type of authentication protocol. On the other hand, each factor 
combination (i.e. a test case) in this context represents a distinctive security 
architecture. In the experiments, each security architecture is denoted with a 
unique code (e.g. 1WP_CAS, etc., see Table 5-3) so that it can be identified in an 
easy manner throughout experimentation and evaluation phases.   
The Set of Subject Cases  



























































1 data message 
+ – –   1WP_CAS 
– + –   1WP_TAS 
+ + – 
+ – 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 
– + 1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 
– + +   1WP_TAS_DAS 
+ + + 
+ – 1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 
– + 1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 
– – +   1WP_D\CAS 




1 data message 
+ – –   2WP_CAS 
– + –   2WP_TAS 
+ + – 
+ – 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 
– + 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 
– + +   2WP_TAS_DAS 
+ + + 
+ – 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 
– + 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 
– – +   2WP_D\CAS 
Three Way 
Pass + (3WP) 
3 control 
messages 
1 data message 
+ – –   3WP_CAS 
– + –   3WP_TAS 
+ + – 
+ – 3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 
– + 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 
– + +   3WP_TAS_DAS 
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+ + + 
+ – 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 
– + 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 
– – +   3WP_D\CAS 
Table  5-5: The security experiment test cases identified by their key codes. 
Eventually, in this performance experimentation, all the 18 security test cases 
are tested under two distinct types of scenarios, “No-Churn” and “Churn”. As 
addressed in the Churn model Section (5.3.4.6), each type consists of three 
different population settings (100, 250, 500 Nodes). Hence, there are 108 total test 
cases (18 security test cases	× 2 scenario types × 3 population sizes) for the 
experimental design. Also, as the study uses simulation, each test case must be 
replicated for specific number of times (i.e. nr = 30) in order to obtain statistically 
reliable results. The issue of selecting the required number of replications will be 
elaborated in the next section. Furthermore, the final experimental settings (i.e. 
controlled variables) are summarised in Table 5-6 and are mostly based on the 
pervious discussion about model configurations of network and SSAM models. 
These settings will be used to initialise the simulation environment.  
Parameter Value 
Simulation Area 1500 ×  1500 m2 
Transport Protocol UDP 
Routing Protocol AODV 
MAC Protocol IEEE805.11g 
Range 150 m 
Radio Propagation Model Path Loss Model 
Mobility Model The Steady-state Random Waypoint Mobility  
Node Speed (Mean) 1 ±  0.5 mps 
Node Pause time (Mean) 60 ±  30 Sec 
Traffic Model 
CBR =  2.5KB/sec   
Two sources (Service Providers),  
Packet Size = 512Byte 
Total traffic volume for each connection =  
25KB 
Simulation Time 7200s, 16400s, 35000s 
Table  5-6: The Experimental OMNeT++ Settings (system parameters) 
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5.4.3  Number of Replications 
The simulation model of this study can be characterised as a terminating 
deterministic simulation, however this model is also expected to have some 
stochastic simulation outputs stemming from dynamic topologies and error-prone 
wireless medium of MANETs. Due to these reasons, it is important to decide the 
number of replications that is necessary for accuracy and reproducibility purposes. 
Based on Robinson’s (2004) approach, the confidence interval method is chosen 
as a popular and simple statistical means which helps to find the number of 
replications required in the simulation to attain better accuracy in the experiment 
results. Normally, this particular method is exploited to indicate the degree of 
accuracy in the mean being estimated. For a more accurate estimate, the 
confidence interval must be small to achieve the desired level of accuracy. 
Therefore, the confidence interval can be applied to simulation output data  by 
carrying out several replications (samples) until the interval becomes sufficiently 
narrow to satisfy the desired level of accuracy (i.e. the percentage deviation of the 
confidence interval on either side of the mean).  
Through analysing simulation results, the confidence interval (CI) can be 
estimated as follows: 
xy = z{ 	± T,}/ √u 
Where: 
Χ{ = the standard mean of the output data from the replications 
S = the standard deviation of the output data from the replications (see 
equation below)  
n = the number of replications 
tn–1,α/2 = a value from Student’s t-distribution with n–1 degree of freedom  
and a significance level of α/2  
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The equation for the standard deviation is: 
 =  (z −	z{)u − 1  Where:  Xi = the result from replication i 
The equation for the percentage deviation of the confidence interval on either side 
of the mean is:  
x	[%] = z{ − xyZjaz{  
Where: 
z{	= the cumulative mean average from the first until the replication i  
xyZja   = the lower bound of confidence interval 
In this study, the significance level (α) has been set equal to 0.05 which is 
commonly used. Also, a MS EXCEL spread sheet is created to calculate all 
necessary values depending on the formulas described before and accordingly 
these values are then plotted to study the required number of replication for each 
test case. However, since this experimentation study comprises several test cases 
as described in the previous section, it is difficult to replicate all test cases to 
obtain output data which is used to calculate the desirable number of replications. 
Consequently, two test cases (3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO_100_nodes_Churn OR 
_No-Churn) are selected to be involved in the process of choosing the number of 
replication. The reasons for this choice are several. Initially, it is argued that the 
security test case of 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO is unlike the other security test 
cases and includes the most of activities in the SSAM model which needs to be 
simulated: (1) 3WP for handshaking relies on a fairly larger number of messages 
(i.e. four initial messages) which is greater than the other 1WP & 2WP protocols; 
(2) this particular test case covers most of proposed server architectures: CAS, 
TAS and DAS; (3) the AAO strategy of calling incurs more traffic than the other 
strategies. Additionally, for simulation, there are two main distinct scenarios (i.e. 
No-Churn and Churn) that are proposed to refer to the dynamic nature of a 
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MANET topology and each one has three cases of a population size (i.e. 100, 250 
and 500 nodes). Therefore, the first case of each scenario (i.e. the case of 
population has 100 nodes) is chosen which clearly exhibits more network 
partitioning than the other cases of 250 and 500 nodes. Eventually, these two 
specific test cases arguably would entail more variance in the output data of 
simulation experiments which is required to be reduced in order to achieve a 
better estimate of mean performance. 
As described before, the key metrics in this experimentation study are the 
Success Ratio, the Round Trip Time (RTT), the Communication Overhead, the 
Failure Frequency and the Standard Deviation of RTT (RTT STDev) which are 
suggested to measure the performance and cost of applying the SSAM model on 
MANETs. A pilot experiment is conducted for 30 replications for each of two test 
cases considered. It is noticed that each different output collected from the 
particular replications in both cases shows less than 10% of the level of deviation 
within the calculated confidence interval as summarised in Table 5-7. This level 
(10%) specified can be considered to be satisfactory in this study (i.e. sufficient 
narrowness in the confidence interval), so the decision is to make use of 30 





100 Nodes - Churn 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 
100 Nodes – No-Churn 
Success Ratio 7.42% 3.24% 
Round Trip Time 
(RTT) 
6.65% 5.26% 
RTT STDev 2.56% 3.54% 




Table  5-7: The percentage deviation of the confidence interval for 30 
replications  
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For more details, the value of each metric with its replications are presented in 
tables and diagrams based on the test case. In this section, as shown below, only 
the tables and charts (i.e. Table 5-8 and 5-9 and Figure 5-16 and 5-17) of the 
success ratio for 30 replications for the predetermined two case scenarios (Churn 
and No-Churn) are displayed. The rest of metrics for the both cases can be found 
in Section B.1 (Appendix B). Eventually, apart from a satisfactory confidence 
interval, it is essential that the cumulative mean line is fairly flat in the 




























1 0.69 0.69 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 0.67 0.68 0.014 0.55 0.81 18.69% 
3 0.69 0.68 0.012 0.65 0.71 4.20% 
4 0.64 0.67 0.024 0.63 0.71 5.59% 
5 0.53 0.64 0.067 0.56 0.73 12.90% 
6 0.58 0.63 0.065 0.56 0.70 10.82% 
7 0.65 0.64 0.060 0.58 0.69 8.72% 
8 0.59 0.63 0.058 0.58 0.68 7.67% 
9 0.73 0.64 0.064 0.59 0.69 7.62% 
10 0.67 0.64 0.061 0.60 0.69 6.73% 
11 0.67 0.65 0.058 0.61 0.69 6.03% 
12 0.51 0.64 0.068 0.59 0.68 6.79% 
13 0.62 0.63 0.065 0.59 0.67 6.21% 
14 0.62 0.63 0.063 0.60 0.67 5.72% 
15 0.6 0.63 0.061 0.60 0.66 5.36% 
16 0.62 0.63 0.059 0.60 0.66 4.99% 
17 0.65 0.63 0.057 0.60 0.66 4.67% 
18 0.56 0.63 0.058 0.60 0.66 4.61% 
19 0.69 0.63 0.058 0.60 0.66 4.45% 
20 0.64 0.63 0.057 0.60 0.66 4.21% 
21 0.63 0.63 0.055 0.61 0.66 3.99% 
22 0.67 0.63 0.055 0.61 0.66 3.83% 
23 0.68 0.63 0.054 0.61 0.66 3.70% 
24 0.64 0.64 0.053 0.61 0.66 3.53% 
25 0.57 0.63 0.054 0.61 0.65 3.50% 
26 0.57 0.63 0.054 0.61 0.65 3.45% 
27 0.74 0.63 0.057 0.61 0.66 3.55% 
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28 0.67 0.64 0.056 0.61 0.66 3.43% 
29 0.65 0.64 0.055 0.61 0.66 3.31% 
30 0.69 0.64 0.055 0.62 0.66 3.24% 
Table  5-8: The Confidence Interval Method: Results of Success Ratio in the 
case of 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO - 100 Nodes No-Churn for 30 replications. 
 
Figure  5-16:  The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and 




























1 0.37 0.37 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 0.42 0.40 0.035 0.08 0.71 80.42% 
3 0.34 0.38 0.040 0.28 0.48 26.65% 
4 0.37 0.38 0.033 0.32 0.43 14.07% 
5 0.24 0.35 0.067 0.26 0.43 23.85% 
6 0.27 0.34 0.068 0.26 0.41 21.22% 
7 0.25 0.32 0.070 0.26 0.39 19.96% 
8 0.33 0.32 0.065 0.27 0.38 16.67% 
9 0.39 0.33 0.064 0.28 0.38 14.93% 
10 0.25 0.32 0.066 0.28 0.37 14.58% 
11 0.26 0.32 0.065 0.27 0.36 13.82% 








































(3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO,  No Churn, 100 Nodes) 
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13 0.35 0.31 0.069 0.27 0.35 13.39% 
14 0.29 0.31 0.066 0.27 0.35 12.39% 
15 0.35 0.31 0.065 0.28 0.35 11.51% 
16 0.3 0.31 0.063 0.28 0.34 10.73% 
17 0.33 0.31 0.061 0.28 0.34 10.02% 
18 0.29 0.31 0.059 0.28 0.34 9.48% 
19 0.29 0.31 0.058 0.28 0.34 8.99% 
20 0.25 0.31 0.058 0.28 0.33 8.82% 
21 0.26 0.30 0.057 0.28 0.33 8.56% 
22 0.25 0.30 0.057 0.28 0.33 8.38% 
23 0.4 0.31 0.059 0.28 0.33 8.39% 
24 0.3 0.31 0.058 0.28 0.33 8.02% 
25 0.16 0.30 0.064 0.27 0.33 8.79% 
26 0.33 0.30 0.063 0.28 0.33 8.44% 
27 0.31 0.30 0.062 0.28 0.33 8.10% 
28 0.35 0.30 0.061 0.28 0.33 7.83% 
29 0.25 0.30 0.061 0.28 0.32 7.69% 
30 0.32 0.30 0.060 0.28 0.32 7.42% 
Table  5-9: The Confidence Interval Method: Results of Success Ratio in the 
case of 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 100-Node Churn for 30 replications. 
 
Figure  5-17: The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and 







































(3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO, With Churn, 100 Nodes) 
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5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter first highlighted the model assumptions for this study. These 
assumptions were used to facilitate the implementation and experimentation of 
SSAM model designed in the previous chapter. A SSAM prototype was 
developed using the OMNET++ simulator which is considered one of the best 
simulation tools for MANETs. Furthermore, the development of SSAM prototype 
are completed by defining the MANET infrastructure and messages and creating 
the SSAM-relevant C++ classes. On the other hand, all vital SSAM and MANET 
–related configurations that is necessary for the prototype simulation were 
proposed in this chapter with their exhaustive explanation. The SSAM-related 
configuration deals with security settings for the SSAM model (e.g. security 
servers, authentication protocols), whereas the MANET–related configuration 
involves in the network features and settings (e.g. mobility, routing protocol, etc.). 
Finally, the experimental design was described by defining the main performance 
and communication metrics, the number of test cases and the required number of 
replications for each experiment. This approach can clearly help to properly 
prepare for simulation experiment. 
The next chapter presents the analysis of results generated from conducting the 
required simulation experiments and security robustness assessments. It will 
underline the key findings of the whole proposed approach by applying it in three 
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Chapter 6:  Result Analysis and Validation  
6.1 Overview 
This chapter discusses the analysis of experimental results generated from testing 
the performance and communication of the proposed security architectures in 
SSAM under different network scenarios (i.e. the Churn and No-Churn settings). 
The results of key measurements defined in the previous chapter for expressing 
performance and cost will be systematically interpreted and compared. These 
measurements concern with the success ratio, the failure frequency, the Round 
Trip Time (RTT), the standard deviation of RTT (RTT-STDev), the 
communication overhead and the multi-level security architecture productivity. In 
addition, the issue of security strength is evaluated for each security architecture, 
according to three security features: the single-point-of-failure (SPF) resilience 
and single-point-compromise (SPC) resilience and authentication protocol 
robustness. The employment of the methodological approach proposed in this 
study to MANET security evaluation is discussed for the SSAM model. On the 
other hand, three different scenarios (i.e. academia, rescue mission and military) 
which are suggested to validate the whole approach are described in this chapter. 
The “best” security architectures for each scenario will then be identified using a 
simple ranking approach using the achievement scoring (i.e. rating), reciprocal 
ranking weighting and weighted averaging methods. The results generated from 
this ranking system would facilitate the selection of the best alternatives suiting 
the demands of a given application for MANETs. 
6.2 Experimental Results and Evaluation  
After running the predefined simulation experiments using the OMNeT++ 
simulator with their required replications (i.e. 30 replications to obtain stable 
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result), output data was collected and analysed using the simple standard 
estimation (e.g. mean average, standard deviation, standard error, confidence 
interval, etc.). The evaluation presented in this chapter is based on this analysis. 
There are presented in full in Appendix C. 
All necessary figures that illustrate these various results can be found in Appendix 
B apart from those figures used in this chapter. Based on the proposed security 
architectures tackling the different network scenarios, the following sections 
demonstrate the outcomes of the analysis of the performance metrics to examine 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the given architectures. These are: Section 
6.2.1 presents the success ratio results; Section 6.2.2 presents failure frequency 
results; Section 6.2.3 presents the outcomes of Round Trip Time (RTT); Section 
6.2.4 presents the results of the standard deviation of RTT ((RTT-STDev); 
Section 6.2.5 includes the result analysis of communication overhead, for each 
security architecture and network scenario being involved. Finally, Section 6.2.6 
demonstrates the evaluation of certificate acquisition for the specific multi-level 
hierarchical server architectures (e.g. certificate types and certificate counts) to 
represent productivity and flexibility of those architectures.  
6.2.1  Success Ratio  
This section discusses the analysis of the success ratio for different security 
architectures performed under the two proposed MANETs scenarios (Churn and 
No-Churn). The higher success ratio a particular security architecture shows, the 
better the availability and robustness of the architecture. Availability improvement 
can contribute to the overall performance. Figure 6-1 shows overall success ratio 
results for the eight proposed server architectures under the Churn and No-Churn 
scenarios each of which includes the three distinct node populations (100-Node, 
250-Node and 500-Nodes, etc.). In addition to this figure, there are a number of 
time-based charts in Section B.3.1, (Appendix B). These charts depict the success 
ratio changes over the simulation time in each case (i.e. categorised in three sets: 
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these are the One, Two and Three -Level secuirty architectures) to investigate and 
confirm differences among the tested architectures.   
 
Figure  6-1: The Success Ratio Chart 
Initially, in the Churn and No-Churn scenarios, most security architectures 
show a common pattern of growth in the success ratio when increasing the 
number of nodes joining the playground. This is due to the fact that as more nodes 
join, more connections can be established (i.e. increasing in node density) in the 
MANET routing infrastructure and therefore enhancing the server reachability. 
Also, it is important to remark that the success ratio of all security architectures in 
the 500-Nodes No-Churn scenario takes the highest value without significant 
difference among the different architectures (approximately between 90%-94%) 
as the MANET nodes become fully connected. 
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On the other hand, regardless of the authentication protocol in use, the TAS 
architecture appears to be the worst server architecture in terms of availability in 
all considered scenarios. This is because every new joining node has only one 
option (a one-level server architecture) to secure multiple connections with at least 
three of the available security servers in order to be able to construct its 
membership certificate (i.e. using TC (k =3 of n=6)), otherwise it fails. Thus, the 
availability of these connections is questionable, especially in a certain scenario 
where a MANET has a fairly high dynamic topology as displayed in Figure 6-1 
(i.e. 0% ratio in the whole Churn scenarios as a result of all nodes leaving and 
lower rates in the other No-Churn scenarios). The cases of D\CAS, 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS reveal the greatest success rate 
throughout all network case scenarios. This due to the fact that these particular 
architectures offer more than three different alternatives of servers (i.e. either 6 
distributed server replicas as in D\CAS or three-level hierarchical servers as in 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS) for new nodes to initiate 
authentication in order to obtain their membership certificates from accessible 
servers. Therefore, any node wishing to join is most likely to be authenticated in 
theses specific security architectures. However, the best availability under all case 
scenarios is shown by the D\CAS architecture which represents the case of having 
multiple server replicas for the same authority. Both CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS and 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO architectures come second in terms of their success ratio 
outcomes. CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO outperforms CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS with a 10%-
5% increase particularly in the Churn scenario across various node populations. 
This makes it much more adaptable to the situation of having highly partitioned 
networks. The success ratios for the rest of cases (CAS, CAS_TAS_AAO, 
CAS_TAS_IPS and TAS_DAS are approximately the same (i.e. negligible 
differences less than 5%) throughout various network settings. Nevertheless, these 
particular architectures have different server hierarchies. Also, it is important to 
note that the TAS_DAS architecture shows higher authentication success among 
them, especially under the Churn scenario. 
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It is clear that the success ratio is not affected considerably by the 
authentication protocol being used except for few cases of the 3WP protocol being 
exploited in certain server architectures (TAS_DAS, CAS_TAS_AAO, 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and D\CAS), especially under the Churn scenario. This 
difference shows a decrease between 5% and 10% compared to the other 
authentication protocols, as seen in Figure 6-1 and it can be confirmed by the 
related time-based charts in Section B.3.1 (Appendix B).  This exception can be 
explained by the fact that the 3WP protocol needs to exchange several messages to 
establish an authentication connection (at least four messages per server 
connection). Besides, in those certain server architectures using 3WP protocol, a 
new node often broadcasts multiple server calls simultaneously (open multiple 
connections). Hence, this would cause more traffic congestion and processing 
which leads to much more loss and long delays, especially in a highly partitioned 
network such as the Churn scenario. Consequently, in this condition, any new 
node would have a less chance of getting a successful authentication.  
The success ratio is a very important criterion to evaluate the effectiveness and 
productivity of any given security architecture for MANETs. It is important to 
recognise that the security architecture which takes advantage of multiple servers 
and different levels (i.e. more than two-level) of a server hierarchy like D\CAS, 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS, demonstrates a better success 
ratio. 
6.2.2  Failure Frequency 
The failure frequency along with the success ratio can be incorporated to reflect 
both reliability and availability of the security architectures. The failure frequency 
measures the relative mean average failures occurring within a simulation time 
unit (i.e. minute). The lower the failure frequency, the more reliable the 
architecture. In the Churn and No-Churn network scenarios, it is recognisable, as 
shown in the Figure 6-2, that failure frequency for most server architectures at any 
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authentication protocol being used declines when increasing the size of node 
population. This is due to improving node density even though occasional node 
churning (in certain cases) and node mobility render disconnection between 
nodes. 
 
Figure  6-2: The Failure Frequency Chart 
In addition to demonstrating worst success ratio, the TAS architecture also 
tends to have higher failure rate in both network scenarios (0.98 – 1.2 
failures/min), especially in the Churn scenario. As discussed in Section 6.2.1., this 
is because the requirements of this architecture are restricted (i.e. only one option) 
and not easy to achieve particularly in an unpredictable MANET topology 
(securing multiple server connections) where failure frequency can be increased. 
However, without considering the authentication protocol, specific 
architectures like CAS, CAS_TAS_AAO, CAS_TAS_IPS and TAS_DAS show 
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insignificant differences between each other in failure frequency (less than 0.04 
failure/min) and follow the same trend, as shown in Figure 6-2. These results can 
be validated in the relevant time-based charts at the Section B.3.2. (Appendix B). 
This group of architectures show lower failure frequency than TAS with a 
variances 0.2 failure/min over the Churn scenario and 0.3 failure/min over the No-
Churn scenario. The CAS_TAS_AAO, CAS_TAS_IPS or TAS_DAS architectures, 
unlike the CAS architecture, depend on a distributed server architecture (i.e. two 
alternatives) that aims to alleviate failures. However, they show approximately the 
same failure rate as the centralised CAS architecture.  This may be justified by the 
fact that the TAS architecture which already suffers from higher rate of failures is 
already integrated in these architectures along with CAS or DAS. This would 
arguably restrict any improvements in failure frequency to the failure frequency of 
the CAS architecture.  
The rest of the architectures, D\CAS, CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS can be considered as another group. This second group has 
the least failures regardless of the type of authentication protocol being utilised 
and the scenario being conducted .This due to a variety of multiple distributed 
server alternatives to connect. The CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS architecture among this 
group shows the higher rate of failure (0.66 – 0.82 failures/min), followed by the 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO architecture with a failure rate (0.55 – 0.7 failures/min). 
The D\CAS architecture is perceived as the best among them with the lowest 
failure frequency (0.5 – 0.65 failures/min). 
Alternatively, similar to the success ratio results, the type of the authentication 
protocol being involved does not have a substantial role to contribute to the failure 
frequency except in a few cases. Most security architectures do not display any 
considerable differences among the three types of protocols mostly in the No-
Churn scenario. However, there are few cases where the 3WP protocol is used 
(e.g. TAS_DAS, CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and D\CAS) and gives an increase 
(approximately 0.09 failures/min) in failure frequency when compared to the 1WP 
and 2WP protocols. This can be explained by the fact that those architectures 
 Chapter 6: Result Analysis and Validation  
 
Salaheddin Darwish 200
seem to overwhelm the network with large traffic originating from broadcasting 
several messages simultaneously (i.e. initial four messages like in 3WP) and this 
would bring about more collision and loss in the network and cause more frequent 
failures.   
6.2.3  Round Trip Time (RTT) 
Round Trip Time (RTT) (i.e. sometime called a delay or response time) in any 
particular networking systems is important as this measurement is associated with 
system performance. In general, the lower the delay a network has, the better 
performance overall. As shown in Figure 6-3 regardless of the authentication 
protocol being applied, the different server architectures show different RTT 
across the two proposed scenarios. Some of the server architectures have to a 
certain extent a stable RTT in the Churn scenario like CAS, D\CAS, 
CAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_IPS while the rest display a moderate decline in 
RTT. Thus, an increase in the population size, in spite of node churning behaviour 
in some specific cases, plays an important role in improving RTT (i.e. reducing 
the time that should be spent for authentication) in most of the architectures by 
bringing more connections. Section B.3.3 and Section B.3.5 (Appendix B) show 
how RTT and node numbers change over time. 
The TAS architecture obviously has no result for RTT in the Churn scenario 
because no successful authentication occurs during this particular scenario, (see 
Section 6.2.1). Additionally, this architecture which is based on a one-level server 
hierarchy reveals an average level of delays among other similar hierarchical 
architectures (e.g. CAS and D\CAS architectures) in the No-Churn scenario. This 
is due to the fact that every new joining node initially calls a specific number of 
available TASs and waits until it gets a sufficient number of partial certificates 
from those different servers (i.e. k=3 of n=5 servers). This is in order to produce a 
valid credential by threshold cryptography. However, this process may take much 
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longer time than other one-level hierarchical architectures that require only one 
response.  
 
Figure  6-3: The Round Trip Time Chart 
However, the TAS_DAS architecture, demonstrates longer response time 
(between 63 and 200 sec), especially in the Churn scenario since this specific 
architecture is established on a two-level server hierarchy. Also, this architecture 
relies initially on the TASs. However, if a required number of successful TAS 
connections  cannot be  satisfied, the architecture makes use of DAS by selecting 
one of reachable TASs (or DAS) in order to acquire credentials (e.g. membership 
and delegation certificates) from it. On the other side, most nodes using this 
architecture in the Churn case scenarios appear to be authenticated by a DAS and 
this clearly causes longer waiting times for TAS_DAS. The issue of certificate 
acquisition from different server architectures will be discussed in detail in 
Section 6.2.6.1. 
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On the other hand, the CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS architecture appears to have 
relatively high RTT similar to the TAS_DAS architecture but with a small decrease 
within the Churn scenario (refer to Figure 6-3). This stems from that fact that this 
architecture involves three different servers, CAS, TASs and DASs (i.e. the three-
level server hierarchical architecture), for providing the security service to user 
nodes. Additionally, it exploits the IPS calling strategy which is built upon a 
priority sequence for calling three different types of servers, normally starting 
from invoking CAS, if it is not available, then calling TASs and finally calling 
DAS if a specific number of TASs are not reachable either. Hence, this strategy, 
especially in the case of invocation failures for certain server types, would need 
much more time to undertake successful authentication. 
The CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO architecture, although it includes the same server 
hierarchy as the CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS, has better RTT by using a different strategy 
of calling the CAS and TASs. This strategy is called “All At Once” (AAO) (i.e. 
broadcasting invocations) and improves RTT especially in the No-Churn scenario, 
as presented in Figure 6-3. This type of calling strategy saves waiting time by 
checking accessibility of all servers simultaneously.   
By observing the RTT outcomes of CAS_TAS_IPS across all types of scenarios 
at any authentication protocol in use, it can be recognised that this particular 
architecture takes a middle place among other architectures in terms of the RTT 
estimation. This particular architecture allows user nodes to depend only on two 
sequential choices of servers (CAS and then TASs) for authentication and this 
leads to an average value of RTT between CAS and TASs authentication cases. 
There is no significant difference (a variance between 0 and 4 seconds) between 
CAS and CAS_TAS_AAO although both are anticipated to be differed as the 
CAS_TAS_AAO architecture already includes a CAS in addition to TASs. This 
means that most authenticated nodes take more advantage of CAS rather than 
TASs in this architecture, especially in the Churn scenario, see Section 6.2.6.1. 
The D\CAS architecture, which is based on a one-level server hierarchy, 
demonstrates the best RTT by having a short and stable delay throughout most of 
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network scenarios regardless of the authentication protocol. This is because in this 
particular architecture a new joining node is allowed to connect with multiple 
independent servers (similar to CAS) and only one successful connection with one 
of those servers is sufficient to get the node full authentication.  
Finally, the type of the authentication protocol can have an impact on RTT, as 
measuring RTT is required to complete handshaking and processing in both ends 
of user and server nodes. As processing and communication required by a given 
authentication protocol increase, so does RTT. There are noticeable differences 
(less than 10 sec) between the different protocols; the 3WP protocol shows higher 
RTT compared to the 1WP and 2WP protocols. This is because the 3WP, which 
consists of an exchange of four messages, clearly requires much more processing 
and communication against the other protocols. 
6.2.4  RTT Standard Deviation (RTT-STDev) 
The standard deviation values of the Round Trip Time (RTT-STDev) indicate the 
variation from its normal behaviour represented by the mean average. As shown 
in Figure 6-4, there are insignificant differences (less than 5 sec) among the three 
different authentication protocols (1/2/3WP) being used in any security 
architecture across most tackled network scenarios. Also, this is due to the same 
reasons discussed before in Section 6.2.3; the RTT-STDev for the TAS 
architecture in the Churn scenario has no results available. 
On the other hand, throughout the No-Churn and Churn scenarios, the RTT-
STDev takes distinct trends across different node populations for each of the 
architectures. The CAS, D\CAS and CAS_TAS_AAO architectures show to some 
extent a steady deviation across all scenarios regardless of the number of nodes 
being involved. This is because node authentication (credential possession) mostly 
originates from broadcasting all required server invocations and only one reply 
can be accepted from a certain server. This is in CAS or D\CAS server 
architectures. Even in the case of the CAS_TAS_AAO that has two different server 
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architectures, most authentications occur in CAS invocations, see Section 6.2.6.1. 
The other architectures, especially in the No-Churn scenario, have moderate 
decrease in RTT-STDev when increasing the population size. This is due to the 
fact that the network becomes more connected leading to an increase in the chance 
to get authentication by the first calling server architecture, like CAS. In contrast, 
in the Churn scenario, there are a number of particular architectures, like 
TAS_DAS and CAS_TAS_IPS, which display an increase in STDev while 
population is growing in size. Regardless of RTT-STDev values (i.e. levels or 
order), a better RTT-STDev trend for a particular architecture can be considered, 
one which demonstrates (1) a decrease or (2) stability in deviation when more 
nodes join the network at any scenario. 
 
Figure  6-4: The RTT Standard Deviation Chart  
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However, comparing the actual RTT-STDev values of the available 
architectures, the CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS server architecture shows the largest RTT 
fluctuation in any scenario. This is because this architecture incorporates different 
alternative servers and calling such servers by a user node following a prioritised 
sequence entails various RTTs and longer latencies for a successful connection. 
Then, the CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO shows partly lower RTT-STDev than the 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS as the CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO utilises the AAO calling strategy 
for invoking CAS and TASs, which appears not to cause many differences in RTT 
unlike IPS. The D\CAS has the smallest RTT-STDev as it depends only on a one-
level server architecture where a number of server replicas are distributed in the 
working space. The CAS, CAS_TAS_AAO, and TAS show a moderate level of 
variance as opposed to the other architectures throughout different scenarios. 
Finally, apart from having a unique trend in the Churn scenario, the 
CAS_TAS_IPS and DAS_TAS reveal a slightly high variation in RTT.  
6.2.5  Communication Overhead 
The communication overhead is acknowledged as a very important measurement 
in any particular networking systems since it mainly represents the cost of traffic 
generated by nodes in the network. In general, it is desirable to achieve lower 
communication overhead in any network. As a result, more communication would 
instigate more congestion and processing in the network which becomes more 
critical especially in limited networks like MANETs. This section discusses the 
results of total communication overhead produced by every successful 
authenticated node as a result of applying different security architectures under 
different network scenarios, as shown in Figure 6-5.  
The amount of communication overhead can also be associated with various 
issues in the SSAM model. Those issues are relevant to the particular types of the 
authentication protocol (e.g. 1/2/3WP) and the server architecture (e.g. CAS, TAS, 
etc.) being used. Each authentication protocol normally relies on a distinct number 
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of messages that need to be exchanged between two end points. Each server 
architecture may have a different number of active server connections and calling 
strategies (i.e. concurrent or on-demand invocations) which would clearly entail 
different amount of traffic required for accomplishing a successful connection. In 
addition to the authentication protocol and server architecture in use, a number of 
re-authentication attempts (e.g. a maximum of three attempts are proposed in this 
study) being part of the authentication protocol can also contribute to total 
communication. 
 
Figure  6-5: The Communication Overhead Chart 
The three authentication protocols being exploited incur different 
communication overhead proportionate with the number of messages being 
exchanged. As presented in Figure 6-5, the 3WP protocol causes the greatest 
communication overhead among the authentication protocols across the 
distinctive networks scenarios irrespective of the type of server architecture as this 
specific protocol primarily takes advantage of three control messages apart from a 
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data message. In addition, the 2WP protocol obviously shows the middle overhead 
between the 1WP and 3WP throughout the different case scenarios whereas the 
1WP protocol has the lowest communication overhead as this has the fewest 
number of messages being involved in the protocol, see the sequence diagrams in 
Section 4.7.1.1. On the other side, based on the type of server architecture being 
used, the number of required server connections has a greater influence on the 
total communication because of an additional cost to establishing multiple new 
connections with different servers. Table 6-1 breaks down the details of the server 
connection within every architecture in SSAM to show differences.  
Server 
Architecture 
The Number of Server Connections 
Connections Type 
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scenarios) 
CAS 1 Instant connection (1 → CAS) 1 1 
TAS 6 instant connections (3  →TASx,y,z) 6 6 
TAS_DAS 
6 Instant connections 
OR  1on-demand 
(3 → TASx,y,z) OR 
(1→DASt) 
6 7 
CAS_TAS_AAO 7  Instant connections 













(7 Instant connections 
OR        1 on-demand) 
(1 →  CAS OR 3→  




(1 Instant connection  
OR 7 on-demand) 
(1 →  CAS) OR         
( 3→  TASx,y,z) OR  
(1→  DASt) 
1 8 
D/CAS 6 instant connections (1 →  CASx) 6 6 
Table  6-1: The Server Connection Evaluation 
The CAS, TAS and CAS_TAS_IPS architectures irrespective of the 
authentication protocol in use, tend to have the lower cost of communication in 
each of the Churn and No-Churn scenarios. This is caused by these particular 
architectures requiring fewer active server connections (i.e. only 1 instant or 6 on-
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demand connections, see Table 6-1) so as to accomplish node successful 
authentication. Most cases, where the TAS_DAS architecture is applied show the 
highest communication overhead. Additionally, some cases of 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and TAS, especially when 3WP protocol is involved, have 
high communication overheads, as those architectures need to simultaneously 
create multiple server connections (initially 6 or 7 connections). Alternatively, the 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS architecture has with fairly low communication overhead 
whereas the rest of the architectures, D/CAS and CAS_TAS_AAO, display an 
average cost of communication in comparison with the other architectures.  
The communication overhead produced from employing a particular 
architecture presents a different trend throughout distinct population sizes within 
each different scenario being tackled (Churn and No-Churn). In the CAS, TAS, 
CAS_TAS_IPS, and D\CAS, the amount of communication comparatively 
stabilises over a growing population in both scenarios regardless of the 
authentication protocol being exploited. The TAS_DAS, CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS and 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO architectures demonstrate a small decrease in the 
communication cost when increasing the number of nodes in the cases of 1WP 
and 2WP protocols and stability in the case of the 3WP protocol. On the contrary, 
the CAS_TAS_AAO architecture expresses a communication increase when the 
node population is gradually expanded. Eventually, stability in the communication 
overhead of any security architecture across different node densities would be 
desirable only when this particular communication overhead is not too high. 
Otherwise, a decline in the communication overhead would be much more 
recommendable as it is important to reduce communication as much as possible 
especially in limited MANETs. 
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6.2.6  The Security Architecture Productivity in  
Certificate Acquisition 
This section aims to discuss effectiveness and productivity of those architectures 
which make use of multiple different servers. These are two-level and three-level 
server hierarchies as there are three distinct server types involved in the SSAM 
model (i.e. CAS, TAS and DAS). The category of the two-level server hierarchical 
architecture includes the CAS_TAS_AAO, CAS_TAS_IPS and TAS_DAS 
architectures which make use of only two types of servers. While the three-level 
server hierarchical architecture includes the CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS architectures which employ three unique types of servers. 
However, it is very important to make sure that all server types are utilised and 
observe how practical they are to deliver security services to user nodes (i.e. 
membership certificate acquisition) when those server architectures are in 
operation under the network case scenarios (i.e. 100-Node Churn or No-Churn, 
etc.). There are two indicators proposed in this study to represent the certificate 
acquisition evaluation: the certificate type and certificate count. The certificate 
type refers to the first type of a server which a user node successfully obtains its 
membership certificate (i.e. full and partial certificates or certificate chain) from. 
Whereas, the certificate count (i.e. having multiple varied certificates) determines 
how many different certificates a user node can acquire at the same time when this 
node tries to use different server architectures in the network. The next 
subsections will present the results of these two measurements and also address 
the key features which make those multi-level server architectures much more 
worthwhile in comparison with the single server type of architectures. 
6.2.6.1 The Certificate Types  
As aforementioned, the certificate type essentially concerns with the multi-level 
architectures where a new node can obtain its first membership certificate from 
different available sources (i.e. specific servers: CAS, TASs, or DAS) and can be 
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considered as an authenticated node. Therefore, the mean percentage of different 
certificate types, acquired by nodes in the particular proposed security 
architectures, are estimated under certain scenarios to understand security server 
effectiveness as shown in Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 for the 100 Nodes No-Churn 
and Churn scenarios. Other scenarios (250-Node No-Churn & Churn and 500-
Node No-Churn & Churn scenarios) can be found in Section B.2.1 (Appendix B). 
 
Figure  6-6: The percentage of different certificate type obtainability in the 
case of the “100 Nodes No-Churn” scenario. 
In the three-level server hierarchical architectures at any authentication 
protocols being applied, the results indicate that all three types of servers (CAS, 
TASs and DASs) are being utilised under all network scenarios except the 100-
Node Churn case. In the 100-Node Churn, the integrated TAS architecture is 
apparently not fully functional in this specific scenario which is explained by the 
higher network partitioning (i.e. lower node density). On the other side, as shown 
in the plots (Figure 6-6, Figure 67, and the figures in B.2.1 Appendix B), it can be 
recognised that the percentage of nodes obtaining their certificates from CAS is 
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82% in the Churn case) than the other nodes acquiring their certificates from 
different servers, such as TASs or DASs. Also, this server shows more productivity 
in terms of service delivery under the No-Churn network settings than under the 
Churn settings. It appears that group of DASs (approximately between 3% - 27% 
in the No-Churn case and 13% - 53% in the Churn case) are more operational in 
the case of having a highly dynamic network. There are fairly few numbers of 
nodes which have taken advantage of the TASs model under both scenarios 
(approximately between 3% - 10% in the No-Churn case, 0% - 9% in Churn 
case). 
 
Figure  6-7: The percentage of different certificate type obtainability in the 
case of the “100 Nodes Churn” scenario. 
Having a higher proportion of nodes’ population obtaining their credentials 
from the CAS or DAS models stems from the fact that, in the particular situation, 
any node relying on one specific server like CAS or DAS has much more 
likelihood of attaining successful authentication than a node that needs to secure 
multiple connections of different distributed servers like TASs, especially under a 
high dynamic network topology like in the Churn case scenarios. On the other 
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all scenarios except the case of 100-Node Churn. This is arguably originated from 
the nature of connections that is required to be created to call CAS or DAS. In 
other words, in calling CAS, every joining node at first establishes an instant 
connection with CAS, whereas, in calling DAS, a connection is created whenever 
required after invocation failures from CAS and TAS based on the SSAM proposal 
to compensate those failures. Therefore, the number of successful CAS calls is 
more likely greater than the number of successful DAS calls unless there exists 
quite high partitioning in the network which causes DAS to outperform CAS 
because of the high rate of CAS failures, as presented in Figure 6-7. 
As such, in the two-level server hierarchical architectures, irrespective to the 
authentication protocols being used, the results (Figure 6-7) clearly reveal that 
only one particular server type can be exploited when those architectures are 
tested under the Churn network scenarios, like 100- and 250-Node Churn, 
otherwise both servers (CAS_TAS or TAS_ DAS) are in operation under the other 
case scenarios. Also, in these two particular scenarios, almost all nodes in both the 
CAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_IPS architectures can attain successful 
authentication only from CAS while in the TAS_DAS architecture, only from DAS.  
Results show that in the CAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_IPS architectures, the 
number of nodes having their certificates from CAS is always much greater 
(approximately between 88% - 93% in the No-Churn case, 94% - 100% in the 
Churn case) than other nodes acquiring their certificates from TASs 
(approximately between 3% - 10% in the No-Churn case, 0% - 5% in the Churn 
case) because of better CAS accessibility than TASs. However, in the TAS_DAS 
architecture, TASs appear to be more effective over the No-Churn scenario 
(approximately between 50%-94%) than DAS (approximately between 6%-50%). 
This is because the MANET in that scenario becomes sufficiently connected, 
especially in the 250-Node and 500-Node conditions, which enables the TASs to 
be more accessible to new nodes wishing to join. On the contrary, DAS becomes 
better in terms of providing the security service (approximately between 61% - 
100%) than TASs (approximately between 0% - 39%) over the Churn scenario. 
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Therefore, the TAS_DAS architecture, where CAS is absent, shows a balance of its 
servers’ utilisation throughout the two different scenarios. 
 With consideration for the type of authentication protocols being used, it is 
noted that using the 3WP protocol in some particular server architectures such as 
CAS_TAS_AAO, CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO, TAS_DAS architectures under certain 
network case scenarios, presents a small impact on the TAS certificate being 
acquired by calling nodes compared to the other, 1WP and 2WP, protocols. This is 
by making this particular certificate less obtainable than the other certificates 
within those server architectures, (as shown in Figure 6-6, Figure 6-7, and the 
figures in B.2.1 Appendix B). 
In conclusion, even though there are clearly significant variances between 
different types of certificates being obtained across various scenarios (i.e. having a 
certificate from CAS or DAS is often more possible than having a certificate from 
TAS), it is important to note that the server types (CAS, TAS and DAS) in the 
proposed three-level hierarchical security architectures compensate potential 
authentication failures (i.e. boost availability). The least effective obtainability 
comes from using TASs because these demand multiple responses from servers in 
order to generate the required membership certificate. 
6.2.6.2 The Certificate Count 
This section primarily investigates certificate count in the multi-level server 
hierarchical architectures. The aim is to show the possibility of a new joining node 
that can obtain more than one type of a membership certificate once it completes 
its authentication. This can be considered as a sort of certificate redundancy. For 
example, obtaining more than one type of certificate can be a certificate backup 
for a node so this backup can be exploited, when required, to avoid the cases of 
certificate loss or corruption. Therefore, the average number of authenticated 
nodes that acquire a different count of certificates irrespective of their actual types 
in the particular proposed security architectures is calculated under certain 
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scenarios to perceive security server effectiveness. The results are presented in 
Figure 6-8 and Figure 6-9 for the 100-Nodes No-Churn and Churn scenarios as 
example and other scenarios (250-Node No-Churn & Churn and 500-Node No-
Churn & Churn scenarios) can be found in Section B.3.2 (Appendix B).  
Two categories have been identified: (1) obtaining two types of certificates, 
and (2) obtaining one type of certificate. By disregarding the authentication 
protocol, results reveal that the only the server architectures (i.e. CAS_TAS_AAO 
and CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO) which take advantage of the AAO calling strategy can 
allow a user node to have two different certificates. This due to the fact that this 
particular strategy depends on opening concurrent connections with servers by a 
calling node for the sake of getting successful authentication as much quickly as 
possible. Whereas, the outcomes of applying the IPS calling strategy (i.e. used in 
the CAS_TAS_IPS and CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS architectures) demonstrates that this 
specific strategy is unable to allow a joining node to gain more than one 
certificate. This is because IPS is based on creating the server connections on 
demand and also in sequence (see Table 6-1) when a certain server connection 
failure occurs. As such, the TAS_DAS architecture shows the same results as 
architectures which make use of IPS because of the same reason discussed above.  
 
Figure  6-8: The percentage of certificate count obtainability in the case of the 
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On the other hand, as shown in Figure 6-8, Figure 6-9, Figure B3.3 (Appendix 
B), etc., the scenario also plays an important role in the opportunity of a given 
node having more than one certificate. The more nodes that get involved in the 
network (i.e. by increase in the node population and decrease in churn rate) to 
make less partitioning, the more chances a node has to acquire more than one 
certificate as a result of improving server accessibility. For example, in the 
CAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO architectures over the 250-Node and 
500-Node No-Churn case scenarios, there are more than 50% of authenticated 
nodes that can have two certificates, whereas in the same architectures but over 
the 100-Node and 250-Node Churn case scenario, the possibility of an 
authenticated node to acquire two certificates becomes very low with less than 5% 
or even null in some cases.  
 
Figure  6-9: The percentage of certificate count obtainability in the case of the 
“100 Nodes Churn” scenario. 
Alternatively, the type of the authentication protocol being involved in the 
particular architectures (e.g. CAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO) appears 
to have a clear influence on certificate acquisition opportunities. The 
authentication protocol, that is characterised with processing and exchanging 
several messages for achieving success in authentication, is expected to have a 
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results, especially under the 100-, 250- and 500-Node No-Churn and 500-Node 
Churn case scenarios. This is as a result of more delays and message losses that 
protocol can entail in the network. Thus, the 1WP protocol across most case 
scenarios demonstrates the best results in the number of cases, that a node could 
have two certificates. While the 3WP protocol shows the least chance, the 2WP 
protocol clearly takes the mid-point of acquiring additional certificates between 
1WP and 3WP protocols in most cases. 
To sum up, it is important to realise from the results that any two- or three-
level hierarchical server architectures incorporating the AAO calling strategy will 
gain an extra feature of a certificate backup (i.e. potentially having multiple 
certificates for the same usage) which could be used to overcome certificate 
corruption and loss. However, this feature could instigate a storage resource 
concern where it is required to have an additional space to store those certificates 
especially in the low-duty nodes within the network. 
6.3 Security Strength Implications 
As highlighted in Section 4.4.1, the security strength is considered a very 
important dimension studying the robustness for a certain security/trust 
infrastructure against potential failures or attacks. Several threats, such as Denial 
of Service (DoS), repudiation, etc., which any trust infrastructure may encounter 
in different operational level, can be recognised (see Section 2.3.2).  
This section addresses the security analysis of the proposed security 
architectures in SSAM in order to determine the level of security strength for each 
architecture against specific challenges (e.g. single-point-of-failure, man-in-the-
middle, etc.). This particular security strength primarily points out to the measures 
being used for securing utilisation (i.e. availability) and communication (i.e. 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, etc.) in the security architectures. Each 
security architecture consists of two key elements: a security server architecture 
and an authentication communication protocol and both elements may have some 
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protection weaknesses. Therefore, both available server architectures and 
authentication communication protocols in SSAM need to be assessed so as to 
decide how robust they are against relevant threats. Similar to the approach used 
in Section 6.5, two simple rankings (i.e. 1,.., 6 for server architectures and 1,.., 3 
for authentication protocols) are incorporated for comparing these elements in 
each security architecture. Also, these two rankings present the security strength 
from the lower to the higher in this analysis. 
In SSAM, there are eight proposed server architectures for providing a 
security/trust service to the new joining node so that these nodes can obtain their 
membership certificate. These architectures may suffer from one or two of 
common security problems, Single-Point-of-Failure (SPF) and Single-Point-of-
Compromise (SPC). Single-Point-of-Failure (SPF) in any server architecture 
means that server architecture relies on single servers when these servers break 
down, the whole server architecture will fail to provide the security service. This 
particular threat usually is caused by a denial of service (DoS) attack. Single-
Point-of-Compromise (SPC) refers to the situation. When an attacker 
compromises or hacks a certain security server in the server architecture; the 
whole security architecture and all nodes that are associated with the 
compromised server, will become compromised. This can be as a result of 
security intrusions (e.g. brute-force attacks, privilege escalation attacks, Trojan, 
backdoors, etc.). However, this type of threat appears to be much more serious 
than SPF since an attacker can take full control of the whole system, leading to 
disclose confidential information and fabricate credentials.  
Based on the SPF evaluation for all server architectures, the CAS architecture is 
affected the most by this problem unlike the other architectures, as shown in Table 
6-2. This is due to the fact that this specific architecture depends on one single 
central server for providing the security/trust services to user nodes; when this 
server has a failure, the whole security architecture becomes completely non-
functional. The rest of the architectures may not have this problem because they 
are built on multiple distributed servers (i.e. threshold, delegated or duplicated 
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servers) for the sake of overcoming failures. Furthermore, some of these 
distributed architectures (e.g. TAS_DAS, CAS_TAS_IPS, CAS_DAS_TAS_AAO, 
etc.) include different server hierarchies which make these particular architectures 
strongly resilient to SPF and manage server failures in operation effectively. 
Although all these architectures appear not to undergo SPF, there is still a 
possibility to experience a complete failure (i.e. related to SPF) especially in 
situations of multiple servers’ halts. Therefore, it is very crucial to evaluate these 
architectures against this problem, for comparing and ranking purposes. On the 
other hand, the SPF problem is associated with system availability, so the general 
characteristics of system performance (i.e. success ratio, failure frequency) can 
assist to reveal the system’s tendency to this problem. In other words, a system 
with low availability is likely to become unavailable if this system is under a 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, even though this system has 
measures to avoid SPF. As such, these distributed server architectures with/out a 
server hierarchy can be analysed and their SPF rank, shown in Table 6-2, can be 
justified through incorporating the success ratio and failure frequency criteria (i.e. 
reflecting availability) in ranking. Therefore, the following list represents the 
analyses of a complete failure for each of these architectures starting from the 
second rank onward:  






Single point of 
failure  (SPF) 
SPF 
Rank 
Single Point of 
Compromise (SPC)  
SPC 
Rank 
CAS Yes 1 Yes – almost certainly 2 
TAS No (SR8-FF8) 2  No – quite unlikely 6 
D\CAS No (SR1-FF1) 6 Yes – certainly 1 
TAS_DAS No (SR4-FF4) 3 Yes – unlikely 5 
CAS_TAS_AAO No (SR6-FF6) 4 Yes – quite likely 3 
CAS_TAS_IPS No (SR5-FF7) 4 Yes – quite likely 3 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO No (SR2-FF3) 5 Yes – likely 4 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS No (SR3-FF2) 5 Yes – likely 4 
Table  6-2: SPF and SPC Comparison and Ranking (“SRi” refers to Success Ratio 
rank, “FFi” refers to Failure Frequency, rank, i= 1, 2,.., 6, the SPC probability scale: quite 
unlikely,…, certainly) 
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• As the TAS architecture involves n dependant servers relying on the TC(k, n) 
scheme for providing a security service, this architecture completely collapses 
if the servers’ failure makes a number of existing servers less than k available 
servers required to satisfy the TC(k, n) scheme. In addition, this architecture 
shows poor availability based on performance evaluation (i.e. success ratio 
and failure frequency).  
 
• Both CAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_IPS architectures show more resistance 
to a server failure than the detached CAS and TAS architectures, since in these 
two-level combined architectures, the architecture breakdown occurs if both 
CAS and TASs fail. Also, these two architectures show a small enhancement 
in performance, a little better than the TAS architecture which is sufficient to 
withstand potential failures. 
 
• In the TAS_DAS architecture, servers play two roles (called TAS and DAS 
services) unlike the other pervious discussed architectures. Therefore, this 
architecture may only encounter a total failure when all servers break down. 
Even though the breakdown of this architecture seems to be hard to be 
achieved, this architecture however presents fair availability which may lead 
to more failures under an attack, such as a DDoS attack. 
 
• Both CAS_DAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_DAS_TAS_IPS architectures involving 
different distributed servers (CAS, TASs and DASs) appear to have a better 
resilience against a complete failure. This stems from the fact that in order to 
break down these architectures entirely, all three different servers existing in 
these architectures must fail. Furthermore, these architectures also 
demonstrate better availability which may alleviate failures when a DDoS 
attack takes place.  
 
• The D\CAS architecture is acknowledged as the most robust architecture 
against SPF because of two particular reasons. Firstly, this architecture uses 
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the approach of generating several copies of the CAS, so every server copy in 
this architecture can handle its invocation independently. Therefore, this 
architecture becomes in the state of a complete failure just in the 
circumstance that all copy servers are destroyed. Secondly, the D\CAS 
architecture shows the best availability among the other architectures 
decreasing the chance of a SPF occurrence. 
Alternatively, by examining the server architectures in terms of Single-Point-
of-Compromise (SPC), the D\CAS and CAS architectures are undoubtedly 
considered the most vulnerable architectures to SPC. This is due to the fact that 
compromising one server in these architectures will render all nodes compromised 
in the network. However, the D\CAS architecture is expected to be on the top of 
the SPC rank list before the CAS architecture. The reason is that compromising 
one of the server nodes in the D\CAS architecture does not only bring damaging 
consequences (e.g. security keys’ disclosure and exploitation) to user nodes but 
also to the other available non-compromised server nodes in the whole 
architecture as well. The TAS architecture, in comparison with the other 
architectures, demonstrates the most robust architecture against SPC (stands on 
the bottom of the SPC rank list as show in Table 6-2). This is because this 
architecture relies on the TC (t,n) scheme which is originally developed to avoid 
such a problem. In other words, to compromise this architecture completely, this 
requires an attacker to compromise several threshold servers (t, t >>2) which 
seems to be difficult to achieve. 
The SPC scale (i.e. its scale represents: (1) quite unlikely, unlikely,…, (6) 
certainly) is suggested specifically to facilitate comparing and ranking the 
particular two- and three-level hybrid hierarchical architectures, based on the 
likelihood of those architectures being compromised totally under a certain attack. 
A ranking starts from the high probability of compromise in Rank 1 until the low 
probability of compromise in Rank 6, based on the “Dense Ranking” (see 
Wikipedia on ranking). The compromise likelihood is defined and interpreted by 
two guidelines: (1) the level of individual SPC resilience and (2) the number of 
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different user associations (i.e. obtaining different certificates). Initially, for the 
level of individual SPC resilience, this scope is to evaluate each single server type 
in the combined architectures against SPC. Apart from the D\CAS architecture, 
there are three main single-server-type architectures (CAS, TASs and DASs) that 
can be found in these compound architectures. As mentioned earlier, the CAS 
architecture is prone to be easily compromised, whereas the TAS architecture is 
quite adaptable to the problem of SPC. However, the DASs architecture can be 
anticipated to be fairly resistant to full compromise (i.e. similar to the situation of 
SPC). If one of DASs is compromised, only the user nodes associated with this 
compromised server can be compromised without affecting the other non-
compromised DASs in the architecture. This is because each DAS relies on its own 
delegated certificate to prove its issuance authority to its calling user nodes. 
Furthermore, to realise the whole view of the impact of compromise on those 
compound architectures, it is important to investigate the number of different user 
associations that can be generated by different type of servers, CAS, TASs or DASs 
(referring to the certificate type acquisition in Section 6.2.6.1). This information 
will indicate to the size of the impact (i.e. compromise likelihood) on the 
architectures when a certain server type is compromised. Therefore, based on the 
full summary of all cases (different authentication protocols, populations and 
churn) for each server architecture in Section 6.2.6.1, the number of CAS 
associations appears to be far greater than the TAS associations in the 
CAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_IPS architectures (approximately 90% difference). 
Hence, these two architectures are quite likely to be fully compromised. The 
TAS_DAS architecture is unlikely to be in a state of full compromise because both 
TASs and DASs are not easy to be compromised as discussed above in the first 
guidelines. Also, there is a relative balance in the number of different 
associations’ types generated for this architecture (approximately 22% difference 
between TASs and DASs). Eventually, the CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS architectures are likely to have a complete compromise when 
they are under an attack. This stems from that fact that both particular 
architectures contain a CAS which is considered the weakest point in these 
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architectures comparing to the other servers, TASs and DASs. However, these 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS architectures show better resilient 
against SPC than the CAS_TAS_AAO and CAS_TAS_IPS architectures without 
DASs. This is due to the fact that these particular architectures are expected to 
have a number of DAS associations (approximately 22% of all associations) which 
result in reducing CAS associations and improving to some extent the security 
strength of these particular architectures. 
Each security architecture in SSAM makes use of a certain end-to-end 
authentication protocol (i.e. One-Way-Pass (1WP), Two-Way-Pass (2WP) and 
three-Way-Pass (3WP) in the standard of X.509 The Directory Authentication 
Framework (ITU-T, 1989, 2008)) to facilitate security communication between 
server and user nodes. However, this authentication protocol may suffer from 
security problems too, (e.g. Man-In-The-Middle attack, replay attacks, etc.) and 
also cannot satisfy desired protection (e.g. mutual authentication, integrity, non-
repudiation, etc.). Based on the evaluation of the three adopted handshaking 
authentication protocols in Boyd and Mathuria (2003), I'Anson and Mitchell 
(1990), and Burrows et al.  (1990), the 3WP protocol is the most robust protocol 
among the other two protocols because this particular protocol uses a challenge 
technique (i.e. third message CMsg3) to avoid man-in-the-middle problem apart 
from apparently satisfying most of mutual authentication, integrity and 
confidentiality requirements. The WP2 protocol demonstrates higher security 
robustness than the 1WP protocol as this specific protocol ensures mutual 
authentication between two ends avoiding masquerading, forge of a certificate, 
etc. Hence, the three authentication protocols are ranked according to the level of 
security strength as it follows: (1 Weak) 1WP; (2 Middle) 2WP; (3 Strong) 3WP. 
Eventually, this dimension of security strength is not only limited specifically 
to these criteria and threats (SPC, SPF, mutual authentication, etc.) discussed 
above. However other threats and related security features can be investigated and 
involved in this dimension if they are relevant to a study.  
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6.4 The Proposed  Methodological Approach in 
Practice (Summary) 
This section summarises the proposed methodological approach which is applied 
to the SSAM model. This approach, as presented in Figure  4-5, is established on 
well-structured stages which enable to investigate all alternatives of security 
architectures in SSAM and then to assess those security architectures based on 
their security strength, performance and MANET context as follows: 
Stage 1- As the SSAM model is developed originally for the “Security Service 
Level”, all security architectures should be applicable to this particular operational 
level (the first step in this approach is satisfied).  
Stage 2- Based on the component analysis of the security/trust infrastructure 
described in Section 4.3, the elements of the SSAM model can be interpreted, as 
shown in Table 6-3.  
Security Roles 
Similar to a typical CA, a security service in SSAM is 
intended to provide membership certificates to users 
for the network admission (issuing and retrieving) 
using authority servers. 
Security-server 
Architectures 
The SSAM relies on four authority servers (CAS, TAS, 
DAS and D\CAS) for establishing its different server 
architectures. Three different architectures can be 
distinguished (one , two and three server level 
architectures (Section 4.7 and 4.7.1)): 
One-Level Architectures: (CAS; TAS;D\CAS)  
Two-Level Architectures: ( TAS_DAS; CAS_TAS) 
Three-Level Architectures: (CAS_TAS_DAS)  
Security Communication 
Protocols 
Authentication Protocols (Section 4.7.1.1): 
- The X509 standard one-way-pass protocol (1WP) 
- The X509 standard  two-way-pass protocol (2WP) 
- The X509 standard three-way-pass protocol (3WP) 
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Strategies of Calling for hybrid server architectures 
(Section 4.7.1.2): 
- All at Once (AAO)  
- In Priority Sequence (IPS) 
Re-authentication schemes (Section  5.3.3.2): 
- The exponential interval model is used for calling all 
types of servers except DAS 
- The adaptable fixed interval model used in calling 
DAS 
Security Mechanisms 
RAS cryptosystems & RSA-Threshold  cryptosystem 
(Section 4.6)   
Security Credentials The X.509-v3 standard certificates (Section 4.6)     
Table  6-3: The SSAM based on the component analysis of a security/trust 
infrastructure 
Accordingly, an initial survey of all security alternatives in SSAM is generated as 
an outcome of this stage. This survey includes 24 different security architectures 
representing different server architectures, authentication protocols, and calling 
strategies, as shown in Table 5-5. 
Stage 3- All security architectures identified from the previous stage should be 
evaluated, according to the security and performance dimensions with 
incorporating the context of particular MANET settings (illustrated in Section 
5.3.4). In the performance dimension, all security architecture candidates are 
implemented using the OMNeT++ simulation tool (Section 5.3.2) and then a 
performance testing is conducted for these candidates (Section 5.4). The 
performance results are analysed for comparison purposes (Section 6.2). 
However, in the security strength dimension, these candidates are examined 
against specific security challenges (e.g. single-point-of-failure, man-in-the-
middle, etc.) and authentication protocol robustness (e.g. mutual authentication, 
confidentiality, etc.), as demonstrated in Section 6.4. The contexts of MANET 
constraints and application settings can be assessed only by studying and defining 
the application domain properties. This can be tackled separately from security 
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architecture evaluations, as illustrated in Section 6.6 (validation and scenarios). In 
the context of application settings, a given domain application should be studied 
in accordance with the proposed settings in this study, such as dependency, 
lifetime, capacity, and environment. However, as this study of MANETs has 
already targeted the planned, large-scale MANET, and long-term application, all 
features of dependency, lifetime, and capacity are already characterised. Only the 
environment settings need to be described since these settings are associated with 
the real case scenario being involved (Section 6.6). Figure 6-10 displays all 
relevant criteria that are intended to be evaluated in this approach when a 
particular real case scenario is considered. However, it is worth pointing out that 
the “node churn” criterion, which indicates the levels of dynamism in the MANET 
topology as detailed in Section 5.3.4.6, is proposed to be under the MANET 
constraint context. Also, this issue may affect the performance criterion since 
there are two separate different node churning scenarios (i.e. the Churn and No-
Churn cases). 
 
Figure  6-10: The elements (Multi-criteria) of the dimensions which are 
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Stage 4- A simple ranking and selection method (i.e. scoring, reciprocal 
weighting, weighted averaging, etc.) is employed in order to facilitate finding the 
best suited architecture matching context requirements. This can be realised by 
ranking all possible security alternatives in SSAM, based on two principles. The 
first principle refers to the desirable requirements (e.g. low traffic, high 
availability, strong protection, etc.) that a certain security alternative can satisfy. 
The second principle stems from the importance of criteria (security, performance, 
communication, etc.) derived from the context of the application being studied 
(e.g. academia, health, and military). Finally, the way of applying these ranking 
and weighting methods will be demonstrated in the next sections. 
6.5 The Ranking Approach (Evaluation Stage 4) 
The ranking approach proposed in this study consists of three main steps: (1) 
result scoring, (2) importance weighting, and (3) weighted averaging. Initially, in 
order to order a group of alternatives, every alternative within this group should 
have a particular score generated from a predefined fixed range of scores (scale) 
for coherent and consistent ranking. In this study, an Achievement Score (AcSc) 
is proposed to represent the degree of the preferable requirement fulfilment for a 
particular alternative. This score is defined as an achievement percentage ranged 
from 0% to 100%. Score 0% indicates to the worst scenario of the achievement 
(i.e. no requirement is met) whereas Score 100% is considered the ideal 
achievement by satisfying almost all desired requirements. As the results of 
performance and communication criteria are numerical with different metrics, the 
alternative AcSc can be estimated for every metric as follows:  
%gZea.	[%] = 1 − 					z				 	× 100 
     Where: 
• X is an average value of a specific metric for a given alternative (altern.) 
• W is the values of the worst case scenario for a specific metrics among all 
alternatives being involved. 
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Therefore, the above formula above is applied on the experimental results of 
performance and communication metrics. In addition, for each metric, the value of 
the worst case scenario (W) is identified as the maximum of the metric maximum 
average. For simplicity, all performance measurement results of three different 
node populations are summarised by taking the average of those three cases so as 
to represent the two main result cases, the Churn and No-Churn scenarios. In 
addition, in each scenario, an average value of each server architecture is taken 
regardless of the authentication protocol being used because of no significant 
differences among these protocols. Accordingly, the total scores for every 
performance metric in both Churn and No-Churn cases are calculated based on 
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CAS 20.56 71.73 88.57 84.82 69.64 73.30 92.08 87.64 
TAS 0.00 66.42 0.00 0.00 59.60 64.91 89.90 87.97 
D\CAS 62.25 81.75 92.58 88.23 84.52 80.85 94.79 90.95 
TAS_DAS 26.62 73.20 20.52 79.00 73.32 73.55 71.31 61.12 
CAS_TAS_AAO 20.42 72.38 90.57 86.28 71.61 72.49 93.19 89.15 
CAS_TAS_IPS 21.31 72.32 86.68 80.18 74.21 71.32 86.17 71.22 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 53.17 79.70 62.00 57.44 81.01 79.22 82.07 66.05 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 46.61 77.42 38.45 20.16 81.16 76.49 70.75 40.22 
Table  6-4: The scoring (AcSc) of server architectures for each performance 
metric in Churn and No-Churn scenarios (0% the worst → 100% the best) 
On the other hand, the communication overhead results are intended to be 
tackled separately as these results implicitly indicate the cost of bandwidth (i.e. 
number of messages) and resources consumption (i.e. computation, power, etc.). 
Since MANETs are usually recognised with power, computation and bandwidth 
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limitations, communication overhead becomes a key factor in describing the 
feasibility of different security architectures (i.e. the context of MANET 
constraints in the proposed approach). Therefore, AcSc values are calculated for 
each security architecture, as shown in Table 6-5.  




Server Architecture  
The Churn Scenario 
 (Communication Overheads) 
(AcSc between 0 and 100%) 
The No-Churn Scenario 
(Communication Overheads)    
(AcSc between 0 and 100%) 
1WP 2WP 3WP 1WP 2WP 3WP 
CAS 89.91 85.81 83.56 91.72 87.59 85.19 
TAS 0.00 0.00 0.00 55.72 38.01 28.17 
D\CAS 59.54 57.05 49.85 60.96 55.32 47.97 
TAS_DAS 25.13 21.92 15.98 50.07 35.36 26.20 
CAS_TAS_AAO 57.44 51.79 44.43 57.39 39.88 30.30 
CAS_TAS_IPS 88.84 84.57 82.13 88.69 83.57 79.99 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 37.84 29.93 23.88 52.10 36.25 27.22 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 64.52 59.43 56.80 82.07 77.13 73.30 
Table  6-5: The scoring (AcSc) of security architectures for communication 
metric in Churn and No-Churn scenarios (0% the worst → 100% the best) 
(Note that the higher value of AcSc means a lower communication overhead as 
this metric is preferable with lower values (i.e. a lower traffic)). 
For the security strength aspect, three main security features, discussed in 
Section 6.3, are considered to represent the robustness of a given security 
architecture alternative: Single-Point-of-Failure (SPF) and Single-Point-of-
Compromise (SPC) resilience and authentication protocol robustness. However, 
the analysis of security strength is conducted in qualitative manner with ranking 
all alternatives, as shown Table 6-2. As a result, the AcSc values should be 
evaluated differently from the formula above. The rank of each alternative needs 
to be normalised within the predefined range of AcSc, as presented in Table 6-6. 
However, the results in this table are presumed to be applicable to both Churn and 
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1WP _CAS 1 1 20.6 
1WP _TAS 1 20.6 99 
1WP _D\CAS 1 99 1 
1WP _TAS_DAS 1 40.2 79.4 
1WP _CAS_TAS_AAO 1 59.8 40.2 
1WP _CAS_TAS_IPS 1 59.8 40.2 
1WP _CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 1 79.4 59.8 
1WP _CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 1 79.4 59.8 
2WP _CAS 50 1 20.6 
2WP _TAS 50 20.6 99 
2WP _D\CAS 50 99 1 
2WP _TAS_DAS 50 40.2 79.4 
2WP _CAS_TAS_AAO 50 59.8 40.2 
2WP _CAS_TAS_IPS 50 59.8 40.2 
2WP _CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 50 79.4 59.8 
2WP _CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 50 79.4 59.8 
3WP _CAS 99 1 20.6 
3WP _TAS 99 20.6 99 
3WP _D\CAS 99 99 1 
3WP _TAS_DAS 99 40.2 79.4 
3WP _CAS_TAS_AAO 99 59.8 40.2 
3WP _CAS_TAS_IPS 99 59.8 40.2 
3WP _CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 99 79.4 59.8 
3WP _CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 99 79.4 59.8 
Table  6-6: The scoring (AcSc) of security architectures based on security 
strength features (0% the worst → 100% the best) 
(Note that the values of 0% and 100% are not taken into account because, there is 
no zero or perfect protection realistically).  
The importance of criteria (i.e. requirements and dimensions) may vary from 
one domain to another. For example, security appears to be much more important 
in military contexts than in civil contexts because of potential hostile 
environments in these contexts. Therefore, the Rank Reciprocal Weighting 
(RRW) method (Stillwell et al., 1981) is adopted for weighting the importance of 
different measurements and dimensions in this ranking approach (referring to the 
second step). Always weights, generated by this method, are between 0 and 1 and 
thereby this is consistent with the predefined range for scoring [0%, 100%] 
proposed in this approach. Also, in this method, the total of weights is always 1 
regardless of the type of ranking being used (i.e. a reliable numerical weighting 
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method). The following formula is taken from Stillwell et al (1981) to reckon a 
weight of a particular criterion, based on its importance rank: (Note that the lower 
the i value, the higher  the importance). 
`eaj = 1/∑ 1/ 	 ,  = 1,2,… , u 
              
              Always ∑  = 1 
where 
n is a number of criteria 
i  a criterion importance score 
wi  a weight for i criterion 
In this study, two simple levels of a criteria hierarchy can be recognised, as 
shown in Figure 6-10. Only performance and security strength dimensions have 
multiple measurements (e.g. performance: success ratio, failure frequency, RTT, 
and RTT-STDev; security strength: authentication protocol robustness, SPF 
resilience, and SPC resilience). In the second level of this hierarchy, for 
simplicity, it is proposed one fixed set of weights for these particular 
measurements. These weights are expected to be applicable to all scenarios being 
tackled. However, for the first level of this hierarchy, the importance of different 
dimensional weights will be defined according to the scenario being involved as 
this will be described in Section 6.6.  
For the performance measurements, the success ratio and failure frequency are 
the most and equally important as these two measurements indicate to the 
desirable requirements of any system (i.e. reliability and availability). Also, other 
measurements (e.g. RTT, etc.) rely on them in terms of calculation. The RTT 
measurement is proposed to be more important than its deviation metrics. As a 
result, performance measurements are prioritised and the corresponding weights 
are calculated accordingly based on the RRW method, as shown in Table 6-7. As 
such, the weights of security strength measurements are estimated. However, the 
importance of security strength measurements are ranked in the following order, 
SPF and SPC resilience first and then authentication protocol robustness. This 
stems from that fact that securing service security on the server sides (being in 
operation) is much important than establishing protected links between user and 
server nodes. 






i = 1 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 Total 
Sum wSuccess Ratio wFailure Frequency wRTT wRTT-STDev 
0.3529 0.3529 0.1765 0.1176 1 
Security 
Strength  
i = 2 i = 1 i = 1 Total 
Sum w AutProt. Robustness wSPF-Resilience wSPC-Resilience 
0.2 0.4 0.4 1 
Table  6-7: The performance and security strength weights based RRW 
method i an importance rank (lowest value is the most important) 
The final step in this ranking approach is to generate the overall rank of all 
alternatives being considered. This can be worked out by using the weighted 
averaging which incorporates the weight of importance for a certain measurement 
and the scores of alternatives in calculation (as described in the formula below). 
An implementation of this step will be presented in next section.   
 rℎ	%^a`	gZea. = ∑ 	∑  ,  = 1,2, … , u   
 
Where: 
n is a number of criteria 
ri  a security alternative score 
wi  a weight for the i criterion 
In conclusion, the ranking approach used in this section is suggested to 
highlight the best and the worst among security architectures, depending on the 
experimental results of performance and communication and the implications of 
security strength. The aim of this approach is to enable MANET developers (i.e. 
decision makers) to easily perceive a whole picture (multi-dimension evaluation 
or multi-criteria), in order to be able to make better decisions. Table 6-4, 6-5, 6-6 
and 6-7 primarily represent the preliminary evaluation (alternative scoring and 
importance weighting) of the key criteria for each different dimension in the 
proposed approach: performance, communication (i.e. MANET constraints) and 
security strength. In Stage 4 of the proposed approach, these tables are intended to 
be employed in the overall assessment of these three dimensions under different 
real case scenarios. This assessment will be demonstrated in the next section.  
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6.6 Validation and Scenarios 
Generally, validation in this context means to ensure that the proposed SSAM 
meets the aim of this study and perform as it is expected (i.e. the system has been 
validated from the experiment quantitative results). In other words, validation, 
particularly in this study, is to prove that the SSAM model can offer the flexible 
approach leveraging a variety of security architectures which can be integrated in 
any service model deployed in large-scale MANETs in order to facilitate trust and 
security. This arguably motivates MANET developers to develop effective and 
efficient security services or applications taking into account MANETs limitations 
and application requirements. In this section, firstly the overall proposed approach 
with all elements will be summarised and highlighted. Secondly, for the SSAM 
approach validation, this section illustrates the usage of this approach in three 
different real case scenarios. Each scenario begins with a high-level description of 
the service/application for a specific domain and MANET characteristics, 
followed by the identification of requirements and preferences for the application.  
6.6.1  The Real Case Scenarios 
This section presents three exemplar cases, inspired by real world applications, 
that MANETs can be employed under different requirements. These cases are 
unfolded within scenarios borrowed from academia, emergency services and crisis 
management, and military missions. SSAM is applied on all three in order to 
prove the feasibility of the approach. The reason for selecting these case scenarios 
is that they cover a wide range of conditions and requirements, and, therefore, the 
flexibility and versatility of the proposed security solution can be demonstrated. 
All presented case scenarios are designated to conform to all pre-conditions 
and assumptions of the SSAM design. For instance, each proposed scenario 
adheres to the authority-based infrastructure where all types of network nodes 
must be trusted and controlled by an authority. That is, they must have 
membership credentials to connect to the network and utilise its services. 
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Additionally, since SSAM is tested and evaluated under a low mobility model in 
MANET (i.e. human mobility model), as described in Section 5.3.4.1, all case 
scenarios must comply with this feature. Consequently, for validity purposes, 
other mobility models cannot be used. For example, a vehicle mobility model 
would show different broken links and partitioning behaviour in the network, and 
this would yield completely different and incomparable results. 
6.6.1.1 The First Scenario – MANETs in Academia (S1) 
Academic wireless networks usually cover University campuses and are accessed 
by a variety of users (students, staff, visitors, etc.) that may have access privileges 
for short or longer periods. MANETs can benefit academic environments 
enormously by providing autonomous networks on the fly that can be accessed by 
battery-powered mobile devices (e.g. smartphones, tablets, laptops, etc.). Thus, 
this networking technology, complementary to the traditional infrastructure-based 
networks, has the potential to provide the academic community with an on-
demand medium for supporting and managing university services on campus (e.g. 
access to email accounts, intranets, e-libraries, etc.).   
The MANETs in Academia scenario studies the case where the IT department 
of a University decides to deploy the services listed above on MANETs so that the 
users can access them using their own mobile devices while roaming around the 
University campus. As in any network, it is of utmost importance to provide a 
secure infrastructure. One way to increase security is to provide short-term 
membership certificates to users. Therefore, MANET restrictions and application 
domain requirements (in this case the academia particularities) must be considered 
when developing a security/trust service.  
Generally, an academic environment is considered as a non-hostile 
environment characterised by benignity. Usually, the users abide with the 
University rules and have no malicious intentions (i.e. there is no contender). 
Furthermore, most of the devices used to access MANET are small and light-duty 
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devices, and, therefore, have limited power and storage capabilities. Therefore, 
performance and security are considered equally and moderately important 
features in this setting. Consequently, the configurations of the simulation model 
should comply with these characteristics. The factors considered for modelling the 
MANETs in Academia case scenario are described below. 
Requirements and Settings: 
The following factors are necessary to be taken into account for the security 
service that needs to be deployed in MANETs within the academic context: 
- The good performance is needed:  
 Both service availability and reliability in this context appear to be 
more important than service quickness. 
- Most devices are smartphones which have limited bandwidth, storage and 
power. 
- The standard protection is essential.   
- Academia can be characterised as a non-hostile environment.  
- The case of node churning is considered as the adopted Churn model 
developed on the node lifetime in the academic domain (campus), see 
Section 5.3.4.6 for more details. 
Results (Decision Implementation):  
Based on the settings of this scenario, the results of the Churn and No-Churn 
cases should be taken into consideration in this decision implementation. 
Following the ranking approach illustrated in Section 6.5, both performance and 
security strength criteria should be evaluated. This is due to the fact that these two 
dimensions consist of more than one measurement in the second level of the 
criteria hierarchy. To begin with  the performance measurements, relying on Table 
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6-5 (i.e. including ranking score.) and Table 6-7 (i.e. including importance 
weights for performance), a weighted average for each alternative can be 
estimated for the two different network scenarios (Churn and No-Churn), as 





The Churn Scenario (score between 0 and 100% ) for 
each performance measurement 
SR (Success Ratio), FF (Failure Frequency), RTTD (RTT-STDev) 
Rank Reciprocal (RR) 
Weights 
 













Server Architecture SR. FF. RTT RTTD. 
CAS 20.56 71.73 88.57 84.82 58.2 
TAS 0.00 66.42 0.00 0.00 23.4 
D\CAS 62.25 81.75 92.58 88.23 77.5 
TAS_DAS 26.62 73.20 20.52 79.00 48.1 
CAS_TAS_AAO 20.42 72.38 90.57 86.28 58.9 
CAS_TAS_IPS 21.31 72.32 86.68 80.18 57.8 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 53.17 79.70 62.00 57.44 64.6 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 46.61 77.42 38.45 20.16 52.9 
Table  6-8: The final ranking estimation for the performance dimension in the 





The Churn Scenario (score between 0 and 100% ) for 
each performance measurement 
SR (Success Ratio), FF (Failure Frequency), RTTD (RTT-STDev) 
Rank Reciprocal (RR) 
Weights 
 













Server Architecture SR. FF. RTT RTTD. 
CAS 69.64 73.30 92.08 87.64 77.0 
TAS 59.60 64.91 89.90 87.97 70.2 
D\CAS 84.52 80.85 94.79 90.95 85.8 
TAS_DAS 73.32 73.55 71.31 61.12 71.6 
CAS_TAS_AAO 71.61 72.49 93.19 89.15 77.8 
CAS_TAS_IPS 74.21 71.32 86.17 71.22 75.0 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 81.01 79.22 82.07 66.05 78.8 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 81.16 76.49 70.75 40.22 72.9 
Table  6-9: The final ranking estimation for the performance dimension in the 
No-Churn network scenario 
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Eventually, regardless of the authentication protocol in use, the D\CAS and 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO architectures respectively show the best performance 
among the other architectures in both Churn and No-Churn scenarios in this 
ranking evaluation. While, the TAS has the worst performance in all scenarios. In 
both scenarios, these two lists of total ranks represent the levels of achievements 
for each security alternative based on the performance requirements in the 
academic context. The alternative with the highest percentage is considered the 
best choice as this indicates that this alternative is able to meet all desirable 
requirements in the context. 
Similarly, for the security strength dimension, the scores of security 
alternatives for every measurement, generated in Table 6-6, and the proposed 
weights for this dimension, shown in Table 7-7, are incorporated for calculate the 
weighted averages of all alternatives, as shown in Table 6-10. This table is 
proposed to be applicable for both Churn and No-Churn scenarios.       
Rank Reciprocal (RR) 
Weights 


























1WP _CAS 1 1 20.6 08.84 
1WP_TAS 1 20.6 99 48.04 
1WP_D\CAS 1 99 1 40.20 
1WP_TAS_DAS 1 40.2 79.4 48.04 
1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 1 59.8 40.2 40.2 
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1 59.8 40.2 40.2 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 1 79.4 59.8 55.88 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 1 79.4 59.8 55.88 
2WP_CAS 50 1 20.6 18.64 
2WP_TAS 50 20.6 99 57.84 
2WP_D\CAS 50 99 1 50.00 
2WP_TAS_DAS 50 40.2 79.4 57.84 
2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 50 59.8 40.2 50.00 
2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 50 59.8 40.2 50.00 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 50 79.4 59.8 65.68 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 50 79.4 59.8 65.68 
3WP_CAS 99 1 20.6 28.44 
3WP_TAS 99 20.6 99 67.64 
3WP_D\CAS 99 99 1 59.80 
3WP_TAS_DAS 99 40.2 79.4 67.64 
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3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 99 59.8 40.2 59.8 
3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 99 59.8 40.2 59.8 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 99 79.4 59.8 75.48 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 99 79.4 59.8 75.48 
Table  6-10: The final ranking estimation for the security strength dimension 
It appears that the CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO, CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS, TAS_DAS and 
TAS architectures with 3WP or 2WP protocols respectively present the best 
security strength among the other architectures. On the other side, most 
architectures with 1WP protocols show lower security strength especially the 
D\CAS, CAS_TAS_AAO, CAS_TAS_IPS and CAS architectures, as demonstrated 
in Table 6-10. After completing the evaluation of the second level of criteria 
hierarchy, in this stage, the final rank of all top-level dimensions (i.e. 
performance, security strength, and MANET constraints) can be calculated for 
every alternative. However, the importance of these three dimensions differs 
based on the requirements and settings of the application being involved. Hence, 
according to the requirements of this real case scenario in an academic context, it 
can be concluded that service performance and security are equally important. On 
the other hand, since most devices which operate the MANET are presumed to be 
limited low-end, it is very important that communication and computation (i.e. 
communication overhead metric) are as lower as possible. Also, this MANET 
constraint is considered much more important than performance and security since 
this network relies on mobile devices for operation. As a result, the corresponding 
weights of importance for the dimensions can be evaluated based on the RRW 
method: (1) wperformance = 25%, (2) wSecurityStrength = 25% and (3) wcommunicationOverhead 
= 50%. These weights are also applied for both Churn and No-Churn network 
cases.  Depending on Table 6-5, 6-8 and 6-10, two lists of final ranks for the 
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Rank Reciprocal (RR) 
Weights 

















                      







































































3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 57.77 82.13 59.8 70.46 
2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 57.77 84.57 50.00 69.23 
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 57.77 88.84 40.20 68.91 
3WP_CAS 58.18 83.56 28.44 63.44 
2WP_CAS 58.18 85.81 18.64 62.11 
1WP_CAS 58.18 89.91 08.84 61.71 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 52.93 56.80 75.48 60.50 
2WP_D/CAS 77.54 57.05 50.00 60.41 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 52.93 64.52 55.88 59.46 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 52.93 59.43 65.68 59.37 
3WP_D/CAS 77.54 49.85 59.80 59.26 
1WP_D/CAS 77.54 59.54 40.20 59.20 
1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 58.88 57.44 40.20 53.49 
2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 58.88 51.79 50.00 53.12 
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 58.88 44.43 59.80 51.88 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 64.59 37.84 55.88 49.04 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 64.59 29.93 65.68 47.54 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 64.59 23.88 75.48 46.96 
2WP_TAS_DAS 48.14 21.92 57.84 37.45 
3WP_TAS_DAS 48.14 15.98 67.64 36.94 
1WP_TAS_DAS 48.14 25.13 48.04 36.61 
3WP_TAS 23.44 0.00 67.64 22.77 
2WP_TAS 23.44 0.00 57.84 20.32 
1WP_TAS 23.44 0.00 48.04 17.87 
Table  6-11: The list of final security alternative ranks in the Churn setting for 
Scenario S1 (Academia) 
Based on the percentage of alternatives’ achievements (scores), both Table 6-
11 and 6-12 produce different ordered lists of alternatives which enable MANET 
developers to choose the best nominated architectures for this specific scenario 
under the Churn or No-Churn settings. In the Churn setting, the 
3/2/1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS architectures respectively show the best achievement 
(approximately between 70.46 and 68.91%). This means that these architectures 
satisfy the most desired requirements (lower communication → better 
performance and security) in this scenario as presented in the green cells in Table 
6-12. Also, the group of 3/2/1WP_CAS, 3/2/1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS and 
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3/2/1WP_D\CAS architectures respectively comes as a second option in the list, as 
shown in the greenish-yellow cells within Table 6-12. Some of the other 
architectures demonstrate a medium level of achievements, such as 
1/2/3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO, 1/2/3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO, etc. As expected, 
3/2/1WP_TAS architectures achieve the minimum requirements in this ordered list 
in the Churn setting. This is because these architectures are completely non-
functional in this particular setting. 
Rank Reciprocal (RR) 
Weights 
















                      







































































3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 73.30 75.48 73.74 
3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 79.99 59.80 73.68 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 82.07 55.88 73.22 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 77.13 65.68 73.20 
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 88.69 40.20 73.13 
2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 83.57 50.00 73.02 
3WP_CAS 77.01 85.19 28.44 68.96 
2WP_CAS 77.01 87.59 18.64 67.71 
1WP_CAS 77.01 91.72 08.84 67.32 
1WP_D\CAS 85.79 60.96 40.20 61.98 
2WP_D\CAS 85.79 55.32 50.00 61.61 
3WP_D\CAS 85.79 47.97 59.80 60.38 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 52.10 55.88 59.72 
1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 57.39 40.20 58.19 
1WP_TAS 70.16 55.72 48.04 57.41 
1WP_TAS_DAS 71.61 50.07 48.04 54.95 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 36.25 65.68 54.25 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 27.22 75.48 52.18 
2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 39.88 50.00 51.89 
2WP_TAS 70.16 38.01 57.84 51.01 
2WP_TAS_DAS 71.61 35.36 57.84 50.05 
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 30.30 59.80 49.55 
3WP_TAS 70.16 28.17 67.64 48.53 
3WP_TAS_DAS 71.61 26.20 67.64 47.91 
Table  6-12: The list of final security alternative ranks in the No-Churn setting 
for Scenario S1 (Academia) 
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Alternatively, in the No-Churn setting, both 3/2/1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS and 
3/2/1WP_CAS_TAS _IPS architectures become in one group which is considered 
the best architectures group accomplishing almost all demands of this context 
(approximately 73%), as shown in the green cells in Table 6-12.Thereafter, the 
3/2/1WP_CAS architectures take the next place with approximately 67% 
achievement score among the other architectures under this setting, as displayed 
in the greenish-yellow cells. In the list, different security architectures using the 
1WP protocol show the in-between order (approximately between 62 and 57%), 
for example 1/2/3WP_D/CAS, 1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO, 1WP_CAS_TAS 
_AAO, and 1WP_TAS architectures respectively. The architectures which are 
characterised with the least success in achieving the requirements of this context 
are 3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO, 3WP _TAS and 3WP_TAS_DAS architectures, as 
shown in Table 6-12.  
Eventually, two- and three-level hierarchical security architectures, especially 
3/2/1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS and 3/2/1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS, offer the best 
solutions for this scenario as the settings of this scenario are constrained with a 
low communication overhead and a standard level of security and performance. 
6.6.1.2 The Second Scenario – MANETs in Emergency and Crisis 
Domains (S2) 
In a crisis (i.e. physical disaster such as earthquake, flood, hurricane, etc. or man-
made disaster such as terrorist attack, explosion, etc.), the three main emergency 
services (i.e. ambulance, fire, and police) cooperate in order to provide timely and 
efficient response. Communication among the various rescue teams is essential in 
emergency situations. In the same time, communication means that depend on 
network infrastructures are considered insufficient, especially in semi-urban or 
rural areas that are not well facilitated by network infrastructures. Therefore, 
MANETs have the potential to offer an infrastructure-less solution since they do 
not depend on any infrastructure in order to operate. In the case of emergency 
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response in disasters, this is an important advantage over traditional pre-
established networks, such as cellular networks, that might not exist or are 
damaged.  
The second case scenario assumes that the rescue team members are equipped 
with handheld devices, such as smartphones, tablets, laptops, etc., that can utilise 
communication technologies for building a MANET (e.g. Wi-Fi). The deployed 
services can facilitate information sharing and communication services, such as 
up-to-date news feed, real-time multimedia streaming (e.g. voice or video calling 
services such as Walkie-Talkie, Push-to-Talk, VoIP, etc.), and instant messaging. 
To accomplish secure utilisation of those resources and services, a security/trust 
system should be adopted. The security system will ensure the distribution of 
security credentials in order to allow users to access the MANET. 
The life-critical nature of crisis management designates the importance of 
network performance for efficient communication while the security, although 
important, comes as a second priority. This is supported by the literature where, 
for example, Lien et al.(2009) and Jang et al. (2009) point out that performance, 
especially efficiency, is more important than security for the emergency response 
communications. However, some security aspects are considered essential for this 
case (e.g. integrity and authentication of users). Furthermore, the communication 
environment in the case of crisis management is considered a non-hostile 
environment that rarely has intended adversaries. Therefore, performance is 
considered a critical requirement. In the same time, integrity and authentication 
are considered more important security requirements than confidentiality. Thus, 
the configurations of the SSAM (i.e. simulation model) should consider these 
requirements. The factors considered for modelling the MANETs in the 
Emergency Services case scenario are described below. 
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Requirements and Settings: 
The following factors have to be taken into consideration when the security 
service is required to be deployed in MANETs within an emergency and crisis 
contexts: 
- There is a demand for high performance service as time is very critical in 
this context. 
- The security strength should be acceptable. 
- In emergency and crisis situations, it is expected to have a non-hostile 
environment.  
- Many devices, exploited by the rescue team members, may suffer from 
problems of limited bandwidth, storage and power. 
Results (Decision Implementation):  
Similar to the decision application of the first scenario described in Section 
6.6.1.1, Tables 6-8 and 6-10 are used in this scenario because the weights of 
performance and security strength metrics are presumed to be fixed for all 
scenarios in this study. On the other side, only the results under the No-Churn 
setting can be applicable to this scenario as the Churn setting (a lifetime node) is 
established on an academic context. Considering the prescribed requirements for 
this scenario, performance is much more important than security and 
communication because applications in this context are time-sensitive. Also, since 
MANETs in this scenario appear to be limited, the communication overhead is 
much important than security. Therefore, the corresponding weights of importance 
for the dimensions are reckoned via applying the RRW method: (1) wperformance = 
54.55%, (2) wSecurityStrength = 18.18% and (3) wcommunicationOverhead  = 27.27%. 
Thereafter, by using the resultant values of Tables 6-5, 6-8 and 6-10, the list of 
final security alternative ranks is calculated, as shown in Table 6-13. 
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3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 79.99 59.80 73.57 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 73.30 75.48 73.46 
2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 83.57 50.00 72.77 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 77.13 65.68 72.72 
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 88.69 40.20 72.38 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 82.07 55.88 72.28 
2WP_D/CAS 85.79 55.32 50.00 70.98 
3WP_D/CAS 85.79 47.97 59.80 70.75 
1WP_D/CAS 85.79 60.96 40.20 70.73 
3WP_CAS 77.01 85.19 28.44 70.41 
2WP_CAS 77.01 87.59 18.64 69.28 
1WP_CAS 77.01 91.72 8.84 68.63 
1WP _CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 52.10 55.88 67.35 
1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 57.39 40.20 65.39 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 36.25 65.68 64.81 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 27.22 75.48 64.13 
2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 39.88 50.00 62.40 
1WP_TAS 70.16 55.72 48.04 62.20 
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 30.30 59.80 61.57 
1WP_TAS_DAS 71.61 50.07 48.04 61.45 
2WP _TAS_DAS 71.61 35.36 57.84 59.22 
2WP_TAS 70.16 38.01 57.84 59.15 
3WP_TAS_DAS 71.61 26.20 67.64 58.50 
3WP_TAS 70.16 28.17 67.64 58.25 
Table  6-13: The final list of security alternative ranks in the No-Churn setting 
for Scenario S2 (Crisis Management) 
The 3/2/1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS and 3/2/1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS architectures are 
considered the best alternatives in meeting all requirements for this scenario 
(approximately between 72% and 73%), as displayed in the green cells in Table 6-
13. In spite of the high communication and fair security strength, the 
2/3/1WP_D\CAS architectures show fairly proper choice as expected 
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(approximately 70%). This is because these architectures are already characterised 
with the highest performance among all architectures. The 2/1WP_TAS_DAS, 
2/3WP_TAS and 3WP_TAS_DAS architectures reveal the minimum achievement 
scores in this scenario. The different achievements of the rest of security 
architectures can be recognised by looking at Table 6-13.  
6.6.1.3 The Third Scenario – MANETs in Military Domain (S3) 
The third case scenario aims to study MANETs under the requirements of military 
missions. For the purpose of this experiment, the case of infantry troops using 
MANET for tactical-level communications is explored. MANET in this case can 
be used to provide services, such as situational awareness, positional awareness, 
command-and-control information systems (C2IS), SMS, and real-time 
multimedia streaming for voice push-to-talk (PTT), voice push-to-group (PTG), 
and video from surveillance monitors.  
Battlefields are generally hostile environments where the enemy will attempt to 
intercept communications. Therefore, the soldiers need secure and resilient 
communication systems. In the same time, speedy communication and accurate 
access to information can prove to be life-saving to ground soldiers. 
Consequently, in this setting, both security and performance are considered highly 
important features for the MANET configurations. Furthermore, military 
equipment is usually high advanced technologically, therefore, it is assumed that 
the soldiers’ gear includes handheld devices with no power and capacity 
limitations. The factors considered for modelling the MANETs in Military 
Missions case scenario are described below. 
Requirements and Settings: 
The following factors have to be taken into account once the security service 
needs to be designed and implemented in MANETs within the military context: 
- Security is more important than performance in this context.  
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- The environment of this scenario is normally characterised with hostility (i.e. 
enemies).  
- The good performance is necessary. 
- In the military domain, most devices that are used, have no power and 
capacity limitations.  
Results (Decision Implementation):  
Similar to the decision application of the first and second scenarios in Sections 
6.6.1.1 and 6.6.1.2, Tables 6-8 and 6-10 are involved in this scenario due to 
having fixed weights of performance and security strength metrics. However, only 
the results of the No-Churn setting are appropriate to this scenario as the Churn 
setting (a lifetime node) is defined only within an academic context (see Section 
5.3.4.6). Based on the identified requirements of this scenario, security is much 
more important than performance and communication because of critical and 
hostile environments. On the other hand, MANETs in this context appear not to 
have resource restrictions in terms of power and computation. In this case, 
performance becomes more important than the communication overhead (i.e. the 
context of MANET constraints). Accordingly, the corresponding weights of 
importance for the dimensions in this scenario are estimated according to the 
RRW method: (1) wperformance = 27.27% (2) wSecurityStrength = 54.55% and (3) 
wcommunicationOverhead = 18.18%. Then, by taking advantage of Tables 6-5, 6-8 and 6-
10, the list of final security alternative ranks is generated as shown in Table 6-14. 
In this scenario, the best architecture in terms of satisfying the desired 
requirements is the 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS architecture, as shown Table 6-14. 
As shown from its performance, communication and security analyses, this 
architecture assures the fulfilment of the high protection, high performance and 
fairly low communication. The 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS, 3WP_CAS_ 
TAS_DAS_AAO and 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS architectures respectively present great 
potential in this scenario apart from the top-rank architecture, as shown in Table 
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6-14. However, the 2/1WP_CAS architectures have the lowest achievement 
scores, as anticipated. This is due to the fact that these architectures are the 
weakest architectures in the context of security and performance.  
Rank Reciprocal (RR) Weights 
wperformance wcom.Overhead wSecurityStrength 
No-Churn Scenario 
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3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 73.30 75.48 74.37 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 77.13 65.68 69.72 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 27.22 75.48 67.61 
3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 79.99 59.80 67.60 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 72.86 82.07 55.88 65.27 
3WP_D\CAS 85.79 47.97 59.80 64.74 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 36.25 65.68 63.91 
2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 83.57 50.00 62.91 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.81 52.10 55.88 61.45 
3WP_TAS_DAS 71.61 26.20 67.64 61.19 
3WP_TAS 70.16 28.17 67.64 61.15 
2WP_D\CAS 85.79 55.32 50.00 60.73 
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 30.30 59.80 59.34 
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 74.95 88.69 40.20 58.49 
2WP_TAS 70.16 38.01 57.84 57.59 
2WP_TAS_DAS 71.61 35.36 57.84 57.51 
1WP_D\CAS 85.79 60.96 40.20 56.41 
2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 39.88 50.00 55.74 
1WP_TAS 70.16 55.72 48.04 55.47 
1WP_TAS_DAS 71.61 50.07 48.04 54.84 
1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 77.79 57.39 40.20 53.58 
3WP_CAS 77.01 85.19 28.44 52.00 
2WP_CAS 77.01 87.59 18.64 47.10 
1WP_CAS 77.01 91.72 8.84 42.50 
Table  6-14: The final list of security alternative ranks in the No-Churn setting 
for Scenario S3 (Military) 
In conclusion, along with the criteria and application requirements, the results 
generated from applying the proposed ranking approach in different scenarios can 
be used as guidelines for MANET developers to find appropriate security 
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architectures which meet not only the security demands but also the performance 
and communication expectations for any specific application. Also, it is important 
to indicate that the security architectures with two- or three-level hybrid and 
hierarchical servers offer best alternatives in all scenarios being tacked, such as 
1/2/3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS, 1/2/3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO, and 1/2/3WP_ 
CAS_ TAS_IPS architectures. 
6.7 Conclusion  
This chapter initially presented the evaluation of the model results obtained from 
conducting the performance and communication testing, for the proposed security 
architectures in SSAM under different network scenarios (i.e. the Churn and No-
Churn settings). These performance and communication results were intended to 
be integrated in the dimensions of performance and MANETs constraints 
respectively in the proposed methodological approach. In addition, the security 
architectures were examined in a qualitative way based on three main security 
concerns (i.e. single-point-of-failure (SPF) and single-point-compromise (SPC) 
and authentication protocol weaknesses) for ranking purposes. The results of this 
particular security analysis were involved in the dimension of the security strength 
in the proposed approach.  
Hence, the methodological approach, which was developed to evaluate security 
services in MANETs under different considerations, was applied incorporating the 
SSAM model for validation purposes. Also, in order to demonstrate the feasibility 
of the proposed approach in practical settings, three unique real case scenarios 
(i.e. academic, emergency, and military contexts) for MANETs were exploited. 
On the other side, in the proposed multi-dimensional methodology, a simple 
ranking approach is suggested and employed as a decision support framework. 
This ranking approach was established on achievement scoring (i.e. rating), 
reciprocal ranking weighting (RRW) and weighted averaging methods. The aim of 
this approach was to enable MANET developers to prioritise their security 
strength, communication and performance requirements so as to rank the available 
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security architecture alternatives in SSAM based on their appropriateness for a 
specified application. As a result of implementing this approach, three key lists 
which included the final ranks of security alternatives were generated based on the 
requirements and settings of three representative scenarios. These lists could allow 
security developers to define a proper security service policy matching the 
demands of the context being tackled. Last but not least, it is worth pointing out 
that the hybrid and hierarchical security architectures in SSAM provide the best 
alternatives among three focused scenarios, for example 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
7.1 Thesis Overview 
This thesis has seven chapters. This chapter presents the thesis contributions, and 
the research aim with its objectives revisited. It also highlights the limitations and 
future research directions for this research. An overview of the previous six 
chapters is outlined below: 
Chapter 1 presented the introduction for this thesis, in which the motivation of 
this research was addressed. Several dimensions (i.e. strength, MANET 
constraints, application requirements, performance and operational levels), which 
have a significant impact on the security design of MANETs, were underlined. 
Therefore, the research aim in this study defined in this chapter was to develop a 
systematic approach which could support MANET developers to select the best 
appropriate server-based security infrastructures that satisfy the security, 
performance and context requirements of a given application in MANETs. Then, 
the six research objectives were identified to reach the aim of this research and the 
simulation approach was adopted to carry out this research. Also, a number of 
relevant definitions used in this thesis were well explained to avoid 
misinterpretation. 
Chapter 2 highlighted the relevant subjects related to MANETs and their security 
issues. Initially, the discussion mainly indicated the unique MANET 
characteristics, the domains of MANET applications, the encountered MANET 
challenges for leveraging a better understanding about MANETs in practice. 
Then, most MANET-related security fundamentals and current trust models, 
which were involved in formulating a part of the proposed approach in this study 
(e.g. security mechanisms, MANET threats and attacks, etc.), were described. 
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This chapter set up a foundation for developing this study’s approach by means of 
identifying a number of elements such as distinct MANET characteristics, 
MANET security aspects and available trust infrastructures. 
Chapter 3 clarified the research methodology adopted in this thesis. The overall 
research approach for this research was presented initially. Then, this chapter 
established the background on a simulation technique and its methodology, which 
were used for testing the performance and communication of the SSAM model. 
Typically, the simulation methodology which was composed of three different 
stages (the problem definition, the model development and the decision support) 
was detailed and linked to this study. Furthermore, the verification validation and 
testing techniques (VV&T), were defined and exploited in this research approach 
for leveraging its credibility.  
Chapter 4 had two parts (Part A and B). Part A demonstrated the proposed 
conceptual security framework for MANETs. This framework highlighted the 
important security-design-related elements and dimensions (i.e. an operational 
level, security/trust components, security strength, performance, the context of 
MANET constraints and application settings) associated with design and 
development of a trust/security infrastructure in MANETs. Also, based on this 
framework, a security-based methodology was proposed to enable MANET 
security developers to develop effective security solutions suiting different 
MANET contexts.  Part B presented the proposal and design of the security model 
(SSAM). In accordance with the building blocks of a security/trust infrastructure 
in MANET, the SSAM components: a server architecture, an authentication 
protocol, a cryptosystem, a security credential, a strategy of calling, and MANET 
settings, were identified. Then, the model design of SSAM activities, 
communications and processes was illustrated. The aim of the SSAM model came 
with two key purposes. The  first purpose was to offer a new security design for 
MANETs in the service operational level while the second purpose was to 
validate the suggested multi-dimension approach  established  from the 
framework proposed in Part A. 
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Chapter 5 discussed the implementation and experimentation of the SSAM model 
being conceptualised in Chapter 4 – Part B, considering the SSAM model 
assumptions. The OMNeT++ simulator was used to build the SSAM prototype 
which was composed of the definitions of necessary network, node and messages 
structures (i.e. *.ned and *.msg files) and the creation of C++ classes related to the 
SSAM activity, communication and process models mentioned in Chapter 4 – Part 
B. In addition, the key configurations and initialisations for this prototype were 
determined in order to properly conduct the performance and communication 
testing. Two different sets of configurations were described and justified in this 
chapter, the SSAM-related security and MANET-related network configurations. 
Eventually, the experimental design for performing the SSAM simulation was 
explained through identifying proper performance and communication metrics, 
specifying required test cases and experimental parameters, and deciding the 
requisite replications of each simulation experiment. 
Chapter 6 provided an evaluation of the proposed approach. This was achieved 
primarily by interpreting the results of applying the SSAM model over MANETs.  
This chapter started with analysing the performance and communication results 
obtained from the simulation experiments of the SSAM under specific network 
scenarios (i.e. different node populations and node No-Churn and Churn settings). 
On the other side, the security strength for every security architecture in SSAM 
was evaluated based on two security criteria. The first one was associated with 
server architecture problems (i.e. Single-Point-of-Failure (SPF) and Single-Point-
of-Compromise (SPC)). The second one represented the level of protocol 
robustness which was be examined by checking whether an authentication 
protocol satisfied certain protection requirements. The simple ranking and 
selecting method (i.e. includes achievement scoring, reciprocal ranking weighting 
(RRW) and weighted averaging) was utilised for facilitating the ranking of 
different security architectures in the SSAM model, based on certain criteria (i.e. 
different requirements). The applicability of the proposed methodology in this 
study was substantiated by using three distinct real case scenarios. The results 
generated from implementing this methodology would help MANET developers 
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to choose the best security alternatives matching the requirements of the context 
being considered. 
7.2 Research Contribution 
The study of this thesis produces three significant contributions. These 
contributions are distinguished with different themes (a methodology, a 
framework and SSAM) and analysed next. 
7.2.1  Methodology Contribution 
The main contribution of this study is a methodological approach whose mission 
is to describe how to evaluate and find the best suited security architecture for 
MANETs in a particular operational level that comply with security strength, 
performance and application context requirements and also handles MANET 
constraints effectively. The structure of this approach is established on the 
conceptual multi-dimensional security framework which is considered the second 
contribution in this thesis. This approach consists of four well-organised steps (see 
Section 4.5, 6.4 and 6.5) which can be used as a roadmap for MANET developers 
to produce a set of guidelines that can support decision making on selecting an 
appropriate security solution fitting their applications in MANETs. In this 
approach, simulation and certain ranking techniques are incorporated for 
implementation and evaluation purposes. This proposed methodology can 
contribute to the design evaluation knowledge for MANETs. 
7.2.2  Security Framework Contribution 
The conceptual multi-dimensional security framework for MANETs proposed in 
this research is the second contribution. This well-structured framework is 
intended to help to recognise the roles of different dimensions (i.e. operational 
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level, security components, security strength, performance, and the context of 
MANET constraints and application settings) in the development of a 
security/trust infrastructure at the service level (or any operational level) of 
MANETs. Also, this framework can be used to establish a better understanding 
about relationships and dependencies among those dimensions. Finally, the 
framework leverages a design approach (i.e. building blocks of a security/trust 
infrastructure) which enables MANET security developers to design and 
standardise an effective security solution for MANETs. 
7.2.3  SSAM Contribution (Model and Tool) 
 Both SSAM model and its implementation (i.e. a simulation tool) are considered 
the third contribution in this research.  Firstly, the design of SSAM, which is 
based on Server-based Security Architectures for MANETs (SSAM), is created to 
offer a suite of different security architectures. These particular security 
architectures can typically be applied in the service level of MANETs for 
deploying a certain security/trust service. In addition, the proposed security 
architectures are established upon four different types of authority servers (i.e. 
CAS, TASs, D\CAS and DASs) and the three different standard authentication 
protocols (i.e. X509 1WP, 2WP and 3WP) for providing membership certificates 
to user nodes in MANETs. The novelty of this model is to present versatile 
security architectures, especially the hybrid and hierarchical ones (e.g. CAS_TAS, 
CAS_TAS_DAS, and TAS_DAS) catering for an enhancement in security service 
availability and utilisation. Besides, two new strategies of calling (i.e. All At Once 
– AAO and In Priority Sequence – IPS) are suggested for the hybrid and 
hierarchical security architectures for flexibility purposes.  
Secondly, the  SSAM tool offers an open simulation model  which is 
implemented in C++ using the OMNeT++  simulator for performance and 
communication testing. This tool can be reused by MANET practitioners in other 
scenarios or be furthered developed. However, this tool also promotes a new 
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feature to the area of MANET simulation through considering  the  “No-Churn” 
and “Churn” models  which represent the cases of  growing and shrinking 
MANETs, stemming from node joining  (i.e. arrivals) and node churning (i.e. a 
node lifetime and leaving). In addition, incorporating two different fixed and base-
2 exponential interval models for the re-authentication process in the SSAM tool 
(as shown in Section 5.3.3.2) is considered advantageous as this can improve the 
success rate in calling server. 
7.3 The Research Aim and Objectives Revisited  
There are a number of different scopes affecting the design of SSAM (i.e. server 
architectures and authentication protocols, etc.) in the service level of MANETs. 
Developing a security solution for a given MANET often requires an insight into 
different issues which are an operational level, security, performance and the 
contexts of MANET constraints and application settings. Therefore, the main aim 
of this research is to develop a methodological approach that enables MANET 
developers to choose the best appropriate server-based security architecture that 
satisfies the security, performance and context requirements of a given 
application. Table 7-1 present how the core chapter’s achievements of this thesis 
have successfully met the claimed research objectives specified in Section 1.2. 
Objective Chapter Achievements 
Objective 1:  Conduct a literature 
review to evaluate the current and most 
common security fundamentals and 
authoritarian trust models in the 
MANET domain to highlight their 
capabilities, requirements and 
limitations which will be a cornerstone 
for developing the proposed approach 
in the aim of this study 
The first objective was achieved in 
Chapter 2: 
Several issues, related to MANETs 
(characteristics, challenges, and 
applications) and security (security 
requirements, threats and techniques) 
were highlighted. Also, various exiting 
credential-based trust models were 
analysed, shown in Figure 2-6.  
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Objective 2: Design a conceptual 
security framework for identifying the 
building blocks of the proposed 
approach of this study: the security 
operational level design; the 
security/trust infrastructure; security 
strength; performance; context and 
addressing the relationship between 
them as well as establishing this 
approach.  
The second objective was achieved in 
Chapter 4 –part A:  
The conceptual security framework 
was developed, based on considering 
operational security level design 
(shown in Figure 4-2), the building 
blocks of the security/trust 
infrastructure (shown in Figure 4-3), 
the influential dimensions of security 
strength, performance and MANET 
context (shown in Figure 4-4). This 
framework constructed the proposed 
methodological approach (shown in 
Figure 4-5).  
Objective3: Design a new security 
model of server-based security 
architectures for MANETs (SSAM), 
based on the components of the 
security/trust infrastructure for the 
service level of MANETs and also for 
checking the applicability of the 
proposed approach designed in 
pervious objectives. 
The third objective was achieved in 
Chapter 4 –part B:  
The SSAM model was designed 
(shown in Figure 4-6) and its 
components were formulated (i.e. 
server architecture, authentication 
protocol, cryptosystem, credential, 
strategy of calling and MANET 
settings). Also, the activity, 
communication and process models 
for SSAM were presented. 
Objective 4: Develop a simulation 
model for the proposed server-based 
security architectures for MANETs 
(SSAM) and experimentally test them 
under different scenarios using a 
The forth objective was achieved in 
Chapter 5:  
The SSAM was implemented using 
the C++-based OMENT++ simulator. 
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network simulator in order to 
understand the cost of applying them on 
the performance and communication of 
MANETs, i.e. to create a performance 
evaluation model. 
Important configurations were defined 
to prepare the model for 
experimentation. Several experiments 
were performed to compare the 
performance and communication of 
different security architectures in 
SSAM under different MANET 
scenarios.  
Objective 5: Develop the proposed 
approach based on the results collected 
from the simulation experiments from 
the previous objective and the 
consideration of the other security 
strength and context requirements. 
 
These objectives were achieved in 
Chapter 6:  
The results from the conducted 
experimentation in pervious chapter 
were analysed and presented. The 
Security strength in SSAM was 
examined. The methodological 
approach was validated by applying 
SSAM in three different real case 
scenarios. 
Objective 6: Evaluate the proposed 
approach through the use of real case 
scenarios so as to demonstrate and 
validate the benefit and value of the 
approach. 
Table  7-1: Research Objectives Vs Chapter Achievements   
7.4 Research Limitations and Future Directions 
This research was conducted in the view of some assumptions and considerations 
that entail some research limitations listed as follows: 
1- Nevertheless, specific security architectures in SSAM primarily comprising of 
different server architectures and authentication protocols for MANETs was 
sensibly nominated to be evaluated for this study; there is a study limitation of 
the number of those evaluated architectures. It is clear that there are other 
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security architectures (e.g. clustered ones) and protocols (e.g. SSL\TLS, etc.) 
that can be covered and expand the scope of security infrastructures in this 
research. 
2- In this study, only one type of a cryptosystem (i.e. asymmetric RSA) and one 
type of a credential (i.e. X.509-v3 certificate) were exploited with a 
generalised processing cost for performance testing although there are several 
types of those cryptographic functions with different computation and  
configurations costs. 
3- Using limited case scenarios and MANET settings that incorporated in the 
simulation model of the SSAM model, for examples:   
- Covering only one type of a mobility pattern – i.e. the steady-state random 
waypoint mobility. 
- Authority servers were not mobile. Also, the distributed and hybrid server 
architectures used a fixed and small number of distributed servers as their 
servers are presumed to exist in a particular region within the playground. 
- Nodes in use of security architecture in SSAM have followed a general 
model of arrivals and churn (e.g. Poisson Process) because of the lack of 
real dataset about node interest that represents the node behaviour. There is 
a demand of obtaining an empirical dataset which may be translated into the 
statistical model to be used in simulation of MANET node lifecycle.  
 
Apart from limitation discussed above which may require a future work, there are 
also other future research opportunities that would extend this study as follows: 
 
• Using other new decision making methods for ranking and selection in the 
evaluation stage of the proposed methodological approach. 
• Investigating the effect of applying the behaviour-monitored trust 
management along with the credential-based trust management that has been 
covered in this study on network performance and communication. 
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• In this study, investigating SSAM model was only on a side of obtaining a 
membership certificates from particular security servers. However, it is vital to 
take into account the use of these certificates (between user nodes and service 
provider nodes) to complete the picture of the usage side.    
• As this study focuses on a usage side of the SSAM model, it is important to 
consider the management side of the SSAM model, such as handling key 
server share update and server aliveness.  
• SSAM Future research can be directed towards enhancing the capabilities of 
the SSAM simulation prototype by upgrading it with new features and 
settings, for example:   
- Investigate power consumption in MANET nodes (i.e. battery models 
tailored with cryptographic processing and communications costs). 
- Test SSAM under different traffic models (multimedia streaming, web 
browsing etc.).  
- Apply other authentication communication protocols, such as SSL\TLS with 
TCP, etc.  
- Tackle different numbers of servers in the distributed security architectures 
in SSAM as this study considered only maximum seven servers. 
- Make use of other mobility patterns especially traced ones such as Gauss 
Markov, Manhattan Grid, and Reference Point Group Mobility models.  
- Take advantage of other different transport protocols - e.g. TCP, etc. and 
routing protocols - e.g. DSR, OLSR, DSDV, etc. 
However, extending SSAM may entail some complexities and problems. Even 
though the SSAM tool is modular-based, adapting a new module to this tool, 
especially for handling more functions of routing, mobility, churn and power 
may require some considerations, and few new code amendments and 
configurations. For example, using proactive routing protocols (e.g. OLSR and 
DSDV) in a MANET needs to consider the time delay for updating a routing 
table of a new joining node, before this node becomes a part of the network 
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and can call a certain set of security servers within a pre-deployed security 
architecture. Involving other different protocols and security architectures in 
the SSAM tool might introduce new components (e.g. additional messages or 
servers) which need to be integrated and consistently linked up with the 
existed components of SSAM tool. Therefore, it is important to make sure that 
any new amendment to a certain module in the SSAM tool would not conflict 
with the functionality of other modules. 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
Security for MANETs is still a dilemma that obstructs development and 
acceptance. This research has basically investigated the variety of existing 
security architectures in the SSAM model to create more in-depth understanding 
about their suitability into different MANET contexts at the service operational 
level. The approach of this study is intended to provide a strategy along with 
guidelines for how to consider the better security architecture that satisfies the 
settings and requirements of given MANET context. This arguably would aid 
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A.1 The BonnMotion Tool 
1- How to install the BonnMotion application? 
Please find its manual available online in the following links: 
http://sys.cs.uos.de/bonnmotion/doc/BonnMotion_Docu.pdf 
2- How to generate a trace file for a particular mobility model using the 
BonnMotion tool? 
We should create and initialise a parameter file (*.params) which includes all 
configuration parameters about a specific mobility scenario. Since this study 
depends on the steady-state Random Waypoint model, the parameters need to be 
adjusted: the type of mobility model, a number of nodes, simulation time, space, 
speed and pause time. In addition, there are different scenarios having different a 
number of nodes (100, 250, and 500 nodes) in this study, so it is required to 
prepare three parameter files as following: 
The *.params File1 
Content (100 Nodes) 
The *.params File2 
Content (250 Nodes) 
The *.params File3 































Figure A.1: Different BonnMotion configurations (params files) 
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After creating these *.params files, we will produce the actual trace or movements 
files for each scenario and also each one must be replicated 30 times according to 
the predefined a number of replications required for each runs in simulation. Since 
this tool relies on a certain random generator along with a seed for generating 
random positions and movements, every repeat for the same *.params file  
without defining the seed parameter would produce a different trace file scenario 
as it makes use of different seeds in every replication. We have coded a bat file to 
run BonnMotion application and repeats n time the same *.params file for each of 
three scenario discussed above.  
FOR /L %%A IN (0,1,29) DO 
bm -f MySteadyStateWPMobSenario%%A -I  SteadyStateWPMobility.params 
SteadyStateRandomWaypoint 
Figure A.6: The *.Bat file for creating trace files 
After running the bat file indicating to the *.params file, thirty (*.movements) 
trace files will be created to represent thirty different replications for one run. 
Also, these steps will be repeated to the other scenarios 250 and 500 nodes. 










A.2 Node NED File (The Node-Level Structure) 




    parameters: 
        @node(); 
        int numTcpApps = default(0); 
        int numUdpApps = default(0);       
@display("i=device/pocketpc_s;bgb=395,372"); 
    gates: 
        input radioIn @directIn; 
    submodules: 
 
        notificationBoard: NotificationBoard { 
            parameters: 
                @display("p=60,70"); 
        } 
 
        interfaceTable: InterfaceTable { 
            parameters: 
                @display("p=60,154"); 
        } 
        routingTable: RoutingTable { 
            parameters: 
                IPForward = true; 
                routerId = ""; 
                routingFile = routingFile;  
                @display("p=60,230"); 
        } 
        tcpApp[numTcpApps]: <tcpAppType> like TCPApp { 
            parameters: 
                @display("p=170,47"); 
        } 
        tcp: TCP { 
            parameters: 
                @display("p=179,161"); 
        } 
        udpApp[numUdpApps]: <udpAppType> like UDPApp { 
            parameters: 
                @display("p=295,47"); 
        } 
        udp: UDP { 
            parameters: 
                @display("p=279,143"); 
           } 
        networkLayer: NetworkLayerGlobalArp { 
            parameters: 
                proxyARP = false; 
                globalARP = true;  
                @display("p=256,230;q=queue"); 
            gates: 
                ifIn[1]; 
                ifOut[1]; 
        } 
        manetrouting: ManetRouting { 
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            @display("p=153,230;i=block/network2"); 
        } 
        wlan: Ieee80211gNicAdhoc { 
            parameters: 
                @display("p=256,310;q=queue"); 
        } 
        mobility: <mobilityType> like BasicMobility { 
            parameters: 
                @display("p=153,301;i=block/cogwheel"); 
        } 
         
    connections allowunconnected: 
        for i=0..numTcpApps-1 { 
            tcpApp[i].tcpOut --> tcp.appIn++; 
            tcpApp[i].tcpIn <-- tcp.appOut++; 
        } 
 
        tcp.ipOut --> networkLayer.tcpIn; 
        tcp.ipIn <-- networkLayer.TCPOut; 
 
        for i=0..numUdpApps-1 { 
            udpApp[i].udpOut --> udp.appIn++; 
            udpApp[i].udpIn <-- udp.appOut++; 
        } 
         
        udp.ipOut --> networkLayer.udpIn; 
        udp.ipIn <-- networkLayer.udpOut;    
 
        networkLayer.MANETOut --> manetrouting.from_ip; 
        networkLayer.MANETIn <-- manetrouting.to_ip; 
 
        // connections to network outside 
        radioIn --> wlan.radioIn; 
        wlan.uppergateOut --> networkLayer.ifIn[0]; 
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Appendix B 
B.1. The Number of Replication Tables and Charts 
 Round Tip Time 
    

























1 83.49881476 83.50 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 81.78117972 82.64 1.215 71.73 93.55 13.20% 
3 100.2866359 88.52 10.224 63.12 113.92 28.69% 
4 58.42857004 81.00 17.208 53.62 108.38 33.80% 
5 67.53103665 78.31 16.073 58.35 98.26 25.49% 
6 88.49828636 80.00 14.967 64.30 95.71 19.63% 
7 98.84478482 82.70 15.407 68.45 96.94 17.23% 
8 81.82966404 82.59 14.267 70.66 94.52 14.44% 
9 94.62292974 83.92 13.936 73.21 94.64 12.76% 
10 88.04561784 84.34 13.203 74.89 93.78 11.20% 
11 84.76434445 84.38 12.526 75.96 92.79 9.97% 
12 87.79690215 84.66 11.984 77.05 92.28 8.99% 
13 87.33322957 84.87 11.498 77.92 91.81 8.19% 
14 95.13210013 85.60 11.382 79.03 92.17 7.68% 
15 84.64344801 85.54 10.971 79.46 91.61 7.10% 
16 64.13835689 84.20 11.873 77.87 90.52 7.51% 
17 70.83705828 83.41 11.944 77.27 89.55 7.36% 
18 59.79512301 82.10 12.855 75.71 88.49 7.79% 
19 72.77746642 81.61 12.674 75.50 87.72 7.49% 
20 89.71019502 82.01 12.469 76.18 87.85 7.12% 
21 78.39385745 81.84 12.179 76.30 87.39 6.77% 
22 76.02534807 81.58 11.950 76.28 86.88 6.49% 
23 106.62831 82.67 12.790 77.14 88.20 6.69% 
24 87.88964384 82.88 12.554 77.58 88.19 6.40% 
25 75.77491896 82.60 12.372 77.49 87.71 6.18% 
26 98.02632687 83.19 12.494 78.15 88.24 6.07% 
27 78.18876649 83.01 12.289 78.15 87.87 5.86% 
28 79.20968365 82.87 12.081 78.19 87.56 5.65% 
29 87.19402313 83.02 11.890 78.50 87.54 5.45% 
30 81.84488823 82.98 11.685 78.62 87.35 5.26% 
The Confidence Interval Method: Results of RTT in the case of 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO with 100-Node and No-Churn for 30 replications. 
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The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and cumulative mean of 
RTT in the case of no node churning 
    

























1 126.082017 126.08 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 127.256032 126.67 0.830 119.21 134.13 5.89% 
3 188.046861 147.13 35.441 59.09 235.17 59.84% 
4 135.960525 144.34 29.472 97.44 191.23 32.49% 
5 90.6785896 133.60 35.032 90.11 177.10 32.56% 
6 128.455586 132.75 31.404 99.79 165.70 24.83% 
7 117.163723 130.52 29.267 103.45 157.59 20.74% 
8 126.052563 129.96 27.142 107.27 152.65 17.46% 
9 133.409343 130.35 25.415 110.81 149.88 14.99% 
10 109.145182 128.23 24.881 110.43 146.02 13.88% 
11 130.713262 128.45 23.617 112.59 144.32 12.35% 
12 129.841657 128.57 22.521 114.26 142.88 11.13% 
13 146.531122 129.95 22.130 116.58 143.32 10.29% 
14 131.860576 130.09 21.268 117.81 142.37 9.44% 
15 123.012032 129.61 20.576 118.22 141.01 8.79% 
16 159.869585 131.50 21.269 120.17 142.84 8.62% 
17 90.5187756 129.09 22.867 117.34 140.85 9.11% 
18 121.235243 128.66 22.261 117.59 139.73 8.60% 
19 123.824514 128.40 21.663 117.96 138.84 8.13% 
20 97.8777668 126.88 22.162 116.50 137.25 8.18% 
21 154.205019 128.18 22.409 117.98 138.38 7.96% 
22 109.874724 127.35 22.214 117.50 137.20 7.73% 
23 153.832231 128.50 22.395 118.81 138.18 7.54% 
24 104.520787 127.50 22.443 118.02 136.98 7.43% 































3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO,  No Churn, 100 Nodes
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26 167.157884 127.91 23.663 118.35 137.46 7.47% 
27 106.289055 127.11 23.573 117.78 136.43 7.34% 
28 139.227966 127.54 23.246 118.52 136.55 7.07% 
29 112.907671 127.03 22.988 118.29 135.78 6.88% 
30 138.860912 127.43 22.691 118.96 135.90 6.65% 
The Confidence Interval Method: Results of RTT in the case of 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO with 100-Node and Churn for 30 replications. 
 
 
The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and cumulative mean of 
RTT in the case of node churning 
 Communication Overhead:  
    




























1 19636 19635.77 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 19433 19534.33 143.453 18245.46 20823.20 6.60% 
3 23044 20704.34 2029.046 15663.91 25744.77 24.34% 
4 19384 20374.19 1783.444 17536.33 23212.05 13.93% 
5 20073 20313.93 1550.374 18388.89 22238.98 9.48% 
6 21632 20533.62 1487.450 18972.64 22094.61 7.60% 






























(3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO, With Churn, 100 Nodes) 
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8 20751 20430.37 1315.502 19330.58 21530.16 5.38% 
9 21105 20505.36 1250.937 19543.81 21466.92 4.69% 
10 19861 20440.89 1196.890 19584.68 21297.09 4.19% 
11 21872 20571.02 1214.732 19754.95 21387.09 3.97% 
12 21294 20631.28 1176.861 19883.54 21379.02 3.62% 
13 19516 20545.48 1168.456 19839.39 21251.57 3.44% 
14 20721 20558.03 1123.598 19909.29 21206.78 3.16% 
15 21536 20623.26 1111.809 20007.56 21238.96 2.99% 
16 19759 20569.21 1095.649 19985.38 21153.04 2.84% 
17 19633 20514.17 1084.865 19956.38 21071.95 2.72% 
18 18443 20399.12 1160.145 19822.20 20976.05 2.83% 
19 19011 20326.08 1171.555 19761.40 20890.75 2.78% 
20 19826 20301.06 1145.784 19764.81 20837.30 2.64% 
21 19920 20282.91 1119.866 19773.15 20792.66 2.51% 
22 20672 20300.59 1096.021 19814.64 20786.54 2.39% 
23 21011 20331.48 1081.021 19864.01 20798.95 2.30% 
24 20763 20349.46 1060.921 19901.47 20797.45 2.20% 
25 20615 20360.07 1039.938 19930.80 20789.33 2.11% 
26 20708 20373.44 1021.205 19960.97 20785.91 2.02% 
27 19586 20344.27 1012.781 19943.63 20744.91 1.97% 
28 20675 20356.08 995.810 19969.94 20742.21 1.90% 
29 19771 20335.89 983.889 19961.64 20710.14 1.84% 
30 20630 20345.70 968.268 19984.14 20707.26 1.78% 
The Confidence Interval Method: Results of Communication Overheads in the 
case of 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO with 100-Node and No-Churn for 30 
replications. 
 
The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and cumulative mean of 














































(3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO,  No Churn, 100 Nodes) 
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1 19325 19324.86 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 19481 19402.91 110.371 18411.27 20394.55 5.11% 
3 23036 20613.90 2098.950 15399.82 25827.98 25.29% 
4 21157 20749.75 1735.189 17988.68 23510.82 13.31% 
5 17536 20107.00 2079.374 17525.12 22688.88 12.84% 
6 20368 20150.45 1862.892 18195.47 22105.44 9.70% 
7 19172 20010.67 1740.327 18401.14 21620.21 8.04% 
8 20204 20034.82 1612.677 18686.59 21383.05 6.73% 
9 20226 20056.04 1509.863 18895.45 21216.62 5.79% 
10 19679 20018.34 1428.496 18996.45 21040.22 5.10% 
11 21627 20164.61 1439.412 19197.60 21131.62 4.80% 
12 20520 20194.26 1376.263 19319.83 21068.70 4.33% 
13 21387 20286.04 1358.591 19465.06 21107.03 4.05% 
14 20520 20302.78 1306.793 19548.26 21057.29 3.72% 
15 19717 20263.76 1268.292 19561.40 20966.11 3.47% 
16 21407 20335.23 1258.198 19664.78 21005.68 3.30% 
17 17700 20180.22 1375.724 19472.88 20887.55 3.51% 
18 19715 20154.38 1339.142 19488.44 20820.32 3.30% 
19 19910 20141.54 1302.616 19513.70 20769.38 3.12% 
20 18560 20062.48 1316.241 19446.46 20678.50 3.07% 
21 22207 20164.62 1365.629 19542.99 20786.25 3.08% 
22 19348 20127.50 1344.041 19531.59 20723.42 2.96% 
23 21633 20192.97 1350.155 19609.12 20776.82 2.89% 
24 18128 20106.93 1386.122 19521.62 20692.24 2.91% 
25 17908 20018.98 1426.410 19430.19 20607.78 2.94% 
26 22003 20095.30 1450.758 19509.33 20681.28 2.92% 
27 18282 20028.16 1464.748 19448.72 20607.59 2.89% 
28 20805 20055.90 1444.843 19495.65 20616.15 2.79% 
29 17893 19981.33 1474.539 19420.44 20542.21 2.81% 
30 20936 20013.16 1459.347 19468.24 20558.09 2.72% 
The Confidence Interval Method: Results of Communication Overheads in the 
case of 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO with 100-Node and Churn for 30 replications. 
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The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and cumulative mean of 
Communication Overheads in the case of node churning 
 Failure Frequency:  
    

























1 0.60073938 0.60 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 0.6731342 0.64 0.051 0.18 1.10 72.21% 
3 0.45541597 0.58 0.111 0.30 0.85 47.78% 
4 0.57348419 0.58 0.091 0.43 0.72 25.03% 
5 0.86246911 0.63 0.150 0.45 0.82 29.48% 
6 0.57140248 0.62 0.137 0.48 0.77 23.05% 
7 0.46423855 0.60 0.139 0.47 0.73 21.34% 
8 0.63529531 0.60 0.129 0.50 0.71 17.82% 
9 0.53147471 0.60 0.123 0.50 0.69 15.85% 
10 0.55944475 0.59 0.117 0.51 0.68 14.06% 
11 0.5629248 0.59 0.111 0.52 0.66 12.63% 
12 0.73387799 0.60 0.114 0.53 0.67 11.99% 
13 0.76509566 0.61 0.118 0.54 0.69 11.58% 
14 0.77337041 0.63 0.121 0.56 0.70 11.15% 
15 0.56281647 0.62 0.118 0.56 0.69 10.48% 
16 0.73309827 0.63 0.117 0.57 0.69 9.92% 
17 0.50978506 0.62 0.117 0.56 0.68 9.67% 
18 0.64436495 0.62 0.114 0.57 0.68 9.06% 
19 0.53853186 0.62 0.112 0.56 0.67 8.73% 
20 0.65015359 0.62 0.109 0.57 0.67 8.25% 
21 0.72604383 0.63 0.109 0.58 0.67 7.93% 
22 0.57864836 0.62 0.107 0.58 0.67 7.60% 
23 0.52505412 0.62 0.106 0.57 0.66 7.43% 













































(3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO, With Churn, 100 Nodes) 
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25 0.65918871 0.62 0.103 0.58 0.67 6.85% 
26 0.69972266 0.63 0.102 0.59 0.67 6.60% 
27 0.60637323 0.63 0.101 0.59 0.67 6.35% 
28 0.43933969 0.62 0.105 0.58 0.66 6.56% 
29 0.48974322 0.61 0.106 0.57 0.65 6.54% 
30 0.59089637 0.61 0.104 0.58 0.65 6.32% 
The Confidence Interval Method: Results of Failure Frequency the case of 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO with 100-Node and No-Churn for 30 replications. 
 
The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and cumulative mean of 
Failure Frequency in the case of no node churning 
    



























1 0.75808909 0.76 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 0.84195966 0.80 0.059 0.27 1.33 66.60% 
3 0.72567907 0.78 0.060 0.63 0.92 19.23% 
4 0.86831985 0.80 0.068 0.69 0.91 13.47% 
5 0.98397041 0.84 0.102 0.71 0.96 15.08% 
6 0.90044284 0.85 0.095 0.75 0.95 11.73% 
7 0.84911737 0.85 0.086 0.77 0.93 9.43% 
8 0.88266914 0.85 0.081 0.78 0.92 7.95% 
9 0.93565921 0.86 0.081 0.80 0.92 7.21% 
10 0.96761638 0.87 0.083 0.81 0.93 6.84% 
11 1.02750841 0.89 0.092 0.82 0.95 6.98% 
12 0.99177006 0.89 0.093 0.84 0.95 6.60% 
13 0.86441505 0.89 0.089 0.84 0.95 6.05% 
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15 0.75446905 0.88 0.090 0.83 0.93 5.65% 
16 0.88787138 0.88 0.087 0.84 0.93 5.25% 
17 0.84087753 0.88 0.085 0.84 0.93 4.96% 
18 0.77926423 0.88 0.086 0.83 0.92 4.88% 
19 0.92307735 0.88 0.084 0.84 0.92 4.62% 
20 0.87770454 0.88 0.082 0.84 0.92 4.37% 
21 0.92988431 0.88 0.081 0.84 0.92 4.17% 
22 0.8535507 0.88 0.079 0.84 0.91 3.98% 
23 0.78380083 0.88 0.080 0.84 0.91 3.93% 
24 0.79288786 0.87 0.080 0.84 0.91 3.86% 
25 0.948151 0.87 0.079 0.84 0.91 3.75% 
26 0.95361802 0.88 0.079 0.85 0.91 3.65% 
27 0.77250133 0.87 0.080 0.84 0.91 3.64% 
28 0.71477908 0.87 0.084 0.84 0.90 3.77% 
29 0.88147031 0.87 0.083 0.84 0.90 3.63% 
30 0.76745807 0.87 0.084 0.83 0.90 3.61% 
The Confidence Interval Method: Results of Failure Frequency the case of 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO with 100-Node and Churn for 30 replications. 
 
The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and cumulative mean of 
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 RTT-STDev:  
    


























1 102.681256 102.68 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 97.1252856 99.90 3.929 64.61 135.20 35.33% 
3 95.3094745 98.37 3.841 88.83 107.91 9.70% 
4 77.77915 93.22 10.763 76.10 110.35 18.37% 
5 94.6413099 93.51 9.343 81.91 105.11 12.41% 
6 88.3666459 92.65 8.616 83.61 101.69 9.76% 
7 107.380728 94.75 9.636 85.84 103.67 9.41% 
8 94.986537 94.78 8.922 87.32 102.24 7.87% 
9 109.433696 96.41 9.669 88.98 103.84 7.71% 
10 106.61279 97.43 9.670 90.51 104.35 7.10% 
11 89.6175139 96.72 9.472 90.36 103.08 6.58% 
12 89.4899075 96.12 9.269 90.23 102.01 6.13% 
13 108.285063 97.05 9.494 91.32 102.79 5.91% 
14 99.2592639 97.21 9.141 91.93 102.49 5.43% 
15 97.8462883 97.25 8.810 92.38 102.13 5.02% 
16 79.3747095 96.14 9.614 91.01 101.26 5.33% 
17 86.3251549 95.56 9.608 90.62 100.50 5.17% 
18 86.1495236 95.04 9.581 90.27 99.80 5.01% 
19 91.4766939 94.85 9.347 90.34 99.35 4.75% 
20 113.493686 95.78 10.007 91.10 100.47 4.89% 
21 90.0730483 95.51 9.833 91.03 99.99 4.69% 
22 99.4121463 95.69 9.632 91.42 99.96 4.46% 
23 111.423429 96.37 9.966 92.06 100.68 4.47% 
24 92.8019945 96.22 9.774 92.10 100.35 4.29% 
25 86.7215928 95.84 9.756 91.82 99.87 4.20% 
26 98.1360501 95.93 9.569 92.07 99.80 4.03% 
27 96.7186584 95.96 9.384 92.25 99.67 3.87% 
28 93.1835191 95.86 9.224 92.28 99.44 3.73% 
29 104.76482 96.17 9.207 92.67 99.67 3.64% 
30 103.395857 96.41 9.143 92.99 99.82 3.54% 
The Confidence Interval Method: Results of RTT-STDev the case of 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO with 100-Node and No-Churn for 30 replications. 
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The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and cumulative mean of 
RTT-STDev in the case of no node churning 
 
    


























1 108.549528 108.55 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 112.302039 110.43 2.653 86.59 134.27 21.59% 
3 88.0597927 102.97 13.049 70.56 135.38 31.48% 
4 96.5018923 101.35 11.134 83.64 119.07 17.48% 
5 96.8323523 100.45 9.852 88.22 112.68 12.18% 
6 98.4404086 100.11 8.850 90.83 109.40 9.28% 
7 100.066229 100.11 8.079 92.64 107.58 7.46% 
8 99.4203286 100.02 7.484 93.77 106.28 6.26% 
9 123.597927 102.64 10.525 94.55 110.73 7.88% 
10 94.2117298 101.80 10.274 94.45 109.15 7.22% 
11 95.8901422 101.26 9.909 94.60 107.92 6.57% 
12 101.146486 101.25 9.448 95.25 107.25 5.93% 
13 107.191111 101.71 9.194 96.15 107.26 5.46% 
14 99.7369504 101.57 8.849 96.46 106.68 5.03% 
15 99.0006672 101.40 8.553 96.66 106.13 4.67% 
16 104.731066 101.60 8.305 97.18 106.03 4.36% 
17 97.4155113 101.36 8.105 97.19 105.53 4.11% 
18 108.279673 101.74 8.031 97.75 105.74 3.93% 
19 101.497978 101.73 7.805 97.97 105.49 3.70% 
20 100.928873 101.69 7.598 98.13 105.25 3.50% 
21 89.7031045 101.12 7.854 97.54 104.69 3.54% 
22 101.192756 101.12 7.665 97.72 104.52 3.36% 




































Number of replications 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO,  No Churn, 100 Nodes) 
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24 100.315393 100.98 7.345 97.88 104.08 3.07% 
25 98.1706019 100.87 7.212 97.89 103.85 2.95% 
26 96.2420345 100.69 7.124 97.81 103.57 2.86% 
27 102.613597 100.76 6.996 97.99 103.53 2.75% 
28 102.692951 100.83 6.875 98.17 103.50 2.64% 
29 112.14903 101.22 7.070 98.53 103.91 2.66% 
30 100.739418 101.21 6.948 98.61 103.80 2.56% 
The Confidence Interval Method: Results of RTT-STDev the case of 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO with 100-Node and Churn for 30 replications. 
The plot represents the 95% confidence intervals and cumulative mean of 











































(3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO,  With Churn, 100 Nodes) 
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B.2. Certificate Acquisition 
B.2.1. The Certificate Type   
 
The percentage of different certificate type obtainability in the case of the 
“250 Nodes No-Churn” scenario. 
 
The percentage of different certificate type obtainability in the case of the 

















































DAS_PRC 7.99% 8.15% 8.14% 5.63% 5.94% 6.30% 12.03% 12.91% 13.94%
TAS_PRC 6.90% 8.59% 13.51% 3.56% 3.94% 5.48% 6.12% 7.68% 12.05% 3.46% 3.89% 4.65% 87.97% 87.09% 86.06%







Certificate Types - No Churn

















































DAS_PRC 3.98% 4.24% 4.20% 2.73% 2.80% 2.97% 5.55% 5.90% 6.13%
TAS_PRC 7.03% 9.16% 15.87% 1.92% 2.30% 3.64% 7.19% 8.79% 15.02% 1.88% 2.30% 3.62% 94.45% 94.10% 93.87%







Certificate Types - No Churn
(Population = 500 Nodes , λ= 1 node/min, No Churn)
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The percentage of different certificate type obtainability in the case of the 
“250 Nodes Churn” scenario. 
 
 
The percentage of different certificate type obtainability in the case of the 











































DAS_PRC 39.24% 38.13% 43.39% 33.75% 36.08% 36.61% 99.79% 99.57% 99.94%
TAS_PRC 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.13% 0.10% 0.07% 1.85% 2.39% 1.26% 3.41% 2.87% 2.08% 0.21% 0.43% 0.06%







Certificate Types - Churn
(Population = 250 Nodes , λ= 1 node/min, Churn (All Failed Authenticated Nodes & 50% of Authenticated Nodes 











































DAS_PRC 15.56% 15.78% 17.10% 12.60% 13.12% 14.16% 54.61% 54.55% 74.67%
TAS_PRC 2.48% 2.99% 2.15% 5.61% 5.09% 5.20% 5.10% 5.98% 8.65% 5.08% 4.87% 5.45% 45.39% 45.45% 25.33%







Certificate Types - Churn
(Population = 500 Nodes , λ= 1 node/min, Churn (All Failed Authenticated Nodes & 50% of Authenticated 
Nodes follow the TruncNormal distribution, lifetime [mean = 600s, STDev = 200s])
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B.2.2. The Certificate Count 
 
The percentage of certificate count obtainability in the case of the “250-Nodes 
No-Churn” scenario. 
 








































Obtaining Two Types of Certificates 79% 67% 48% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 69% 59% 42% 0% 0% 0%












Certificates Acquisition Count  - No Churn








































Obtaining Two Types of Certificates 97% 84% 55% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 94% 78% 52% 0% 0% 0%












Certificates Acquisition Count  - No Churn
(Population = 500 Nodes , λ= 1 node/min, No Churn)
















































Obtaining Two Types of Certificates 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 4% 2% 0% 0% 0%












Certificates Acquisition Count - Churn





































Obtaining Two Types of Certificates 9% 8% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 38% 33% 22% 0% 0% 0%












Certificates Acquisition Count  - Churn
(Population = 500 Nodes , λ= 1 node/min, with Churn)
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B.3. Time Series for the Common Main Metrics 
As the actual time-based scattered results are aggregated from all replications of 
each experiment, the results of each experiment that are presented in this section 
are estimated according to the so-called Moving Average with a predefined 
smooth factor (α = 0.05) in order to notice the output data variances across time 
and also for showing the result trend of each experiment.   












































No Churn -Time [Sec]




250 Nodes 500 Nodes












































No Churn - Time [Sec]
No-Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 1WP_TAS_DAS 2WP_TAS_DAS 3WP_TAS_DAS
100 Nodes








































No Churn - Time [Sec]
No-Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS 2WP_CAS 3WP_CAS 1WP_TAS 2WP_TAS 3WP_TAS 1WP_D\CAS 2WP_D\CAS 3WP_D\CAS
100 Nodes
250 Nodes 500 Nodes









































Churn [Three-Level Hierarchical Architectures]







































Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO














































Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
















































No-Churn [Three-Level Hierarchical Architectures]






















































No-Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO
















































No-Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]





























































Churn [Three-Level Hierarchical Architectures]























































Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 1WP_TAS_DAS 2WP_TAS_DAS 3WP_TAS_DAS
100 Nodes 250 Nodes
500 Nodes
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Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]




























No Churn - Time [Sec]
No-Churn [Three-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO
100 Nodes 250 Nodes 500 Nodes






























No Churn - Time [Sec]
No-Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_TAS_DAS 2WP_TAS_DAS 3WP_TAS_DAS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS
























No Churn - Time [Sec]
No-Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS 2WP_CAS 3WP_CAS 1WP_TAS 2WP_TAS 3WP_TAS 1WP_D\CAS 2WP_D\CAS 3WP_D\CAS
100 Nodes 250 Nodes 500 Nodes


































Churn [Three-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO
100 Nodes


























Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO




































Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_D\CAS 2WP_D\CAS 3WP_D\CAS 1WP_CAS 2WP_CAS 3WP_CAS



































No-Churn [Three-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO
100 Nodes 250 Nodes
500 Nodes












































Churn [Three-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO



































No-Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 1WP_TAS_DAS 2WP_TAS_DAS 3WP_TAS_DAS
100 Nodes 250 Nodes
500 Nodes









































Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 1WP_TAS_DAS 2WP_TAS_DAS 3WP_TAS_DAS



































No-Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_D\CAS 2WP_D\CAS 3WP_D\CAS 1WP_CAS 2WP_CAS 3WP_CAS 1WP_TAS 2WP_TAS 3WP_TAS
100 Nodes
250 Nodes 500 Nodes










































Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_D\CAS 2WP_D\CAS 3WP_D\CAS 1WP_CAS 2WP_CAS 3WP_CAS














































































Churn [Three-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO



































Churn [Two-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 1WP_TAS_DAS 2WP_TAS_DAS 3WP_TAS_DAS
100 Nodes 250 Nodes
500 Nodes




































Churn [One-Level Hierarchical Architectures]
1WP_D/CAS 2WP_D/CAS 3WP_D/CAS 1WP_CAS 2WP_CAS 3WP_CAS 1WP_TAS 2WP_TAS 3WP_TAS
100 Nodes 250 Nodes
500 Nodes
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Appendix C 
Success Ratio  
 
Experiment ID = 100 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 16.35% 5.0% 1.0% 14.30% 18.40% 
TAS 0% NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 20.60% 5.0% 1.0% 18.60% 22.60% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 15.73% 4.6% 1.0% 13.70% 17.80% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 15.63% 4.9% 1.0% 13.60% 17.70% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 38.83% 5.7% 1.0% 36.80% 40.90% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 30.07% 6.9% 1.0% 28.00% 32.10% 
D\CAS 50.10% 7.0% 1.0% 48.10% 52.10% 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 13.08% 5.7% 1.1% 10.90% 15.20% 
TAS 0% NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 21.07% 5.1% 1.1% 18.90% 23.20% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 16.13% 4.5% 1.1% 14.00% 18.30% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 14.10% 5.2% 1.1% 12.00% 16.20% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 38.70% 6.1% 1.1% 36.60% 40.80% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 28.13% 5.9% 1.1% 26.00% 30.30% 
D\CAS 49.43% 8.4% 1.1% 47.30% 51.60% 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable:Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 13.18% 6.3% 1.1% 11.10% 15.30% 
TAS 0% NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 14.67% 4.5% 1.1% 12.60% 16.80% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 13.73% 5.2% 1.1% 11.60% 15.80% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 13.07% 4.7% 1.1% 11.00% 15.20% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 30.23% 6.0% 1.1% 28.10% 32.30% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 26.30% 4.9% 1.1% 24.20% 28.40% 
D\CAS 36.73% 8.5% 1.1% 34.60% 38.80% 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
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Experiment ID = 250 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 18.70% 3.6% 1.1% 16.50% 20.90% 
TAS 0% NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 21.74% 4.3% 1.1% 19.50% 24.00% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 17.87% 4.0% 1.1% 15.70% 20.10% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 18.42% 3.6% 1.1% 16.20% 20.60% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 51.77% 8.4% 1.1% 49.60% 54.00% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 45.69% 9.7% 1.1% 43.50% 47.90% 
D\CAS 64.17% 6.2% 1.1% 62.00% 66.40% 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 16.09% 4.2% 1.1% 14.00% 18.20% 
TAS 0% NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 21.91% 3.7% 1.1% 19.80% 24.00% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 17.25% 4.3% 1.1% 15.20% 19.30% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 16.79% 4.3% 1.1% 14.70% 18.90% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 53.34% 7.4% 1.1% 51.30% 55.40% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 43.24% 7.9% 1.1% 41.20% 45.30% 
D\CAS 65.48% 7.0% 1.1% 63.40% 67.60% 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 15.02% 3.7% 1.1% 12.80% 17.20% 
TAS 0% NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 16.30% 4.0% 1.1% 14.10% 18.50% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 14.18% 3.9% 1.1% 12.00% 16.40% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 15.53% 4.5% 1.1% 13.30% 17.70% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 42.97% 8.2% 1.1% 40.80% 45.20% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 39.73% 8.2% 1.1% 37.50% 41.90% 
D\CAS 51.58% 8.0% 1.1% 49.40% 53.80% 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
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Experiment ID = 500 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 





Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 34.92% 9.1% 1.4% 32.10% 37.70% 
TAS 0% NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 45.61% 8.2% 1.4% 42.80% 48.40% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 32.05% 9.6% 1.4% 29.20% 34.90% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 36.90% 10% 1.4% 34.10% 39.70% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 76.59% 4.0% 1.4% 73.80% 79.40% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 70.45% 5.7% 1.4% 67.60% 73.30% 
D\CAS 82.44% 3.3% 1.4% 79.60% 85.30% 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 29.47% 9.7% 1.3% 27.00% 32.00% 
TAS 0% NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 45.47% 6.1% 1.3% 43.00% 47.90% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 32.32% 8.7% 1.3% 29.80% 34.80% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 31.22% 8.1% 1.3% 28.70% 33.70% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 75.25% 4.6% 1.3% 72.80% 77.70% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 69.94% 5.2% 1.3% 67.50% 72.40% 
D\CAS 83.15% 3.5% 1.3% 80.70% 85.60% 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 28.23% 8.7% 1.4% 25.40% 31.00% 
TAS_DAS 32.17% 8.2% 1.4% 29.40% 35.00% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 24.53% 10.3% 1.4% 21.70% 27.30% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 30.11% 9.5% 1.4% 27.30% 32.90% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 70.87% 5.5% 1.4% 68.10% 73.70% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 65.93% 5.9% 1.4% 63.10% 68.70% 
D\CAS 77.21% 4.3% 1.4% 74.40% 80.00% 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
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Experiment ID = 100 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 46.70% 6.9% 1% 44.70% 48.70% 
TAS 27.50% 3.7% 1% 25.50% 29.50% 
TAS_DAS 52.40% 6.2% 1% 50.40% 54.40% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 48.67% 5.3% 1% 46.70% 50.60% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 53.13% 5.0% 1% 51.20% 55.10% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 66.33% 5.9% 1% 64.40% 68.30% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 66.07% 4.8% 1% 64.10% 68.00% 
D\CAS 73.97% 5.3% 1% 72.00% 75.90% 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 45.87% 7.0% 1% 43.90% 47.80% 
TAS 25.77% 3.7% 1% 23.80% 27.70% 
TAS_DAS 51.77% 6.0% 1% 49.80% 53.70% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 48.27% 5.0% 1% 46.30% 50.20% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 52.33% 5.3% 1% 50.40% 54.30% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 66.07% 5.7% 1% 64.10% 68.00% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 65.20% 5.2% 1% 63.20% 67.20% 
D\CAS 73.53% 5.2% 1% 71.60% 75.50% 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 44.00% 6.8% 1% 42.10% 45.90% 
TAS 23.40% 3.3% 1% 21.50% 25.30% 
TAS_DAS 49.43% 5.8% 1% 47.50% 51.40% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 46.63% 5.0% 1% 44.70% 48.60% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 50.53% 5.1% 1% 48.60% 52.50% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 63.77% 5.5% 1% 61.80% 65.70% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 64.07% 4.6% 1% 62.10% 66.00% 
D\CAS 69.57% 5.8% 1% 67.60% 71.50% 
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Experiment ID = 250 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 77.26% 2.6% 0.4% 76.50% 78.00% 
TAS 69.90% 2.0% 0.4% 69.20% 70.60% 
TAS_DAS 79.43% 1.9% 0.4% 78.70% 80.10% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 78.56% 1.8% 0.4% 77.90% 79.30% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 80.99% 2.0% 0.4% 80.30% 81.70% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 85.34% 2.0% 0.4% 84.60% 86.10% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 85.77% 1.6% 0.4% 85.10% 86.50% 
D\CAS 87.85% 1.7% 0.4% 87.10% 88.60% 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 






 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 76.32% 2.8% 0.4% 75.60% 77.10% 
TAS 69.19% 2.1% 0.4% 68.40% 69.90% 
TAS_DAS 79.47% 1.9% 0.4% 78.70% 80.20% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 78.35% 2.0% 0.4% 77.60% 79.10% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 80.53% 2.0% 0.4% 79.80% 81.30% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 85.25% 2.2% 0.4% 84.50% 86.00% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 85.68% 1.8% 0.4% 84.90% 86.40% 
D\CAS 87.68% 1.7% 0.4% 86.90% 88.40% 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 74.72% 2.6% 0.4% 74.00% 75.40% 
TAS 67.62% 2.1% 0.4% 66.90% 68.30% 
TAS_DAS 78.66% 2.2% 0.4% 77.90% 79.40% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 77.42% 1.9% 0.4% 76.70% 78.10% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 79.81% 1.6% 0.4% 79.10% 80.50% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 84.23% 2.0% 0.4% 83.50% 85.00% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 85.06% 1.7% 0.4% 84.30% 85.80% 
D\CAS 86.33% 1.9% 0.4% 85.60% 87.10% 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
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Experiment ID = 500 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 






 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 88.28% 1.3% 0.2% 87.90% 88.60% 
TAS 84.79% 1.1% 0.2% 84.40% 85.20% 
TAS_DAS 89.80% 1.1% 0.2% 89.40% 90.20% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 89.13% 1.0% 0.2% 88.80% 89.50% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 90.47% 0.9% 0.2% 90.10% 90.80% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 92.86% 1.0% 0.2% 92.50% 93.20% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 93.03% 0.8% 0.2% 92.70% 93.40% 
D\CAS 94.26% 0.9% 0.2% 93.90% 94.60% 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 87.70% 1.2% 0.2% 87.30% 88.10% 
TAS 84.41% 1.1% 0.2% 84.00% 84.80% 
TAS_DAS 89.74% 1.1% 0.2% 89.40% 90.10% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 88.91% 1.1% 0.2% 88.50% 89.30% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 90.26% 0.9% 0.2% 89.90% 90.60% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 92.87% 1.0% 0.2% 92.50% 93.20% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 92.83% 0.9% 0.2% 92.50% 93.20% 
D\CAS 94.07% 0.8% 0.2% 93.70% 94.40% 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Success Ratio [%] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 85.95% 1.2% 0.2% 85.60% 86.30% 
TAS 83.80% 1.1% 0.2% 83.40% 84.20% 
TAS_DAS 89.21% 1.0% 0.2% 88.80% 89.60% 
CAS_TAS_AAO 88.57% 1.1% 0.2% 88.20% 88.90% 
CAS_TAS_IPS 89.84% 0.9% 0.2% 89.50% 90.20% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 92.40% 1.0% 0.2% 92.00% 92.80% 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 92.70% 0.9% 0.2% 92.30% 93.10% 
D\CAS 93.42% 0.9% 0.2% 93.10% 93.80% 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 3W 
 
Appendix C  
 XLI 
 
Round Trip Time  
Experiment ID = 100 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 




 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 25.64 6.55 3.88 17.99 33.29 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 231.07 6.55 3.88 223.42 238.72 
CAS_TAS_AAO 16.78 9.10 3.88 9.13 24.43 
CAS_TAS_IPS 25.60 8.10 3.88 17.95 33.25 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 135.14 17.61 3.88 127.49 142.79 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 195.94 50.99 3.88 188.29 203.60 
D\CAS 18.06 4.27 3.88 10.40 25.71 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 33.62 13.95 4.24 25.26 41.98 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 230.60 5.05 4.24 222.24 238.96 
CAS_TAS_AAO 16.14 7.38 4.24 7.78 24.50 
CAS_TAS_IPS 33.74 10.68 4.24 25.38 42.10 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 138.31 19.07 4.24 129.95 146.67 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 214.26 54.85 4.24 205.90 222.62 
D\CAS 17.80 3.59 4.24 9.44 26.16 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 31.23 9.84 4.22 22.91 39.56 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 227.96 8.39 4.22 219.63 236.28 
CAS_TAS_AAO 34.67 10.30 4.22 26.34 42.99 
CAS_TAS_IPS 36.91 14.15 4.22 28.59 45.24 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 127.43 22.69 4.22 119.11 135.75 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 203.41 52.16 4.22 195.09 211.73 
D\CAS 30.92 5.79 4.22 22.60 39.25 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
 
Appendix C  
 XLII 
Experiment ID = 250 Nodes (The Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 27.47 3.99 2.30 22.94 32.01 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 229.26 3.50 2.30 224.73 233.80 
CAS_TAS_AAO 20.60 6.33 2.30 16.07 25.14 
CAS_TAS_IPS 28.56 4.72 2.30 24.02 33.09 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 105.13 15.47 2.30 100.59 109.66 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 175.85 27.82 2.30 171.31 180.38 
D\CAS 17.11 2.63 2.30 12.58 21.64 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 30.22 7.04 2.18 25.92 34.52 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 230.76 3.66 2.18 226.45 235.06 
CAS_TAS_AAO 21.34 5.07 2.18 17.03 25.64 
CAS_TAS_IPS 32.07 7.54 2.18 27.77 36.37 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 103.85 13.82 2.18 99.55 108.16 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 185.69 25.64 2.18 181.39 190.00 
D\CAS 17.87 2.50 2.18 13.57 22.17 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 35.12 7.28 2.69 29.81 40.43 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 228.07 5.41 2.69 222.76 233.38 
CAS_TAS_AAO 33.60 7.46 2.69 28.28 38.91 
CAS_TAS_IPS 33.48 5.82 2.69 28.17 38.79 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 117.44 15.61 2.69 112.13 122.75 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 187.29 33.07 2.69 181.98 192.61 
D\CAS 28.03 3.83 2.69 22.72 33.34 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
 
Appendix C  
 XLIII 
Experiment ID = 500 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 23.90 2.50 2.42 19.13 28.66 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 140.90 30.67 2.42 136.14 145.67 
CAS_TAS_AAO 22.71 3.87 2.42 17.95 27.48 
CAS_TAS_IPS 36.80 6.25 2.42 32.03 41.57 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 48.32 7.36 2.42 43.55 53.09 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 82.46 13.07 2.42 77.70 87.23 
D\CAS 11.88 1.36 2.42 7.11 16.64 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 28.27 3.51 1.88 24.56 31.98 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 142.54 22.12 1.88 138.83 146.25 
CAS_TAS_AAO 23.86 3.65 1.88 20.15 27.58 
CAS_TAS_IPS 39.28 5.38 1.88 35.57 42.99 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 49.96 5.40 1.88 46.25 53.67 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 86.90 13.01 1.88 83.19 90.61 
D\CAS 12.72 1.31 1.88 9.01 16.43 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 29.877 3.94750 2.481 24.986 34.769 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 183.508 31.40983 2.481 178.616 188.399 
CAS_TAS_AAO 29.241 3.77743 2.481 24.350 34.132 
CAS_TAS_IPS 42.682 6.56217 2.481 37.791 47.573 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 56.293 8.10870 2.481 51.402 61.185 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 96.638 12.80901 2.481 91.747 101.529 
D\CAS 17.720 1.75118 2.481 12.829 22.611 




Appendix C  
 XLIV 
Experiment ID = 100 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 






 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 23.58 4.39 2.45 18.75 28.40 
TAS 38.51 9.13 2.45 33.68 43.33 
TAS_DAS 131.78 16.78 2.45 126.95 136.60 
CAS_TAS_AAO 22.67 5.92 2.45 17.85 27.50 
CAS_TAS_IPS 50.10 13.97 2.45 45.27 54.92 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 78.48 13.61 2.45 73.65 83.30 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 126.21 25.13 2.45 121.38 131.03 
D\CAS 15.58 2.82 2.45 10.76 20.41 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 25.99 4.45 2.56 20.94 31.03 
TAS 40.82 9.25 2.56 35.77 45.86 
TAS_DAS 137.71 19.29 2.56 132.66 142.75 
CAS_TAS_AAO 24.28 5.60 2.56 19.24 29.33 
CAS_TAS_IPS 54.41 11.82 2.56 49.36 59.45 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 80.96 13.41 2.56 75.91 86.00 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 131.16 27.20 2.56 126.11 136.20 
D\CAS 16.46 2.36 2.56 11.42 21.51 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 29.10 4.48 2.46 24.25 33.94 
TAS 45.79 9.14 2.46 40.95 50.63 
TAS_DAS 145.73 13.95 2.46 140.89 150.57 
CAS_TAS_AAO 28.06 5.47 2.46 23.22 32.90 
CAS_TAS_IPS 57.24 13.78 2.46 52.39 62.08 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 82.98 11.68 2.46 78.14 87.83 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 137.36 28.06 2.46 132.51 142.20 
D\CAS 20.97 3.05 2.46 16.12 25.81 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
 
Appendix C  
 XLV 
Experiment ID = 250 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 14.29 1.79 0.73 12.86 15.72 
TAS 16.03 1.56 0.73 14.60 17.46 
TAS_DAS 42.37 5.25 0.73 40.93 43.80 
CAS_TAS_AAO 12.38 1.68 0.73 10.95 13.82 
CAS_TAS_IPS 22.69 3.88 0.73 21.26 24.12 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 30.02 3.78 0.73 28.59 31.45 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 46.55 7.75 0.73 45.12 47.99 
D\CAS 9.79 1.22 0.73 8.35 11.22 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 16.77 1.71 0.76 15.27 18.26 
TAS 17.99 1.57 0.76 16.49 19.49 
TAS_DAS 46.27 4.97 0.76 44.77 47.76 
CAS_TAS_AAO 14.07 1.62 0.76 12.57 15.56 
CAS_TAS_IPS 26.26 3.46 0.76 24.76 27.75 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 31.82 4.24 0.76 30.32 33.32 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 51.59 8.59 0.76 50.09 53.08 
D\CAS 10.88 1.32 0.76 9.39 12.38 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 21.40 1.82 0.76 19.90 22.90 
TAS 22.24 1.76 0.76 20.75 23.74 
TAS_DAS 52.61 4.72 0.76 51.12 54.11 
CAS_TAS_AAO 17.08 1.57 0.76 15.59 18.58 
CAS_TAS_IPS 34.08 4.14 0.76 32.58 35.57 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 34.73 4.61 0.76 33.24 36.23 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 59.16 8.23 0.76 57.66 60.66 
D\CAS 13.99 1.03 0.76 12.50 15.49 




Appendix C  
 XLVI 
Experiment ID = 500 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 11.01 0.81 0.38 10.27 11.75 
TAS 11.89 0.61 0.38 11.14 12.63 
TAS_DAS 24.25 2.62 0.38 23.51 24.99 
CAS_TAS_AAO 9.07 0.65 0.38 8.33 9.81 
CAS_TAS_IPS 15.73 1.66 0.38 14.99 16.48 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 17.89 2.13 0.38 17.15 18.63 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 27.25 4.25 0.38 26.51 28.00 
D\CAS 7.97 0.66 0.38 7.22 8.71 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 14.23 1.20 0.43 13.38 15.07 
TAS 13.75 0.63 0.43 12.90 14.60 
TAS_DAS 26.77 2.80 0.43 25.92 27.61 
CAS_TAS_AAO 10.48 0.62 0.43 9.64 11.33 
CAS_TAS_IPS 19.57 1.74 0.43 18.72 20.41 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 19.82 2.39 0.43 18.97 20.67 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 31.88 5.02 0.43 31.04 32.73 
D\CAS 8.94 0.65 0.43 8.09 9.78 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Round Trip Time [Sec] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 19.93 1.25 0.47 19.00 20.86 
TAS 17.81 0.86 0.47 16.88 18.74 
TAS_DAS 31.32 2.48 0.47 30.39 32.25 
CAS_TAS_AAO 13.60 0.72 0.47 12.67 14.53 
CAS_TAS_IPS 27.95 2.47 0.47 27.02 28.88 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 22.56 2.34 0.47 21.63 23.49 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 40.11 5.70 0.47 39.18 41.04 
D\CAS 11.53 0.69 0.47 10.60 12.46 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
 
 




Experiment ID = 100 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 2749 195 241 2273 3225 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 21225 176 241 20750 21701 
CAS_TAS_AAO 10548 1568 241 10072 11024 
CAS_TAS_IPS 2705 210 241 2230 3181 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 18611 1333 241 18135 19087 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 11785 2728 241 11309 12261 
D\CAS 10498 658 241 10022 10974 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 3820 281 238 3352 4289 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 21300 156 238 20831 21768 
CAS_TAS_AAO 11495 1376 238 11027 11963 
CAS_TAS_IPS 3809 218 238 3340 4277 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 19283 1253 238 18815 19751 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 13204 2814 238 12735 13672 
D\CAS 10444 561 238 9975 10912 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 4406 263 251 3911 4900 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 22741 549 251 22246 23236 
CAS_TAS_AAO 14413 1517 251 13918 14908 
CAS_TAS_IPS 4498 343 251 4003 4993 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 20013 1459 251 19518 20508 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 13443 2757 251 12949 13938 
D\CAS 12650 839 251 12156 13145 




Appendix C  
 XLVIII 
Experiment ID = 250 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 2738 114 146 2450 3026 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 21292 92 146 21004 21580 
CAS_TAS_AAO 11385 1098 146 11097 11673 
CAS_TAS_IPS 2765 152 146 2477 3053 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 17210 991 146 16922 17498 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 10687 1447 146 10399 10975 
D\CAS 10695 395 146 10407 10983 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 3796 162 116 3566 4025 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 21418 106 116 21188 21647 
CAS_TAS_AAO 12574 861 116 12344 12803 
CAS_TAS_IPS 3850 187 116 3620 4079 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 18656 608 116 18427 18886 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 12029 1231 116 11800 12259 
D\CAS 11147 383 116 10917 11376 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 4460 169 151 4163 4757 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 22511 284 151 22214 22808 
CAS_TAS_AAO 14672 1141 151 14375 14969 
CAS_TAS_IPS 4399 169 151 4102 4696 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 20242 668 151 19945 20539 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 12703 1625 151 12406 13000 
D\CAS 12658 486 151 12361 12955 




Appendix C  
 XLIX 
Experiment ID = 500 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 2622 67 122 2381 2862 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 17660 1284 122 17419 17900 
CAS_TAS_AAO 12270 608 122 12030 12510 
CAS_TAS_IPS 3503 408 122 3263 3743 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 14135 621 122 13895 14375 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 6047 704 122 5807 6287 
D\CAS 11328 218 122 11088 11569 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 3787 73 100 3589 3985 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 20039 462 100 19841 20237 
CAS_TAS_AAO 14675 942 100 14477 14873 
CAS_TAS_IPS 4742 491 100 4544 4940 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 18373 464 100 18175 18571 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 7370 698 100 7172 7568 
D\CAS 12929 264 100 12730 13127 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 4348 106 125 4101 4595 
TAS NA NA NA NA NA 
TAS_DAS 22272 367 125 22025 22519 
CAS_TAS_AAO 15580 1387 125 15333 15827 
CAS_TAS_IPS 5466 609 125 5219 5713 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 20920 479 125 20673 21167 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 8576 714 125 8329 8823 
D\CAS 15000 335 125 14753 15247 




Appendix C  
 L 
Experiment ID = 100 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 2605 108 163 2284 2926 
TAS 13971 1058 163 13650 14292 
TAS_DAS 17387 785 163 17066 17708 
CAS_TAS_AAO 12736 973 163 12415 13057 
CAS_TAS_IPS 4392 903 163 4071 4713 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 15904 897 163 15582 16225 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 8327 1364 163 8006 8649 
D\CAS 10766 447 163 10445 11087 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 3782 127 168 3451 4113 
TAS 18437 1087 168 18106 18768 
TAS_DAS 20028 667 168 19696 20359 
CAS_TAS_AAO 16118 1013 168 15786 16449 
CAS_TAS_IPS 6087 924 168 5755 6418 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 18455 906 168 18124 18786 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 9815 1503 168 9483 10146 
D\CAS 11286 431 168 10955 11617 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 4393 130 186 4026 4759 
TAS 21021 1113 186 20654 21387 
TAS_DAS 22193 552 186 21827 22559 
CAS_TAS_AAO 18240 1135 186 17873 18606 
CAS_TAS_IPS 6918 1186 186 6552 7284 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 20346 968 186 19979 20712 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 10931 1661 186 10565 11298 
D\CAS 12808 590 186 12442 13175 






Appendix C  
 LI 
Experiment ID = 250 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 2359 47 66 2230 2489 
TAS 12492 191 66 12362 12622 
TAS_DAS 13519 254 66 13389 13649 
CAS_TAS_AAO 12374 567 66 12244 12503 
CAS_TAS_IPS 2917 243 66 2787 3047 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 13343 560 66 13213 13473 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 4168 422 66 4038 4297 
D\CAS 11470 255 66 11341 11600 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 3564 55 68 3429 3699 
TAS 17901 264 68 17766 18036 
TAS_DAS 18404 194 68 18270 18539 
CAS_TAS_AAO 18069 559 68 17934 18204 
CAS_TAS_IPS 4336 259 68 4201 4471 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 18611 573 68 18477 18746 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 5622 484 68 5488 5757 
D\CAS 13480 268 68 13345 13614 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 4275 72 70 4137 4414 
TAS 20979 277 70 20841 21118 
TAS_DAS 21298 254 70 21159 21436 
CAS_TAS_AAO 21086 530 70 20947 21224 
CAS_TAS_IPS 5497 370 70 5359 5636 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 21495 521 70 21357 21634 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 6696 496 70 6558 6835 
D\CAS 15842 324 70 15703 15980 




Appendix C  
 LII 
Experiment ID = 500 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 2278 22 62 2156 2400 
TAS 12262 97 62 12140 12384 
TAS_DAS 12759 121 62 12636 12881 
CAS_TAS_AAO 12161 607 62 12039 12283 
CAS_TAS_IPS 2579 96 62 2457 2701 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 12647 634 62 12525 12769 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 3184 225 62 3062 3307 
D\CAS 11905 259 62 11783 12027 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable :Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 3508 42 59 3391 3625 
TAS 17877 145 59 17760 17994 
TAS_DAS 18098 96 59 17981 18215 
CAS_TAS_AAO 18393 577 59 18276 18510 
CAS_TAS_IPS 3945 141 59 3828 4062 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 18687 593 59 18570 18804 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 4563 289 59 4446 4680 
D\CAS 14307 158 59 14190 14424 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Communication Overhead [Bytes] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 4285 53 56 4175 4395 
TAS 20824 217 56 20714 20934 
TAS_DAS 21057 156 56 20947 21167 
CAS_TAS_AAO 21638 453 56 21528 21748 
CAS_TAS_IPS 5090 209 56 4979 5200 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 21810 505 56 21700 21920 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 5721 365 56 5611 5831 
D\CAS 16852 194 56 16742 16962 




Appendix C  
 LIII 
Failure Frequency  
Experiment ID = 100 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 1.03 0.11 0.02 0.99 1.06 
TAS 1.17 0.09 0.02 1.14 1.21 
TAS_DAS 0.97 0.10 0.02 0.93 1.01 
CAS_TAS_AAO 1.00 0.09 0.02 0.96 1.04 
CAS_TAS_IPS 1.01 0.11 0.02 0.97 1.05 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.78 0.11 0.02 0.74 0.82 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.87 0.10 0.02 0.83 0.91 
D\CAS 0.68 0.12 0.02 0.65 0.72 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 1.06 0.12 0.02 1.02 1.10 
TAS 1.17 0.09 0.02 1.14 1.21 
TAS_DAS 0.98 0.09 0.02 0.94 1.02 
CAS_TAS_AAO 1.00 0.09 0.02 0.96 1.03 
CAS_TAS_IPS 1.02 0.09 0.02 0.98 1.06 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.78 0.11 0.02 0.75 0.82 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.90 0.09 0.02 0.87 0.94 
D\CAS 0.69 0.13 0.02 0.65 0.72 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 1.05 0.11 0.02 1.01 1.08 
TAS 1.17 0.09 0.02 1.14 1.21 
TAS_DAS 1.02 0.10 0.02 0.98 1.06 
CAS_TAS_AAO 1.03 0.09 0.02 0.99 1.07 
CAS_TAS_IPS 1.03 0.09 0.02 0.99 1.06 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.87 0.08 0.02 0.83 0.90 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.90 0.09 0.02 0.87 0.94 
D\CAS 0.82 0.14 0.02 0.79 0.86 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 3WP 
 
 
Appendix C  
 LIV 
Experiment ID = 250 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 1.03 0.05 0.01 1.00 1.06 
TAS 1.22 0.06 0.01 1.20 1.24 
TAS_DAS 0.99 0.07 0.01 0.96 1.01 
CAS_TAS_AAO 1.02 0.07 0.01 0.99 1.04 
CAS_TAS_IPS 1.01 0.07 0.01 0.99 1.04 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.72 0.10 0.01 0.69 0.75 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.78 0.08 0.01 0.75 0.81 
D\CAS 0.62 0.08 0.01 0.59 0.65 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 1.06 0.07 0.01 1.04 1.09 
TAS 1.22 0.06 0.01 1.20 1.24 
TAS_DAS 1.00 0.07 0.01 0.97 1.02 
CAS_TAS_AAO 1.03 0.07 0.01 1.00 1.05 
CAS_TAS_IPS 1.03 0.07 0.01 1.00 1.06 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.70 0.07 0.01 0.67 0.72 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.80 0.07 0.01 0.77 0.83 
D\CAS 0.62 0.08 0.01 0.59 0.65 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 1.07 0.06 0.01 1.05 1.10 
TAS 1.22 0.06 0.01 1.20 1.24 
TAS_DAS 1.05 0.06 0.01 1.02 1.08 
CAS_TAS_AAO 1.04 0.07 0.01 1.02 1.07 
CAS_TAS_IPS 1.04 0.08 0.01 1.02 1.07 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.80 0.08 0.01 0.78 0.83 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.83 0.06 0.01 0.80 0.85 
D\CAS 0.75 0.09 0.01 0.73 0.78 




Appendix C  
 LV 
Experiment ID = 500 Nodes (The “Churn” Scenario) 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.91 0.08 0.01 0.89 0.94 
TAS 1.23 0.05 0.01 1.21 1.25 
TAS_DAS 0.87 0.05 0.01 0.84 0.89 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.92 0.08 0.01 0.90 0.95 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.93 0.07 0.01 0.90 0.95 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.62 0.07 0.01 0.59 0.64 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.73 0.07 0.01 0.70 0.75 
D\CAS 0.54 0.07 0.01 0.52 0.57 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.96 0.10 0.01 0.94 0.99 
TAS 1.23 0.05 0.01 1.21 1.25 
TAS_DAS 0.86 0.05 0.01 0.83 0.89 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.93 0.07 0.01 0.90 0.95 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.94 0.07 0.01 0.91 0.97 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.63 0.08 0.01 0.60 0.65 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.74 0.05 0.01 0.71 0.76 
D\CAS 0.53 0.07 0.01 0.51 0.56 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (Ch), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.97 0.09 0.01 0.94 1.00 
TAS 1.23 0.05 0.01 1.21 1.25 
TAS_DAS 0.94 0.05 0.01 0.91 0.96 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.97 0.09 0.01 0.95 1.00 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.95 0.07 0.01 0.92 0.97 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.68 0.06 0.01 0.65 0.70 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.76 0.06 0.01 0.73 0.79 
D\CAS 0.64 0.08 0.01 0.61 0.67 






Appendix C  
 LVI 
Experiment ID = 100 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.82 0.16 0.02 0.77 0.86 
TAS 1.01 0.09 0.02 0.97 1.06 
TAS_DAS 0.75 0.12 0.02 0.71 0.80 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.80 0.11 0.02 0.75 0.84 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.80 0.12 0.02 0.75 0.84 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.59 0.13 0.02 0.55 0.64 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.67 0.10 0.02 0.62 0.71 
D\CAS 0.52 0.13 0.02 0.47 0.56 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.82 0.16 0.02 0.78 0.86 
TAS 1.02 0.09 0.02 0.98 1.06 
TAS_DAS 0.75 0.11 0.02 0.71 0.79 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.80 0.11 0.02 0.76 0.84 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.80 0.12 0.02 0.76 0.84 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.60 0.12 0.02 0.56 0.64 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.67 0.10 0.02 0.62 0.71 
D\CAS 0.52 0.13 0.02 0.48 0.56 
 a. Experiment ID = 100 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.83 0.16 0.02 0.78 0.87 
TAS 1.02 0.09 0.02 0.97 1.06 
TAS_DAS 0.78 0.09 0.02 0.73 0.82 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.81 0.11 0.02 0.76 0.85 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.80 0.11 0.02 0.76 0.84 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.61 0.10 0.02 0.57 0.65 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.68 0.10 0.02 0.64 0.72 
D\CAS 0.58 0.13 0.02 0.54 0.62 




Appendix C  
 LVII 
Experiment ID = 250 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 





 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.77 0.09 0.02 0.67 0.74 
TAS 0.97 0.10 0.02 0.93 1.00 
TAS_DAS 0.74 0.11 0.02 0.70 0.77 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.74 0.11 0.02 0.71 0.78 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.79 0.11 0.02 0.75 0.82 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.57 0.11 0.02 0.53 0.61 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.66 0.11 0.02 0.62 0.69 
D\CAS 0.53 0.10 0.02 0.50 0.57 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 





 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.71 0.10 0.02 0.67 0.74 
TAS 0.96 0.10 0.02 0.93 1.00 
TAS_DAS 0.74 0.11 0.02 0.70 0.77 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.74 0.10 0.02 0.70 0.77 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.79 0.11 0.02 0.75 0.83 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.57 0.10 0.02 0.53 0.60 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.65 0.10 0.02 0.62 0.69 
D\CAS 0.54 0.09 0.02 0.51 0.58 
 a. Experiment ID = 250 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.69 0.10 0.02 0.65 0.72 
TAS 0.96 0.09 0.02 0.93 1.00 
TAS_DAS 0.75 0.11 0.02 0.72 0.79 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.75 0.09 0.02 0.71 0.78 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.77 0.10 0.02 0.74 0.81 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.59 0.10 0.02 0.55 0.62 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.66 0.10 0.02 0.62 0.69 
D\CAS 0.58 0.10 0.02 0.55 0.62 




Appendix C  
 LVIII 
Experiment ID = 500 Nodes (The “No-Churn” Scenario) 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.75 0.10 0.02 0.71 0.79 
TAS 0.96 0.09 0.02 0.92 1.00 
TAS_DAS 0.70 0.10 0.02 0.67 0.74 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.76 0.12 0.02 0.72 0.80 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.81 0.14 0.02 0.77 0.85 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.56 0.12 0.02 0.52 0.60 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.63 0.10 0.02 0.59 0.67 
D\CAS 0.49 0.11 0.02 0.45 0.53 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 1WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.73 0.08 0.02 0.69 0.77 
TAS 0.95 0.10 0.02 0.91 0.99 
TAS_DAS 0.70 0.08 0.02 0.66 0.74 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.75 0.12 0.02 0.72 0.79 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.82 0.13 0.02 0.78 0.85 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.55 0.10 0.02 0.51 0.59 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.65 0.11 0.02 0.61 0.69 
D\CAS 0.50 0.10 0.02 0.46 0.54 
 a. Experiment ID = 500 (NoCh), Authentication Protocol = 2WP 
 




 Dependent Variable: Failure Frequency [Node/min] 
Server Architecture Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CAS 0.65 0.08 0.02 0.62 0.69 
TAS 0.94 0.09 0.02 0.91 0.98 
TAS_DAS 0.72 0.09 0.02 0.68 0.75 
CAS_TAS_AAO 0.75 0.12 0.02 0.71 0.78 
CAS_TAS_IPS 0.80 0.12 0.02 0.77 0.84 
CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 0.57 0.10 0.02 0.54 0.60 
CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 0.64 0.09 0.02 0.60 0.67 
D\CAS 0.53 0.09 0.02 0.50 0.56 
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1WP_CAS 30.83 21.93 16.42 26.55 32.48 31.52 26.62 
2WP_CAS 32.35 23.09 19.07 40.03 37.73 36.06 31.39 
3WP_CAS 32.94 25.71 23.48 34.25 39.45 35.12 31.82 
1WP_TAS 35.91 20.98 14.25 NA NA NA 23.72 
2WP_TAS 36.18 21.14 14.76 NA NA NA 24.03 
3WP_TAS 37.01 22.61 16.93 NA NA NA 25.51 
1WP_TAS_DAS 106.62 75.96 53.69 20.63 27.54 103.58 64.67 
2WP_TAS_DAS 103.75 77.63 54.55 20.36 30.30 102.80 64.90 
3WP_TAS_DAS 102.16 80.24 55.69 22.48 26.41 79.32 61.05 
1WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 30.67 19.77 13.89 22.36 29.00 31.31 24.50 
2WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 31.01 20.47 14.27 20.59 30.15 31.67 24.69 
3WP_CAS_TAS_AAO 31.94 20.99 15.27 43.42 39.84 34.87 31.05 
1WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 78.88 48.54 36.45 28.40 34.84 61.96 48.18 
2WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 82.74 51.33 39.45 42.46 39.55 61.76 52.88 
3WP_CAS_TAS_IPS 82.37 58.12 47.85 39.60 38.54 61.94 54.74 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 97.24 63.71 45.48 108.56 104.78 81.96 83.62 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 97.94 63.73 46.35 108.54 104.55 81.84 83.83 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_AAO 96.41 63.41 45.91 101.21 103.49 83.43 82.31 
1WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 170.44 108.36 78.06 200.85 198.68 147.85 150.71 
2WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 171.90 111.37 80.23 202.61 199.87 149.59 152.59 
3WP_CAS_TAS_DAS_IPS 172.65 114.32 84.74 198.03 197.49 152.59 153.30 
1WP_D/CAS 24.42 16.33 12.46 27.25 26.40 20.15 21.17 
2WP_D/CAS 24.61 16.49 12.26 26.46 26.25 19.89 20.99 
3WP_D/CAS 27.06 18.23 13.37 37.08 34.48 24.90 25.85 
 
 
